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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I investigate operational issues in the context of online social net-
works and digital economy. The first essay analyzes the phenomenon of open technology
in the context of resource allocation. In this study, based on evidence from prior literature
and current business practices, I develop optimal control models to determine the optimal
extent of technology openness and firm’s effort levels for maintaining an existing technology
and developing a newer version of the technology. I derive and discuss important insights
and shed light on the business practices of major technology firms. In the second essay, I
develop a data-driven prescriptive framework for conducting an influencer marketing cam-
paign on online social networks. Influencer marketing involves hiring influencers to promote
products on behalf of a firm. The effectiveness of an influencer marketing campaign depends
on choosing the right set of influencers for seeding and scheduling of ads on social media
platforms. I first develop an optimization model to select influencers and then propose a
model to schedule their posts on social media. Next, I develop a polynomial time heuristic
that provides a near-optimal solution for selecting influencers. Next, using actual data from
a popular social network, I demonstrate the superior performance of our selection model
against current industry practices. Finally, the third essay empirically analyzes the effects
of social media content created by influencers on audience engagement. In particular, I fo-
cus on the tone of an influencer’s content, an important emotional facet that plays a vital
role in determining whether an audience engages with the content. Our results demonstrate
that the tone of social media content affects the engagement levels of an influencer with the
audience. In addition, the findings from this study establish the moderating role of an influ-
encer’s popularity and the tone of related brands on the relationship between an influencer’s
tone and engagement. The results of these essays provide prescriptive solutions that are easy
to implement and several important managerial insights.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The rapid digitization of businesses presents several new challenges, yet, research in this
literature stream is scarce. In this dissertation, I specifically focus on online social networking
platforms such as Twitter and GitHub that have enabled firms to access massive social
networks and directly interact with the users in these networks, thereby transforming how
firms operate their businesses. My dissertation, through three essays, studies how firms can
effectively utilize social networks to manage technology development, improve their service
and marketing operations, and attract customers to their products and services.
In the first essay, we analytically examine the phenomenon of open innovation in the
context of resource allocation between maintaining an existing technology and developing a
newer version of the technology. Open innovation is an approach where firms open-up their
technology to its customers, suppliers, and competitors and rely on them to spur innovation.
We develop an optimal control model to determine the optimal extent of technology openness
and effort levels. In our analysis, we consider various factors including: (i) the characteristics
of the market (e.g., valuation of the technology, market competitiveness, network effects, and
market expectations from the next version of the technology), (ii) the characteristics of the
technology firm (e.g., costs for developing technology and maintaining existing technology),
and (iii) the effects of making the technology fully or partially open source on the current
and next versions of the technology. Based on the results, we derive and discuss several
important insights and shed light into the business practices of different technology firms.
Some of our key findings include: (i) the firm might keep its technology proprietary even
in conditions that seem to favor an open source environment, and (ii) if the technology
becomes more valuable, the technology firm might decide to decrease the level of effort for
fixing defects but rely more on the open source technology community. Finally, we derive
several managerially relevant insights and explain possible rationale on current business
practices of major technology firms.
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Explosive growth in the number of users on various social media platforms has trans-
formed the way firms strategize their marketing activities. To take advantage of the vast size
of social networks, firms have now turned their attention to influencer marketing. Influencer
marketing strategy involves seeding (sending) ads through opinion leaders or influencers to
promote a firm’s products to an online audience. The effectiveness of an influencer marketing
campaign depends on choosing the right set of influencers and scheduling of ads to be posted
by influencers. While the topic of scheduling of ads in other mediums such as television,
internet, and mobile has been extensively studied in the management sciences literature, the
problem of scheduling of ads in social networks has not been rigorously studied in the litera-
ture. In this paper, we develop a data-driven framework to help a firm successfully conduct
an influencer marketing campaign. We decompose the problem into two phases: (i) selection
of influencers, and (ii) scheduling of influencers’ ads. For the first phase, we develop an
optimization model to select influencers for an ad campaign. We validate the assumptions
that we make in the model for the first phase by conducting an empirical analysis using
real data from Twitter. We then present structural properties for our model. Using these
properties, we develop a polynomial time heuristic to provide near-optimal solutions to the
problem of selecting influencers. For the second phase, we present a model to help firms with
scheduling of ads to be posted by influencers (selected in the first phase) over a planning
horizon in order to maximize the effectiveness of the campaign. Finally, using the results
from extensive numerical experiments, we develop and present several managerially relevant
insights to improve marketing operations of a firm.
In the third essay, I empirically analyze the operational effects of social media content
created by influencers on audience engagement. Influencers or human brands in fields ranging
from sports to art to politics use social media platforms to connect and engage with their
audience. We analyze the effects of content generated by human brands (referred to as human
generated content) in the popular social media platform, Twitter, on audience engagement.
The first objective of this study is to examine the effect of tone (positive versus negative) of
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human generated content on the social media engagement measured by number of retweets.
Next, we investigate the role of popularity of human brand on engagement. Furthermore,
as human brands are often associated with a group, our third objective is to investigate
the spillover effects of the content generated by human brands. In particular, we empirically
examine if the content of brands associated with a focal human brand affects the engagement
of the focal human brand. Set in the context of Indian general election 2014, our analysis
based on a mixed effects model that accounts for user and group level heterogeneity reveals
that the tone of social media content created by human brands significantly affects audience
engagement. Specifically, we find that the main effect of negative toned content on social
media engagement is significantly positive. In contrast, we find that the effect of positive
toned content on engagement is greater only for popular candidates. Furthermore, our results
also suggest that the popularity of human brand and the tone of related brands moderate
the relationship between negative tone content and engagement. We supplement our core
results with additional analyses that include alternative model specifications, estimation
strategies, engagement metrics, and models that account for selection bias. Finally, we
present implications of this study to practice as well as the literature on social media content.
In summary, my dissertation, which is motivated by current business practices, makes
several theoretical and managerial contributions. I utilize various methodological approaches
including optimal control theory, combinatorial optimization, and empirical modeling to
generate actionable insights for firms and provide prescriptive solutions for problems that
have emerged with the digitization of businesses.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. The first essay of my dissertation
is presented in Chapter 2 of the dissertation whereas essays two and three are presented in
Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. Formal proofs and additional analyses are presented in the
Appendix.
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2. ESSAY 1: HOW MUCH TO OPEN, HOW FAST TO FIX AND DEVELOP? –
IMPACTS OF TECHNOLOGY OPENNESS
2.1 Introduction
Firms are increasingly opening their proprietary technologies to accelerate innovation
through both internal and external resources such as suppliers, customers, and competitors
(Terwiesch and Xu 2008). The approach of opening up proprietary technologies to external
resources and relying on them is often referred to as open innovation. Dominant technology
firms have taken initiatives to make a portion of their technology open, and open innovation
has become a key part of their strategies to provide more robust and secure products and ser-
vices (e.g., Microsoft 2014; Apple 2015). Although open technology is widely popular in the
software industry, firms from other industries such as automobile (e.g., Toyota and Tesla),
aerospace (e.g., Airbus), and 3-D printing (e.g., MakerBot) have also embraced strategies
that relate to open sourcing or open technology. In this study, we refer to technology as
the design of a tangible (e.g., batteries and pharmaceutical drugs) or an intangible product
(e.g., software and services).
Open technology has several advantages including (i) higher demand for the product
because of network effects, (ii) faster improvement in quality, and (iii) lower costs related
to maintenance of the current technology (i.e., fixing defects and perfecting the current
technology) and development (i.e., upgrading the current technology or innovation of new
technology) (Lerner and Tirole 2002; West 2003). On the other hand, opening the tech-
nology may increase market competition (the market competition refers to the ability of
competitors in copying unique features of the technology) and the costs required to man-
age the collaboration between the firm and the external resources. Consequently, managing
open innovation presents new operational challenges concerning managing a firm’s internal
resources (Lerner and Tirole 2002; West 2003). Against this background, in this essay (or
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hereafter also referred to as the paper), we seek to analyze the effects of technology openness
on the optimal behavior of a technology firm (hereafter also referred to as simply the firm).
In today’s markets, adding features to existing technologies and innovating new technolo-
gies to have reliable and up-to-date products are vital for firms to remain competitive by
making their products or technologies more relevant to the ever-changing customer or busi-
ness needs. An industry study by PricewaterhouseCoopers reports that major technology
firms have increased their spending on research and development to innovate and develop
new technologies or products (PWC 2017). However, several products are released into the
market with defects (although not intentionally). In particular, defects are often identified
by the external or internal resources after the product is rolled out into the market. For
example, customers of Tesla cars often report problems that include broken door handles, or
internal computer systems crashing (Matousek 2018). In software products alone, the detri-
mental effects of defects on the global economy is estimated to be more than $312 billion
(Cambridge University 2013). Consequently, several technology firms, including Microsoft
and Tesla, have announced intentions to improve the quality of their products continually
even after the release by becoming more efficient and effective in fixing defects. Hence, it is
necessary for the technology firms to “continually” fix defects in their technologies after they
release their products (Arora et al. 2010) while developing new technologies. Therefore, firms
need to optimally allocate their resources between innovating or developing new technologies
and maintaining existing technologies.
Paulson et al. (2004) argue that open technology is more creative, better in quality, easier
and cheaper to develop, and defects are identified and fixed faster. The following statements
ratify this argument from the perspective of large technology firms:
“The first generation hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, launched between 2015 and 2020, will be
critical, requiring a concerted effort and unconventional collaboration between automakers,
government regulators, academia and energy providers. By eliminating traditional corporate
boundaries, we can speed the development of new technologies and move into the future of
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mobility more quickly, effectively and economically.” – (Toyota 2015).
“Apple believes that using Open Source methodology makes Mac OS X a more robust,
secure operating system, as its core components have been subjected to the crucible of peer
review for decades. Any problems found with this software can be immediately identified and
fixed by Apple and the Open Source community.” – (Apple 2015).
While there is unanimity in the literature that making a technology open source reduces
the time to find and fix defects (Arora et al. 2010) and accelerates innovation of newer
technologies (Toyota 2015), its effect on the behavior of a technology firm (regarding the
maintenance of current version and development of newer version) has not received enough
attention (Schryen and Kadura 2009). Our study aims to fill this gap in the literature. In
particular, we develop an optimal control model to determine: (i) the allocation of efforts
between maintenance of current version and development of the next version of technology,
and (ii) the extent of openness of its technology. In the next subsection, we discuss our key
findings and contributions.
2.1.1 Contributions and Key Findings
Our study contributes to the open technology and resource allocation literature by ex-
amining the impact of open technology on the firm’s maintenance and development efforts.
With several technology firms opening up their technologies to external resources (whom
we refer to as members of open source community, which may include suppliers, customers,
and competitors), determining the optimal level of openness along with optimal effort levels
is not only a relevant issue to literature that seeks to broaden the knowledge and theory
of open innovation but also to industry. Our analysis provides critical insights to the firms
by helping them decide the best strategy in determining the effort levels and the extent of
technology openness. Furthermore, we use our analysis to explain real-world decisions of
major technology firms such as Tesla, Microsoft, Apple, and IBM. Traditionally, technology
openness has been examined in the literature as a binary variable (i.e., fully open source
or proprietary), whereas we allow it to be a continuous variable between 0 and 1 (i.e., the
6
firm may partially open the technology, which is more prevalent in the industry). In the
remainder of this subsection, we highlight the key questions that are answered in this study.
To gain a deeper understanding of firms’ open source strategy, the first key question that
we analyze is: When should the firm keep its technology proprietary, or make it partially or
fully open? More specifically, we examine how various key factors (i.e., the characteristics of
the market, firm, and technology) affect the optimal choice of the technology firm regarding
openness. We find that the firm might keep its technology proprietary even in conditions
that seem to favor an open source environment. For example, as the network effect due to
technology openness (more specifically, demand sensitivity of the next version to openness)
increases, we should expect the firm to increase the extent of openness to drive more demand
for the technology. However, our analysis reveals that this is not always the case.
Further, we ask the following question: Should the firm increase its effort of fixing defects
if the technology becomes more valuable? We find that the answer to this question is not
necessarily “yes.” Under certain conditions, as the technology becomes more valuable, the
firm should focus on increasing the extent of openness and rely on the open source community
(i.e., external resources) in fixing defects. Therefore, firms should carefully manage their
resources in response to changing market conditions.
Next, we analyze the following question: should the firm increase the extent of openness
if the effectiveness of the open source community in developing the next version increases?
The firm’s decision in this scenario should depend on the trade-offs between the effectiveness
and the collaboration cost. Intuitively, the firm should reduce the extent of openness as the
collaboration cost between the firm and the open source community increases, in order to
reduce additional costs. However, contrary to this intuition, our analysis reveals that the
firm should sometimes increase the extent of openness despite higher collaboration costs. In
fact, we find that the firm should sometimes switch to making the technology fully open
source (from keeping it proprietary or partially open) as the collaboration cost increases.
In addition, we investigate other important business settings. For example, in some set-
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tings, the market might have a pre-determined quality requirement for the next version.
Hence, we also examine such a setting in which the market has a minimum quality require-
ment for the next version of the technology. Although we mainly focus on an environment
where the firm has sufficient resources required for the maintenance of the existing technol-
ogy and the development of the next version, for completeness, we also analyze the scenario
when the firm has a limited budget. In the next subsection, we briefly review the relevant
literature, and highlight our contributions with respect to past studies.
2.1.2 Related Literature
Our work closely relates to the following two literature streams: (i) open innovation,
and (ii) resource allocation. Here, we briefly discuss related studies in these streams and
highlight our contributions with respect to those studies.
2.1.2.1 Open Innovation
The gradual increase in the number of firms making their technologies open source has
raised challenging questions and a need for new models and theories to address these concerns
(von Hippel and von Krogh 2003). Prior literature in this stream mainly focuses on the (i)
motivations of users and contributors in participating in the development and maintenance
of open source technology (e.g., Bonaccorsi and Rossi 2003), (ii) market competition between
open source technology and proprietary technology (e.g., Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat
2006), or (iii) management of open source community (e.g., von Krogh and von Hippel 2006).
In a more recent study, Hu et al. (2017) study the impact of competing firms’ open technology
strategy. They find that opening their technology can promote higher supplier investments.
However, Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2006) call for research that explicitly examines
the impact of technology openness on firm’s effort levels. Our study responds to this call
and contributes to this stream of literature by analytically analyzing the optimal extent of
technology openness and its impact on firm’s effort levels.
Open technology literature suggests that there is substantial tension between the two op-
8
posing strategies of keeping technology proprietary versus making it open. On the one hand,
proponents argue that open technology will replace proprietary technology as the predomi-
nant mode of product development. For example, West (2003) argues that firms adopt open
source methodology because of higher adoption rates and better network effects. Higher
technology adoption rates, in turn, may attract more skilled resources and help the firm
achieve higher levels of efficiency and effectiveness in development and maintenance (Lerner
and Tirole 2002). On the other hand, opponents of the open source methodology agree with
the following argument of Levy (2000): “Sure, the code is available. But is anyone reading
it?” Researchers have analyzed this question by empirically examining whether the open
source community is responsive in identifying and fixing defects, or whether defects are found
and fixed faster in open source environments in software industry (e.g., see Paulson et al.
2004; Arora et al. 2010). Findings from these studies demonstrate that defects are identified
and fixed faster in when the technology is open source compared to proprietary technology.
To further validate some of the assumptions in our analytical model, we also supplement the
past studies in this stream by empirically studying the impact of openness on the time it
takes to fix defects.
Although it is clear that there are several advantages of making a technology open source,
firms need to be aware of the costs associated with coordination between open source commu-
nity and the firm’s internal resources (West 2003), and the loss in competitive edge (Lerner
and Tirole 2002). In order to balance this tension, firms have adopted a hybrid strategy in
which they open a part of their proprietary technology to derive the benefits of open source
technology, while minimizing the costs associated with it and maintaining their competitive
edge (e.g., see Microsoft 2014). Besides, several past studies have recognized the need to ex-
amine hybrid technology development forms that combine the strengths of both open source
and proprietary development (Mockus et al. 2000; Bonaccorsi and Rossi 2003). Our study
builds on the findings of the open innovation literature and complements the literature by
analytically modeling the impact of openness on the firm’s operational strategies.
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2.1.2.2 Resource Allocation
Our paper is also related to the literature on managing resources in maintaining existing
technologies and developing new technologies. The operational issues related to technology
development and maintenance has been studied extensively in both operations and infor-
mation systems literature. The technology development literature examines the frequency
and the timing of various activities involved in the “technology development stage.” In the
closest study to ours, Ji et al. (2005) formulate an optimal control model to study the prob-
lem of allocation of resources between new software construction and fixing defects before
the software is released into the market. Their results suggest that integrating the decisions
pertaining these activities leads to significant savings.
The technology maintenance literature mainly deals with finding optimal policies to min-
imize the overall cost of maintenance of existing technology (Kulkarni et al. 2009). This lit-
erature has its roots in the traditional machine maintenance literature. Furthermore, Lientz
et al. (1978) argue that the maintenance of the software (i.e. fixing of software defects and
bugs) along with development of new features take a high share of the total budget after the
software is released. In the closest study to ours in this area, Kulkarni et al. (2009) examine
the problem of optimal allocation of resources for technology (i.e., software) maintenance re-
quests from the customer using variations of M |G|1 queues. In addition, Repenning (2001)
examines the allocation of resources for fixing problems during the product development
stage. Ji et al. (2011) complement the earlier studies in this stream by simultaneously ex-
amining the initial number of features in a technology and the enhancement effort after the
technology is released. However, unlike our study, they do not consider the effects of making
the technology fully or partially open.
In contrast to the above studies, to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to
find the optimal level of technology openness and investigate how it impacts the firm’s be-
havior in allocating resources for maintenance (for the current version) and development of
the next version of technology, an important managerial challenge in the presence of limited
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resources. In particular, we focus on the notion of technology openness that is not considered
in Ji et al. (2011) together with fixing/maintenance and development efforts. In the next
section, we present our analytical model.
2.2 Analytical Model
We consider a typical technology firm who releases a product (referred to as the “current
version”) and provides support for it (i.e., by fixing defects or maintaining the technology)
while simultaneously working on developing a new version of this product (referred to as the
“next version”). In the next subsection, we begin with discussing the business setting along
with the objective function of the technology firm.
2.2.1 Objective Function
Even though several open source technology products (specifically in software industry)
are offered for free to customers, technology firms employ different business models to gen-
erate revenue from them (e.g., see Lerner and Tirole 2002; Fitzgerald 2006). For example,
Mozilla’s Firefox is a free and open source software, and yet the revenues of Firefox were
more than $300 million in 2013 (Mozilla 2013). Further, technology firms often generate
value by providing complementary services or products to the open source systems (Lerner
and Tirole 2002). In addition, there are products that are open source but not free (e.g.,
any software licensed under NASA Open Source Agreement) (Gnu.org 2012). We would like
to emphasize that our focus in this paper is not on the revenue models, instead it is on the
overall profit of the technology firm based upon the demand for the technology irrespective
of being offered for free or not.
In the remainder of this subsection, we discuss the following components of the firm’s
objective function: (i) demand for current version of the technology, (ii) demand for the next
version, (iii) costs associated with the effort (both maintenance and development), and (iv)
costs related to collaboration with the open source community.
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2.2.1.1 Demand for the Current Version of the Technology
Quality is a complex and multi-faceted concept that can be interpreted from different
perspectives (Garvin 1984). Similarly, the definition of product quality is also ambiguous
and there is no single metric to quantify the quality of product that is acceptable to everyone
(Kitchenham and Pfleeger 1996). One realistic and universally accepted metric for measur-
ing quality of a technology is the number of defects (Fenton and Neil 1999). Therefore,
as the number of defects decreases, the quality of the technology improves. Fixing defects
improves the quality of the current version (that we denote by q(t)), which in turn, increases
the demand from the customers. Further, fixing defects also helps in improving customers’
goodwill that translates into higher demand for the current version of the technology.
In addition, literature in open technology suggests that firms open their technology to
get their products widely adopted (Lerner and Tirole 2002; West 2003). In software in-
dustry, open source technology also attracts skilled users such as engineers and developers
as it provides them the opportunity to modify the code and work with other developers
(Dahlander and Magnusson 2005). Besides, Hu et al. (2017) show that by making their
technologies open, firms can induce higher supplier investments, which could in turn lead
to wider adoption of the technology. Therefore, as the firm makes a higher portion of its
technology open source, more users (i.e., customers) and suppliers become interested in the
technology so that the demand for the current version increases. Hence, in line with the prior
literature, we model the demand as a function of extent of openness “s.” Here, s can also be
considered the portion of the technology that is open. Unlike most of the past literature that
considers the technology to be either fully open (i.e., s = 1) or fully closed or proprietary
(i.e., s = 0), in line with current industry practices, we also acknowledge that the technology
can be partially open (i.e., 0 < s < 1).
To summarize, the demand for the current version of the technology (denoted by Dq(t))
primarily depends on: (i) the quality of the technology q(t) (extent of this dependence is
controlled with the sensitivity parameter, θ1), and (ii) the extent of openness s (extent of
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this dependence is controlled with the sensitivity parameter, θ2). In particular, we model
the demand for the existing version of the technology at time t as follows: Dq(t) = θ0 +
θ1q(t) + θ2s. If the customers are highly sensitive (resp., not highly sensitive) to the quality
of the technology, then θ1 is high (resp., low). On the other hand, as Lerner and Tirole (2002)
argue, the rate of diffusion of an open source technology depends on the characteristics of the
product (such as complexity of the technology) and the market (such as sophistication of its
end users). Hence, we capture the extent of demand sensitivity to openness with parameter
θ2. Clearly, we can set θ2 to 0 when there is no impact of openness on the demand of the
existing technology.
One of the objectives of the firm is to increase the sales of the current version throughout
the planning horizon that is expressed as
∫ T
0
kDq(t)dt. We consider a continuous model,
where T is the time between the release of the current version and the next version, and k is
the value per unit of demand of the current version. Thus, the value of the current version
to the firm is ongoing and dynamic, i.e., it is not realized only at the end of the project. By
using such a model, we are able to analyze the dynamics of variables such as the effort levels
and the quality levels of both versions of the technology throughout the planning horizon.
Since the decision to release the technology is generally pre-determined based on external
factors such as market characteristics, business plans of the competitors, and contractual
obligations between the firm and the customer (Ji et al. 2005), we consider the release time
of the next version (i.e., T ) to be exogenous.
2.2.1.2 Demand for the Newer Version of the Technology
Older technologies need to be replaced with new versions beyond a point in order to
provide the functions needed by the users (Aoyama 2002; Heales 2002). There are several
reasons for switching to a next version of the technology. First, replacement might be
necessary for economic reasons due to the high cost of maintaining the system since each
maintenance effort deteriorates the structural integrity of the system (Bianchi et al. 2001).
Secondly, replacement might be needed for technical reasons. For example, the development
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environment might become obsolete with no support from the firm, or business pressures or
market needs might require new functions that are fundamentally different from the existing
capabilities of the current version of the technology. Hence, we consider that, at the end of
the useful life of the current version (i.e., T ), the next version of the technology is released.
Similar to the demand for the existing version, the demand for the new version of tech-
nology depends on: (i) the quality of the technology (denoted by r(t)), and (ii) the extent of
openness (s). First, the demand for the new version depends on the quality of the technology.
In particular, higher quality at the time of release (i.e., T ) would translate to higher demand.
Next, as discussed earlier, prior literature suggests that technology openness increases the
likelihood of attracting a wider audience, and hence the demand for the new version of the
technology depends on the openness of the technology (West 2003). Hence, we model the
demand for the next version of the technology as Dr(t) = ρ0 + ρ1r(t) + ρ2s, where ρ1 repre-
sents the demand sensitivity to quality of the technology, ρ2 denotes the demand sensitivity
to the extent of openness, and ρ0 is the intercept. If the extent of openness of the existing
version has no affect on the demand for the next version, we can set ρ2 to 0.
While modeling the value from the next version, one needs to consider the negative effect
of openness as well. In particular, as the large portions of the technology become open,
the value of the next version decreases in the market. That is because, in an open source
setting, the competitors have access to the technology, and they may utilize it for competitive
advantage (Kumar et al. 2011). In addition, some users can alter the technology (if they
are capable of doing so) to address their individualized needs. This modified version may
be made available to other customers as well. Hence, some customers may not be willing to
upgrade to the next version when it is released. Therefore, we consider that the extent of
openness is directly proportional to the loss in competitiveness of the firm. More specifically,
as the portion of technology that is made open source increases, the competition effect (from
the rival firms and own customer) increases linearly (consideration of nonlinear structures
does not change the findings qualitatively). Hence, we represent the value of the next version
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of the technology as (h − es)Dr(T ), where h is the value of the next version per unit level
of quality, e represents the competitiveness of the market, and Dr(T ) is the demand for the
next version of the technology when it is released (i.e., at time T ). Note that the negative
effect due to openness because of market competition is es, hence the degree of openness (i.e.,
s) affects the competition. In order to represent the settings with no increased competition
effect due to openness, one can set the corresponding sensitivity parameter e to 0. In the
following subsection, we now introduce the maintenance effort and development effort, and
the corresponding costs.
2.2.1.3 Effort Levels
The firm strives for both maintaining the current version (i.e., by fixing defects) and
developing the next version throughout the planning horizon. We define u(t) as the effort
exerted by the firm to maintain the current version by fixing defects and v(t) as the effort
allocated for developing the next version. In the literature, diseconomies of scale has been
observed and verified during both the support and development phases of a technology
product (Banker et al. 1994; Banker and Slaughter 1997). This phenomenon is due to the
fact that adding more resources to the project increases the cost non-linearly due to increased
complexity, training, and coordination issues. Therefore, analogous to the literature (e.g.,
Tsay and Agrawal 2000), we use a quadratic cost structure. In particular, we model the









2(t)dt. Hence, the rate of expenditure incurred by the firm (denoted
by ẋ(t)) is as follows: ẋ(t) = cfu
2(t) + cdv
2(t). This implies that the expenditure incurred by






Although our objective is to maximize the profits of the technology firm, in certain instances,
the firm may be constrained by a limited budget (denoted by B). Hence, we consider that
x(T ) ≤ B. The budget threshold is determined by the firm and hence is considered as an
exogenous variable in our model.
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2.2.1.4 Cost of Collaboration with Open Source Community
There are several sources of costs related to making the technology open source, such as
the management of collaboration between external resources (i.e., open source community)
and internal resources (i.e., in-house engineers). With users of the open source community
scattered around the globe, the coordination between the internal team of the firm and the
open source community is even more complicated and important from the firm’s perspective
(Koch 2009). In the context of software industry, the firm needs to examine every change
in the source code (or every modified function) in order to make sure that the changes are
meaningful and do not introduce new defects or for compatibility issues. As the extent of
openness increases, more users adopt the technology and users have more access to the de-
signs. This increases the number of interactions between the open source community and
the firm. That is, if there is more contribution to fixing defects, then the extent of resources
required for coordination also increases. Thus, management of collaboration becomes harder
and the cost increases non-linearly due to increased complexity and coordination as the basis
of interaction (i.e., extent of openness) increases as it is stated in the literature (Clemons
and Row 1992). This is also in line with the findings presented in Scholtes et al. (2016) in
which the authors empirically observe diseconomies of scale in the management of large-scale
open source projects. That is, the cost of collaboration with the open source community is
needed throughout the planning horizon and it increases with time. Hence, we model the
direct cost of managing the collaboration in the quadratic form as as2T. In this formulation,
a is the unit collaboration cost of technology that is open.
Taking into account the value from the current and next versions of the technology, effort
costs, and cost of the collaboration with the open source community (discussed above), we








In the next subsection, we discuss the state equations.
2.2.2 Quality Levels of the Current and the Next Version
The quality of the current version of the technology depends on: (i) the effort level of
the firm, and (ii) the extent of openness. We first discuss the impact of technology openness
on the evolution of the quality of the current version of technology over time t. Several
studies have empirically shown that defects are fixed faster when firms employ open source
methodology. Arora et al. (2010) use a proportional hazard model to investigate if technology
openness impacts patch (i.e., fixes for software defects) release time. They find that patches
for the defects in open source software are released faster compared to closed source software.
Similarly, Paulson et al. (2004) find that the defects are found and fixed faster in open source
projects.
As discussed in Section 2.2.1.1, as the number of defects decreases, the quality of tech-
nology improves. Therefore, fixing defects essentially improves the quality of technology.
Hence, Arora et al. (2010) (and our empirical results) indicate that the quality of technology
improves at a faster rate when firms a open portion of its design. We utilize this result
in modeling the impact of technology openness on the quality of the current version of the
technology and state that q̇(t) improves with bs, where b ≥ 0 is the effectiveness of the open
source community in fixing defects.
Since the quality of technology can also be improved by the maintenance effort of the
firm, we can write the state equation for the quality of the current version of the technology
as follows: q̇(t) = mu(t) + bs. Here, u(t) is the maintenance effort exerted by the technology
firm at time t. Although the maintenance effort directly impacts the quality of the technology,
it is important to note that the initial quality of the technology plays a vital role in how q(t)
evolves over time. In particular, when the initial number of defects is high, i.e., the initial
quality of the technology is low, the firm needs to exert more effort than it would if the
initial quality of the technology were better. That is, the impact of effort on the quality is
proportional to the initial quality level of the technology. Hence, in the state equation, we
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employ m as the effectiveness of the firm’s effort level. In particular, when the initial quality
of the technology is low, the value of m is lower, and hence, the firm needs to exert more
effort to improve the quality. Since m already captures the impact of the initial quality, for
simplicity, we normalize q(0) to zero.
The quality of the next version of the technology primarily increases with the development
effort of the firm that is denoted by v(t). Besides, since each version of the technology gener-
ally builds on the past releases (e.g., MacOS, Windows, and Matlab) by adding new features
to the current version of the technology (Rahmandad 2005), the quality of the next version
increases with the effort of fixing defects in the current version (i.e., u(t)) as well. The corre-
sponding sensitivity term (i.e., w) can be set to zero if there is no such effect, i.e., the next ver-
sion is built from scratch with no relationship to the current version. Similarly, the extent of
openness may also help in improving the next version of the technology, because some mem-
bers of open source community might initialize or undertake development activities. For ex-
ample, while making its artificial intelligence engine TensorFlow open source, Google stated:
“What we are hoping is that the community adopts this as a good way of express-
ing machine learning algorithms of lots of different types, and also contributes to
building and improving [TensorFlow] in lots of different and interesting ways.” –
(Wired.com 2015).
Thus, Google expects that making TensorFlow open source will feed new projects (or new
versions of its technology) as well (Wired.com 2015). In a similar vein, we model the rate of
improvement in the quality of the next version of the technology as ṙ(t) = wu(t)+nv(t)+ys.
Clearly, we can set y = 0 when there is no impact of openness on the quality of the next
version. Besides, n is utilized in this formulation to represent the effectiveness of the firm’s
development effort in the quality of the next version. All parameters and variables are
summarized in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: List of Parameters and Variables
Symbol Definition
Parameters
a Cost multiplier for managing the collaboration with the open source community
b Sensitivity of the quality of the current version of the technology to openness
(Effectiveness of openness on the rate of fixing defects)
B Maximum budget available to the firm for maintenance and development effort
(Overall budget/resource constraint)
cf Cost multiplier of the maintenance effort (Costliness of the maintenance effort)
cd Cost multiplier of the development effort (Costliness of the development effort)
e Market competition parameter due to openness (Competitiveness of the market)
h Value of the next version of the technology per unit level of quality
(Valuation of the next version of the technology)
k Value of the current version of technology per unit level of quality
(Valuation of the current version of the technology)
m Sensitivity of the quality of the current version to maintenance effort
(Effectiveness of maintenance effort on the current version of the technology)
n Sensitivity of the development of the next version to development effort
(Effectiveness of development effort on the next version of the technology)
T End of the planning horizon (Release time of the next version of the technology)
w Sensitivity of the development of the next version to maintenance effort
(Effectiveness of maintenance effort on the next version of the technology)
y Sensitivity of the development of the next version to openness
(Effectiveness of openness on the next version of the technology)
Z Minimum quality level of the next version of the technology
θ0 Intercept for the demand function of the current version
θ1 Sensitivity of the demand of the current version to quality of the technology
θ2 Sensitivity of the demand of the current version to openness
ρ0 Intercept for the demand function of the next version
ρ1 Sensitivity of the demand of the next version to quality of the technology
ρ2 Sensitivity of the demand of the next version to openness
Variables
Dq(t) Demand for the current version of the technology at time t (State Variable)
Dr(t) Demand for the next version of the technology at time t (State Variable)
q(t) Quality of the current version of the technology at time t (State Variable)
r(t) Quality of the next version of the technology at time t (State Variable)
s Portion of the technology that is open (Extent of openness) (Decision Variable)
u(t) Effort of fixing defects in the current version of the technology at time t
(Maintenance effort) (Control Variable)
v(t) Development effort of the next version of the technology at time t
(Control Variable)
x(t) Expenditure of firm on maintenance effort and the development effort at time t
(State Variable)
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2.2.3 The Optimal Control Model
Taking the objective function, state equations, and other constraints into consideration,








q̇(t) = mu(t) + bs, (2.2)
ṙ(t) = wu(t) + nv(t) + ys, (2.3)
Dq(t) = θ0 + θ1q(t) + θ2s, (2.4)




x(T ) ≤ B, (2.7)
0 ≤ s ≤ 1, (2.8)
q(0) = 0, r(0) = 0, x(0) = 0, u(t) ≥ 0, v(t) ≥ 0. (2.9)
In summary, Equation (2.1) states that the firm determines the optimal levels of (i) main-
tenance effort, (ii) development effort, and (iii) the extent of openness, with the objective
of maximizing the profit from both versions of the technology. Next, Equations (2.2) and
(2.3) depict the evolution of the quality levels of the current version and the next version,
respectively. Equations (2.4) and (2.5) represent the demand for the current version and the
next version of the technology respectively. Equations (2.6) and (2.7) track the expenditure
incurred by the firm for the maintenance effort and the development effort and state that the
total budget is capped at B. Equation (2.8) defines bounds on the extent of openness since
it is defined as a portion. Finally, Equation (2.9) lists the technical constraints: the starting
levels of the quality of current and next versions, initial budget use, and the non-negativity
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of the effort levels. When possible, we suppress the time indicator (t) from the variables
for simplicity in notation. Before presenting the results, we briefly discuss the methodology
used in our analytical model.
2.2.4 Methodology
The optimal control technique has been used in multiple disciplines including operations
management to solve problems where the outcome depends not only on the current action,
but also the on previous ones (Sethi and Thompson 2000). The optimized decision variables
(here, the effort of fixing defects, the development effort, and the extent of openness) manage
the evolution of the dynamic system through state variables (here, the quality levels of the
current version and the next version of the technology, and the spending on maintenance
and development) to achieve an optimal outcome (here, the profit of the firm) by the end of
the planning horizon. For our dynamic problem, a traditional mathematical programming
approach would use a multistage dynamic programming formulation and solve the problem
numerically without providing analytical results and insights. Optimal control, however,
decouples our dynamic problem over time into an infinite number of simpler static optimiza-
tion problems for each time instance t, and enables us to derive managerial insights from the
analytical results that we present in the following section.
2.3 Results and Managerial Insights
In this section, we first derive a closed-form solution to the problem presented in Equa-
tions 2.1-2.9. Next, we glean several results and managerial insights. As discussed in Sec-
tion 2.2.1.3, we analyze the optimal effort levels and extent of openness for two different
scenarios: (i) firm has sufficient budget (e.g., by borrowing from an external investor or a
financial institution such as a bank) to cover the expenditure of the firm (i.e., x(T ) < B),
and (ii) firm has a limited budget and cannot borrow from elsewhere (i.e., x(T ) = B). Since
the primary objective of our study is to maximize the profits of the firm, our analysis mainly
focuses on the first scenario, i.e., the firm has enough resources to maintain the current
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version and develop the next version. Nevertheless, we find that most of the insights remain
the same for both scenarios. We present and discuss results that are different in these two
scenarios. Below, we first present the solution of the optimal control model for an arbitrary
level of openness. All the necessary proofs for lemmas and propositions that we present in
the rest of this paper are provided in Appendix A.2
Lemma 1. For an arbitrary level of openness (i.e., s), the optimal trajectories of the main-
tenance effort (i.e., u(t)) and the development effort (i.e., v(t)) are given by:
u(t) =
ρ1w(h− es) + θ1km(T − t)
2cf




Lemma 1 implies that opening up a higher portion of the technology (i.e., increasing s)
decreases both fixing and development efforts. This is due to the fact that opening up a
portion of the technology has positive effects on the quality levels of both the current ver-
sion (because there are more eyes on the defects, see Equation (2.2)), and the next version
(because some members of open source community might initialize or undertake develop-
ment activities, see Equation (2.3)). Furthermore, opening up the technology increases the
demand for the existing and next versions (due to network effects, see Equations (2.4) and
(2.5)). On the other hand, the objective function presented in Equation (2.1) implies that
increasing the extent of openness is costly to the firm because of two main reasons: (i)
complications in the management of collaboration between the parties (internal resources
and the open source community), and (ii) the decrease in the competitiveness or value of
the next version (since it becomes easier for: (a) the competitors to understand and copy
features of the technology and gain competitive advantage, and (b) the competitors to tailor
the technology for different needs and distribute the modified technology). By examining
the interdependencies among the extent of openness and both types of effort levels, and the
effects of openness on the current and next versions of the technology, the firm can determine
the optimal level of openness. The results of this analysis, i.e., the quality of next version of
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the technology, the optimal level of openness, the corresponding optimal effort trajectories,
and the profit of the firm are presented in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. The optimal levels of the openness (i.e., s∗), effort of fixing defects (i.e., u∗(t)),
the development effort (i.e., v∗(t)), the quality of the next version of the technology (i.e.,
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Further examination of the optimal trajectories of the effort levels, i.e., u(t) and v(t) pre-
sented in Lemma 1 reveals that the firm needs to actively manage its resources. In particular,
the firm should exert higher maintenance effort during the initial stages of the project and
then gradually decrease its effort level. The intuition behind this result is that the firm gets
a “cumulative” benefit from improving the quality of the current version because of higher
demand for the technology in the early stages. Furthermore, because of higher maintenance
effort in the early stages, more defects are fixed in the early stages, and hence the number
of defects that need to be fixed in the later stages are reduced. Moreover, the benefit of
fixing defects in the later stages is marginal as the current version is replaced by the next
version. Thus, the firm can reduce the effort it exerts for maintaining the technology in the
final stages of the project.
Lemma 1 also reveals that the trajectory of the development effort does not depend on
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time. This result is both interesting and important. The key takeaway for the managers is
that the resources need to be actively managed for maintenance, but development of newer
technology does not require micromanagement. Next, we present and analyze the conditions
when the firm should keep its technology proprietary (i.e., s = 0) or make it fully open (i.e.,
s = 1) or make it partially open (i.e., 0 < s < 1).
2.3.1 When to Keep the Technology Proprietary or Fully Open or Partially
Open
In the following proposition, we begin with summarizing the conditions when the firm
should choose extreme strategies (i.e., keep the technology proprietary or fully open). The
expressions for thresholds in all the propositions are provided in Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1.
(a) The firm should keep its technology proprietary if the sensitivity of the demand of the
next version to openness (i.e., sensitivity to network effect) is high (i.e., ρ2 > ζ) and
the market is highly competitive (i.e., e ≥ E ).
(b) The firm should make its technology fully open source if the sensitivity of the quality of
the current version to openness is high (i.e., b ≥ B) and the collaboration cost is high
(i.e., a > A ).
We first focus on part (a) of the proposition that analyzes the conditions when the firm
should not rely on the open source community and keep the technology proprietary. Propo-
sition 1(a) suggests that despite higher benefits from wider adoption (or network effects) due
to openness, the firm should in fact not open any portion of the technology when the market
is highly competitive (i.e., e is large). In this scenario, the benefit of increased demand due
to openness (see Equation (2.5)) does not outweigh the loss in competitiveness. Therefore,
it is optimal for the firm to keep its technology proprietary even when the sensitivity of the
demand of the next version to openness (i.e., ρ2) is high. The finding in Proposition 1(a)
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provides an important and interesting insight to the firms: Despite higher demand for the
next version of the technology due to openness, it is, in fact, optimal for the firm to keep its
technology proprietary when the competitiveness is sufficiently high. This result may provide
a plausible explanation behind Microsoft’s decision to keep the technology of some of their
products proprietary. Hoffman (2015) argues that if Microsoft decides to make Windows
open source “competing companies could take Windows [Kernel] and use it to make a com-
peting operating system.” This suggests that the market is highly competitive (i.e., e > E ).
Thus, in line with our finding, Microsoft’s strategy is to keep its technology proprietary.
The finding in Proposition 1(a) is illustrated in Figure A.1. In Figure A.1, we consider
a scenario where the characteristics of the firm, the technology, and the market are opera-
tionalized using the following parameter values: k = 1
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, h = 1, a = 1, T = 16,m = 2, b =
1, w = 1, n = 2, y = 1, cf = 1, cd = 1, θ0 = 1, θ1 = 4, θ2 = 2, ρ1 = 2, ρ0 = 1, ρ2 = 2. These
parameter values are reasonable in the sense that they represent a typical technology firm.
First, the sensitivities of the firm’s effort (i.e., m and n) are higher than the sensitivities of
the open source community (i.e., b and y). These values of the sensitivities are representative
of real business settings because the firms are typically expected to be more productive and
proactive compared to the open source community, and hence the effect of firm’s effort on
the quality of the technology is higher (i.e., the values of m and n are higher than b and
y). Furthermore, industry reports suggest that the operational expenses in the technology
industry are around 50% to 75% (e.g., Mergent Online 2017). Thus, we select the values of
cost parameters (i.e., a, cf , cd, e, h, and k) such that the expenses are in the range of 50% to
75% of the revenue generated the technology (however, we find that the results are consistent
and do not change qualitatively for a wide range of values for all the parameters).
We now focus on the conditions when the firm makes its technology fully open source (see
Proposition 1(b)). We utilize these key findings to explain the possible motivation behind
the strategy of IBM to fully open some of their technology systems. This result reveals
that the level of sensitivity of the quality of the current version on openness (i.e., b) has a
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very important role in the firm’s decision to fully open the technology or not. In particular,
it shows that the firm should fully open source its technology when b is above a critical
value, despite high cost of collaboration (i.e., a). This result may not be intuitive since
it is expected that higher cost of collaboration might discourage the firms to make their
technology fully open.The intuition behind this result is that despite the negative effect
of cost of collaboration on firm’s profit, the firm derives greater benefits by the increased
rate of improvement in the quality of the existing technology (see Equation (2.2)). This
finding might provide a plausible explanation to IBM’s decision to make the technology (i.e.,
software code) of WebSphere fully open. Despite, the high expected cost of collaboration
(i.e., high a) (Wayner 2000), IBM recognized that large groups of open source community
were very effective in fixing defects (i.e., high b) (West 2003). In line with our finding, IBM
decided to make WebSphere fully open, IBM’s first open source technology. We illustrate
this finding in Figure A.2. The parameter values in this figure are the same as those in
Figure A.1 except e = 0.2.
Before turning our attention to the case when the firm should keep the technology par-
tially open, in the following proposition, we first present an integrated result regarding the
decision of openness.
Proposition 2.
(a) In a highly competitive market (i.e., when e ≥ E ), the firm should either fully open
source its technology or keep it proprietary.
• if the cost of collaboration is low (i.e., a < Ā ), the firm should make its technology
open source (i.e., s = 1),
• if the cost of collaboration is high (i.e., a > Ā ), the firm should keep its technology
proprietary (i.e., s = 0).
(b) The firm should make its technology partially open source only if e < E .
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Proposition 2(a) suggests that when the market is very competitive (i.e., e is high), the
firm should either keep its technology proprietary or make it fully open source depending
on the level of the cost of collaboration (i.e., a). More specifically, our results reveal that
if the market is very competitive, the firm should keep its technology proprietary when the
cost of collaboration is high. On the other hand, in this case, if the cost of collaboration is
relatively lower, the firm should fully open its technology without even considering to make
it partially open. This result is somewhat counter-intuitive because if the market is very
competitive (i.e., e is very high), one may expect that the firm should minimize its loss due
to market competition by making its technology partially open under some circumstances.
We now discuss the intuition behind this finding.
Note that higher values of parameter e suggest that the firm is likely to have several com-
petitors that are keen to utilize the technology of the firm to develop their own technology.
A highly competitive market might suggest that the customer demand for the technology
is likely to be fragmented among several firms. In order to increase the demand, the firm
may try to increase the quality of the technology and/or open its technology (to increase
the demand for the technology via network effects, see Equations (2.4) and (2.5)). The new
customer base will in turn increase the rate of improvement of the quality of both versions.
Therefore, the loss due to e is compensated by higher demand and reduced effort levels.
Further, if the firm only partially opens the technology in a highly competitive environment,
the increase in demand because of openness is not very high compared to how much the
competitors would gain from the released patents related to the technology (because of high
e). Hence, the costs of opening the technology are not compensated by the benefits of open-
ness. Thus, despite competitive market conditions, it is profitable for the firm to make its
technology fully open source only if the cost of collaboration is low. Our result is consistent
with the strategy of Sun Microsystems and its decision to open source its programming soft-
ware Java. Martens (2006) summarizes the strategy of Sun Microsystems in the following
statement: “Sun is hoping [fully] open sourcing Java will help stop fragmentation in the
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market and instead drive convergence around Java.” Thus, an optimal strategy for the firm
to operate in a highly competitive environment is to fully open its technology when the
cost of collaboration is relatively low or keep the technology proprietary when the cost of
collaboration is relatively high.
After discussing the conditions in which the firm chooses to either keep its technology
proprietary (i.e., s = 0) or make it fully open (i.e., s = 1), we shift our focus to the
condition when the firm should partially open the technology (i.e., 0 < s < 1). The finding
in Proposition 2(b) suggests that if the negative impact of competition is relatively low (i.e.,
e < E ), the firm may partially open up its technology. For example, in Figure A.1, as the
value of e goes below the threshold E ≈ 0.26, the value of s > 0. The rationale behind this
result is that, by opening up its technology, the firm’s cost of collaboration is compensated
by: (i) the open source community’s effort in fixing defects and new technology development,
and (ii) the additional demand for the technology due to network effects. Accordingly, Tesla’s
approach of opening up its battery technology seems very much in line with our results. In
2014, Tesla considered that the competition among electric car manufacturers was low and
the technology would not be used by the big automotive players, and thus e < E . Hence, loss
to competition due to opening the technology behind batteries (by opening up its patents)
was minimal and Tesla decided to open up part of its technology (Bessen 2014).
2.3.1.1 Discussion on Strategies of Technology Firms
In this subsection, we use our model based results to explain the open source strategies
(i.e., to keep the technology of its products proprietary or make it fully open or make it
partially open) adopted by four different technology firms, namely, Microsoft, Apple, IBM,
and Sun Microsystems in the software industry.
We first discuss the rationale behind Microsoft’s decision to keep its operating system
(OS), Windows, proprietary. Given that Windows OS is a highly successful product in an
extremely competitive marketplace, making Windows open source would not only allow the
existing competitors to use the software code and create better competing software, but
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also allow newer competitors to enter the market place. Furthermore, Microsoft often uses
Windows as a platform to promote several of its other services and products (e.g., Microsoft
Edge). Moorhead (2017) argues that if Microsoft were to open source Windows, it would
diminish the revenues from services and products that depend on Windows. Therefore,
opening up its software has a two-fold effect on Microsoft: 1) lower revenue from the sales
of Windows OS, and 2) reduced revenues of its other products and services that are based
on Windows platform. In other words, the value of e (that captures the competitiveness
of market) is extremely high for Windows. Proposition 1(a) suggests that if the market is
highly competitive, despite the benefits of increased user based due to network effects, the
firm should keep its technology proprietary, which explains Microsoft’s Windows strategy to
keep its OS code proprietary.
On the other hand, Wayner (2000) observes that large portions of Apple’s Mac OS X
software code came from the free versions of Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) based
operating systems. The project manager of Apple’s first open source effort explains the
motivation behind their strategy to partially open source Mac OS X :
“We realized that the pieces they’re most interested in are the most commoditized. There
wasn’t really any proprietary technology added that we had to worry about them copying.
There are people who know them better than we do like the BSD community. We started
making the case, if we really want to partner with the universities we should just open the
source code and release it as a complete BSD-style operating system” – (Wayner 2000).
This suggests that by opening up part of its technology pertaining to its software, the negative
impact of the competition from Apple’s perspective was relatively low, and moreover the
benefit from the opening up an already commoditized part of the technology outweighed the
negative impact. Hence, it was beneficial for Apple to partially open up its technology, in
particularly, the code based on BSD OS. This reasoning is similar to our finding and rationale
presented in Proposition 2(b), which suggests that the firm should partially open up its code
when market competition is low. This provides one plausible rationale behind why Microsoft
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and Apple had two diverging strategies with respect to their operating systems.
Next, we discuss the motive behind the strategy of IBM to make WebSphere fully open
source. West (2003) notes that the large open source community working with IBM to
maintain WebSphere provided greater flexibility and faster implementation of bug fixes. This
suggests that the value of b (that captures the sensitivity of the quality of the current version
to openness) is high. However, in order to collaborate with the open source community,
IBM had to hire permanent liaisons (West 2003), which suggests high value of a. Despite
high cost of collaboration, Proposition 1(b) suggests that the firm should open source its
technology when b is relatively high, a scenario that corresponds to WebSphere. Given that
IBM’s WebSphere open source strategy was a success, this industry evidence validates the
robustness of our model based results.
Finally, we shift our focus to explaining the reasoning behind Sun Microsystem’s strat-
egy to make Java fully open source. As discussed earlier, Proposition 2(a) suggests that the
firm should make its technology fully open source if the market is very competitive (i.e., e
is high) and if the level of the cost of collaboration (i.e., a) is relatively low. In late 1990s
and early 2000s, the marketplace for general purpose programming, which Java belongs to,
was extremely competitive, i.e., e was high. Furthermore, Sun Microsystem’s existing ties
with the open source community kept the cost of collaboration considerably lower, i.e., low
a. In such a scenario, our model based result can explain one plausible reason behind Sun
Microsystem’s decision to fully open source its software.
2.3.2 Should the Firm Focus on Maintenance or Development
Next, we present and analyze the conditions when the firm should focus more on the
maintenance effort or the development effort. The results are summarized in the proposition
below.




, the maintenance effort (i.e., u) is always greater than the




, the maintenance effort is not always less
than the development effort.
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We first define the productivity in developing the next version as the sensitivity to the
effort levels on the development of the next version adjusted by the respective costs (i.e.,
w/cf and n/cd). The proposition reveals that if the productivity of the maintenance effort is
higher than the productivity of development effort (i.e., w/cf > n/cd), then the firm should
exert more effort on maintenance throughout the project. Hence, if the next version relies
heavily on the current version (i.e., high w), the focus should be more on the maintenance
effort. The reasoning behind this finding is as follows. Higher values of w implies that higher
maintenance effort would lead to faster rate of development of next version. Hence, if the
firm shifts its focus on fixing the defects in the existing version, it would eventually lead to
increased quality of the next version as well. Thus, in this scenario, by focusing more on
the maintenance effort, the firm is able to increase the inherent quality of both the current
version and the next version. This finding is illustrated in Figure A.3(a). On the other hand,
if w/cf < n/cd, interestingly, the firm’s focus is not necessarily more on the development
effort. Rather, we find that, in certain scenarios, the focus of the firm should be more on the
maintenance effort in the earlier phases and the focus on the maintenance effort is reduced
in the later stages of the project as illustrated in Figure A.3(b).
Therefore, the firm should carefully evaluate the characteristics of its technology (such
as the cost of efforts and productivity levels) before allocating the resources to the mainte-
nance effort and the development effort. In the following subsection, we now examine the
behavior of the firm with respect to the changes in the valuation of the current version of
the technology.
2.3.3 Impact of the Valuation of Current Version on Firm’s Behavior
In this subsection, we discuss the firm’s reaction to changes in the valuation of the current
version of the technology (i.e., k). If the valuation increases, in order to benefit more from
the higher valued technology, the firm has an incentive to focus on increasing the demand
for current version. The demand for existing technology depends on the network effects
from opening the technology and the quality of the current version of technology. Thus, to
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increase the quality of the current version of technology, the firm should increase: (i) the
effort of fixing defects, and/or (ii) the portion of the technology that is open.
We find that if the valuation increases, the firm’s effort levels and the extent of openness
depend on the sensitivity of the quality of the current version to openness (i.e., b). In
particular, we find that, if the current version is not much sensitive to openness (i.e., b is
low), the firm reduces the openness but increases its maintenance and development efforts
to boost its demand due to higher quality. However, for moderate levels of b, the firm
decreases its development effort and shifts its focus towards improving the quality of the
current version by increasing both openness and maintenance effort.
Furthermore, we find that if the current version is highly sensitive to openness (i.e., b is
high), the firm relies more on the open source community by increasing the openness and
decreasing both of its effort levels (maintenance and development). By doing so, the firm is
able to save costs related to fixing and development. Note that to benefit from the increase
in valuation, the firm does not decrease both the maintenance effort and the openness at
the same time because it reduces the rate of improvement of the quality (i.e., q̇(t)), which in
turn affects the demand for the technology. We also find that whenever the firm increases
its development effort, it also increases its maintenance effort. We outline these findings in
the following proposition.
Proposition 4. With an increase in the valuation of the current version (i.e., k)
(a) If the sensitivity of the quality of the current version to openness (i.e., b) is low (i.e.,
b < β0),
(i) both the development effort of the next version (i.e., v) and the maintenance effort
(i.e., u) increase,
(ii) the portion of the technology that is open (i.e., s) decreases.
(b) If the sensitivity of the quality of the current version of the technology to openness is
at a moderate level (i.e., β0 < b < β1),
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(i) the development effort of the next version decreases but the maintenance effort
increases,
(ii) the portion of the technology that is open increases.
(c) If the sensitivity of the quality of the current version to openness is high (i.e., b > β1),
(i) both the development effort of the next version and the effort of fixing defects
decrease,
(ii) the portion of the technology that is open increases.
The results of Proposition 4 indicate that the managers should be careful in planning
their response to changing market conditions. According to parts (a) and (b), an increase in
the valuation of the current version should be accompanied with an increase in the internal
resources who are responsible for maintaining the technology if the quality of existing tech-
nology is not much sensitive to openness. On the other hand, when the quality of the current
version is highly sensitive to openness, the firm should be prepared to increase the openness
in order to benefit more from the open source community and reduce internal resources who
are responsible for maintenance and development (see part (c)). As discussed earlier, the
maintenance effort decreases with time, and therefore the firm may keep some part-time or
contract workforce (for the maintenance project) to handle the varying resource requirement.
Furthermore, to ensure that the conditions in the above proposition are reasonable, we
perform numerical experiments. One representative instance of our numerical study that
illustrates the findings in the Proposition 4 is shown in Figure A.4 in Appendix A.3. Inter-
estingly, the threshold β1 in part (c) of Proposition 4 depends on time t (i.e., the stage of
the project). In particular, we find that the value of β1 is very high in the early stages of the
project compared to the later stages of the project. In order to check the feasibility of the
condition in part (c) of the proposition, we conduct a numerical study. Indeed, we find that
the value of β1 is extremely high relatively in the initial stages. Figure A.5 in Appendix A.3
illustrates the values of β1 at various stages of project. As apparent in this figure, the values
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of b needs to be relatively high for the condition b > β1 to be satisfied at the beginning of
the project, a very unlikely case. In fact, this finding confirms the intuition that it is not
reasonable to reduce the maintenance effort when the valuation of the technology increases.
However, if the open source community is indeed very capable and effective (i.e., the open
source community finds and fixes all the defects in the technology), then part (c) of the
proposition applies. We also find that in the later stages of the project, it is indeed possible
to reduce the maintenance effort despite a higher valued technology. The reason behind this
finding is that the firm has a very little incentive to fix defects at the end of the project as
the new version is about to be released.
As discussed earlier, in certain environments, the firm may have a limited budget and
the overall spending on the workforce (or the effort levels) cannot exceed this budget (i.e.,
X(T ) ≤ B). We conduct an extensive numerical study to analyze how the firm reacts to
increased valuation of the technology in such a setting. Interestingly, in contrast to the find-
ings in part (a) of Proposition 4, we find that if the valuation of the current version of the
technology increases, the extent of openness may increase despite a low level of sensitivity of
the quality of the current version to openness. The intuition behind this result is that when
the valuation increases, the firm has an incentive to increase quality, and consequently the
demand for the technology. However, if the firm has a limited budget, the effort levels are
already constrained. Hence, in this scenario, the firm’s only leverage is openness. This is
because openness might increase the demand (due to network effects, through parameters θ2
and ρ2) and quality (even though at a lower rate when b is low). The details of this numerical
study are omitted for brevity, but we summarize this finding in the following observation.
Observation 1. If the firm has a limited budget, as the valuation of the current version (i.e.,
k) increases, the firm might increase the extent of openness (i.e., s) even if the sensitivity
of the quality of the current version to openness (i.e., b) is low.
In the next subsection, we now analyze how the changes in openness sensitivity terms
(i.e., b and y) affect the behavior of the firm.
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2.3.4 Impact of Openness Sensitivity Terms on Firm’s Behavior
We first examine the implications of a change in the sensitivity of the current version to
openness (i.e., b) on firm’s effort levels and the extent of openness. An increase in b implies
that the open source community becomes more effective or helpful in fixing defects. In such
a case, Equation (2.2) implies that the inherent quality of the current version increases at a
faster rate with the extent of openness (i.e., s). Hence, we find that the firm increases the
openness with b. On the other hand, the firm decreases both fixing and development efforts.
Furthermore, we find that the profit of the firm increases with b. These results are formally
presented in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. If the effectiveness of the open source community increases in fixing defects
(i.e., b increases), the
(a) portion of the software that is open source (i.e., s) increases,
(b) maintenance effort (i.e., u) decreases,
(c) development effort (i.e., v) decreases,
(d) profit of the firm increases.
In summary, it is advantageous for the firm to have a higher b since it is able to reduce its
effort levels but increase its profit. Therefore, the managers should pro-actively seek ways to
make the members of the open source community more effective and more interested in the
technology. For example, the managers can consider providing the open source community
with development tools, access to testing environments, educational materials, or any other
resource that can increase their productivity and make them more engaged.
Next, we examine the change in the behavior of the firm when the sensitivity of the
development rate of the next version to openness (i.e., y) increases. An increase in this sen-
sitivity term implies that the members of the open source community become more effective
or engaged in developing new features. Because of this higher level of engagement of the
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open source community, the firm can build the next version of the technology at a reduced
level of development effort. In effect, the firm also reduces the maintenance effort. Hence,
the firm benefits from the reduced costs of effort on both maintenance and development.
Further, the marginal benefit of an increase in y is higher for the firm if the open source
community can access and work on a larger portion of the technology. Hence, intuitively,
the firm should increase the extent of openness as y increases. However, we find that this
is not always the case. In particular, if the cost of collaboration (i.e., a) is low, the firm, in
fact, decreases the extent of openness with y. This finding is summarized in Proposition 6(a)
below and illustrated in Figure A.6(a) in Appendix A.3.
Proposition 6. As the effectiveness of the open source community increases in developing
the next version of the technology (i.e., y),
(a) if the cost of collaboration with the open source community is low (i.e., a < α),
(i) both the development effort of the next version (i.e., v) and the effort of fixing
defects (i.e., u) increase,
(ii) the portion of the technology that is open (i.e., s) decreases;
(b) if the cost of collaboration with the open source community is high (i.e., a > α),
(i) both the development effort of the next version and the effort of fixing defects
decrease,
(ii) the portion of the technology that is open increases.
Clearly, the result presented in Proposition 6(a) is somewhat counter-intuitive, but can be
explained as follows. It is apparent from Lemma 2 that ds
∗
da
< 0, hence the extent of openness
actually decreases with the cost of collaboration. Therefore, when the cost of collaboration
is low, the portion of the technology that is open is already at a high level. Hence, increasing
the sensitivity of the next version on openness enables the firm to reduce the extent of
openness and help it save both the direct cost (i.e., the collaboration cost between the firm
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and the open source community) and the indirect cost (due to competition). However, our
numerical results suggest that the decrease in openness and increase in efforts is marginal
(see Figure A.6(a)). On the other hand, if the cost of collaboration is high, the portion of
the technology that is open is at a low level (see Figure A.6(b)). Hence, as the open source
community becomes more effective in developing the next version, it is beneficial for the firm
to increase the extent of openness despite the high collaboration cost (see Proposition 6(b)).
To summarize, the managers should be careful about the changes in the effectiveness
of the open source community in developing the next version. This is because, although
increasing the extent of openness seems to be a reasonable strategy (with an increase in
the effectiveness of the open source community), the firm should actually decrease it if the
collaboration cost is low. However, in this case, since the overall contribution of the open
source community increases (regardless of the reduced level of openness), the firm is able to
reduce costs by decreasing both fixing and development efforts. Furthermore, our numerical
results (not presented for brevity) suggest that the above proposition holds true even when
the firm has a limited budget. This indicates that the results presented in Proposition 6 are
robust. In the next subsection, we now examine the behavior of the firm with respect to the
changes in the valuation of the next version of the technology.
2.3.5 Impact of the Valuation of Next Version on Firm’s Behavior
We now shift our focus to analyzing the firm’s reaction to the changes in the valuation
of the next version of the technology (i.e., h). When h increases, the firm has an incentive
to increase the demand for the next version of the technology. In particular, the firm can
increase the demand by: (i) increasing the quality of the next version, and/or (ii) increasing
the extent of openness (see Equation (2.5)). To take advantage of the higher valuation,
we find that it is optimal for the firm to increase its effort levels (both maintenance and
development). However, the optimal extent of openness may increase or decrease. When
the market competition is high, intuitively, the firm should decrease the openness. On the
contrary, we find that the firm should increase the extent of openness when the market is
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highly competitive and the development time for the new technology (i.e., T ) is relatively
low. This result can be explained as follows. When the market competition is high, the
extent of openness is low. Therefore, an increase in the valuation of the next version entices
the firm to increase the extent of openness from its low baseline since the time to release
the next version is also short. We outline these findings in the following proposition and
illustrate them in Figure A.7 in Appendix A.3.
Proposition 7. As the valuation of the next version (i.e., h) increases, the portion of the
technology that is open (i.e., s) increases if the market competition is high (i.e., e > Ē ) and
the time to release is low (i.e., T < T̄ ).
Proposition 7 indicates that the managers should be careful when the valuation of the
next version increases. Under the conditions presented in the proposition, with an increase in
the valuation of the next version, the firm should go “all-in” in the next version by increasing
the openness as well as both maintenance and development efforts. On the other hand, when
the firm has a limited budget, we numerically find that the openness may increase regardless
of the values of e and T . This is because when the firm is constrained by a budget to achieve
a higher quality level for the next version, the firm’s only choice is to increase the openness.
We summarize this finding in the following observation.
Observation 2. When the budget is limited, as the valuation of the next version (i.e., h)
increases, the firm may increase the portion of the technology that is open (i.e., s∗) regardless
of the level of market competition (i.e., e) and the time to release the new version of the
technology (i.e., T ).
We extend our discussion in the next section to the markets that have a pre-determined
minimum quality level for the next version.
2.4 Minimum Quality Threshold for the Next Version
In this section, we analyze a scenario in which the firm has to meet a certain quality
threshold before the next version of the technology is released. This quality threshold, Z,
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may be determined by customer expectations or market requirements, and hence considered
as an exogenous variable in our model. In other words, the quality of the next version (that
we denote by r(t) at time T ) needs to be at least Z at the time it is released (i.e., r(T ) ≥ Z).
In this setting, the technology firm attempts to meet the required quality level for the next
version by taking one (or more) of the following actions: (i) increase the development effort
of the next version of the technology (direct effect), (ii) increase the effort of fixing defects
in the current version of the technology (indirect effect), and (iii) increase the portion of the
technology that is open source (indirect effect).
In the rest of this section, we consider the setting where the firm needs to meet the
market expectations (i.e., r(T ) = Z) (if the firm finds it profitable to exceed the quality
threshold (i.e., r(T )∗ > Z), then the analysis in Section 2.3 applies). Hence, in addition to
the constraints presented in Equations (2.2) - (2.9), an additional constraint, r(T ) = Z needs
to be considered in the model. Although most of the solutions and variables of interest are
cumbersome to present, we glean several results and managerial insights. In the following
lemma, we first outline the solution of the corresponding optimal control problem for an
arbitrary level of openness.
Lemma 3. If the market has a minimum quality requirement for the next version (i.e.,
r(T ) = Z), the optimal trajectories of the maintenance effort (i.e., u(t)) and the development
effort (i.e., v(t)) for an arbitrary level of openness (i.e., s) are given by:
u(t) =
θ1kmT (2cfn
2 (T − t) + cdw2 (T − 2t)) + 4cfcdw (Z − sTy)
4cfT (cfn2 + cdw2)
, and
v(t) =
n (4cf (Z − sTy)− θ1kmT 2w)
4T (cdw2 + cfn2)
.
Lemma 3 reveals that opening up a higher portion of the technology (i.e., increasing s)
decreases both fixing and development efforts. This result is similar to that in Lemma 1, and
can be explained in a similar manner. By examining the interdependencies among the extent
of openness and both types of efforts, and the effects of openness on the quality and demand
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of the current and next versions of the technology, the firm can determine the optimal level
of openness. The results of this analysis, i.e., the optimal level of openness, corresponding
optimal effort trajectories, and the profit of the firm are presented in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. The optimal level of openness (s∗), effort of fixing defects (u∗(t)), development
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The behavior of the variables presented in Lemma 4 with respect to changes in different
parameters are mostly similar to the results presented in Section 2.3. Hence, for brevity, we
present only a limited number of findings that are interesting and different from those in the
earlier analyses.
2.4.1 Impact of the Valuation of the Current Version on Firm’s Behavior
The valuation of the current version (i.e., k) might increase because of several reasons.
For example, the technology might become more valuable to customers if business conditions
or regulations change. In Proposition 4 (in Section 2.3), we find that the firm decreases its
development effort (of the next version) with k only if the sensitivity of the quality of the
current version to openness is above a certain threshold (i.e., b > β0). However, interestingly,
when the market requires a minimum quality threshold, we find that the firm always decreases
its development effort with k and its focus tends to shift towards improving the quality of
the current version. The reason why the development effort decreases lies in the fact that
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when the quality of the next version is pre-determined by the customer and is high, the firm
already has a high level of development effort to meet the quality requirement. An increase
in the valuation of the current version gives the firm an incentive to increase either the main-
tenance effort or openness in order to benefit more from the current version. Furthermore,
since there are indirect benefits of the maintenance effort and openness on the development
rate of next version, the firm can decrease the development effort and still meet the quality
threshold Z. Also, similar to the results in Proposition 4, with an increase in the valuation
of the current version, the firm finds it beneficial to increase either the maintenance effort
or the portion of the technology that is open, and there is no case in which both decrease.
Since, with a pre-determined quality requirement, the impacts on the effort of fixing
defects (i.e., u) and the portion of technology that is open (i.e., s) remain qualitatively
similar to those in Proposition 4 (with different thresholds), we do not present them formally.
Hence, in the following proposition, we present the impact of increasing k only on the the
development effort of the next version (which is different from that in Proposition 4).
Proposition 8. As the valuation of the current version (i.e., k) increases in a market that
has a pre-determined quality requirement of Z, the development effort of the next version
(i.e., v) decreases.
When the firm has a limited budget, despite minimum quality requirement for the next
version of the technology, we observe similar findings as in Observation 1.
2.4.2 Impact of the Valuation of the Next Version on Firm’s Behavior
We now examine how the valuation of the next version of the technology (i.e., h) affects
the extent of openness and the effort levels in the following proposition.
Proposition 9. As the valuation of the next version (i.e., h) increases in a market that has
a pre-determined quality requirement of Z, the portion of the technology that is open (i.e.,
s) increases but both the maintenance effort (i.e., u) and the development effort (i.e., v)
decrease.
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When there is no minimum quality threshold, with an increase in the valuation of the next
version (i.e., h), the firm actually increases both of the effort levels and sometimes decreases
the extent of openness depending on the other factors (see Section 2.3.5). However, the above
proposition shows that, with a pre-determined quality requirement, it is more profitable for
the firm to decrease both maintenance and development effort levels and increase the extent
of openness as the valuation of the next version increases. The reason for the difference in
the firm’s behavior is that, in the main model (i.e., Section 3), the quality of the next version
is not fixed and the firm can decide to increase or decrease the quality level depending on
the characteristics of the market such as the changes in the valuation of the technology.
However, in the current model, to take advantage of an increase in the valuation of the next
version, the firm would attempt to increase the demand. The demand for the next version
depends on: (i) the quality of the next version, and (ii) the extent of openness. Since the
goal of the firm is still meeting the minimum quality threshold, it is optimal to increase the
demand by increasing openness, but not by exceeding the quality threshold. Therefore, the
firm decreases both effort levels and saves cost while meeting only the quality threshold.
2.4.3 Impact of Changes in Market Requirements on Firm’s Behavior
As discussed earlier, the technology systems need to be replaced with new versions be-
yond a point. One of the reasons for switching to a new version is to provide the functions
needed or required by the market or existing customers. Hence, if such differences or require-
ments become more involved (i.e., Z increases), the firm would need to exert more effort in
order to meet or exceed those expectations. In effect, in such a case, we find that not only
the development effort of the next version increases, but also the maintenance effort (of the
current version) increases (because of its indirect contribution to the quality of next version;
see Equation (2.3)). In the next proposition, we summarize the impact of change in Z on
the extent of openness and the effort levels.
Proposition 10. As the market requirements (i.e., Z) increase,
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(a) the portion of the technology that is open (i.e., s) increases (resp., decreases) if the
market competitiveness is low, i.e., e < η (resp., e > η);
(b) both the development effort of the next version (i.e., v) and the maintenance effort of
the current version (i.e., u) increase.
If the market competitiveness is high (i.e., e > η), by reducing openness, the firm reduces
the risk of its (i) rivals getting a competitive edge, and (ii) customers tailoring the technology
to their needs and distributing it to other users. In addition, the firm is also able to reduce
the costs of collaboration with the open source community. On the other hand, if the
competitiveness is at a low level (i.e., e < η), the firm should increase the extent of openness
in order to benefit more from the open source community. As discussed earlier, regardless
of the competition level, the firm should increase the effort levels to meet the higher market
requirement. These findings are illustrated in Figure A.8 in Appendix A.3.
On the other hand, when the firm has a limited budget, our numerical results suggest
that if the market requirement increases, the firm may increase the extent of openness de-
spite higher market competition. In this case, the effort levels may not increase because the
firm already uses its available resources (as x(T ) = B). However, to be able to meet the
higher level of market requirement, the firm increases technology openness and expects the
open source community to help them develop a higher quality product. We summarize this
finding in the following observation.
Observation 3. When the budget is limited, as the market requirements increase, the firm
may increase the portion of the technology that is open (i.e., s∗) regardless of the level of
market competition (i.e., e).
2.5 Conclusions
This study is among the first of its kind to model the effects of making a portion of
its technology open source on the quality and maintenance of the current version of the
technology, and on the quality and development of the next version. In order to determine
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the best course of action in open source environments, the technology firms need to make
several decisions. In particular, they need to decide on the level of maintenance effort in
the current version and the level of development effort of the next version throughout the
planning horizon. In addition, a firm should also decide whether to make the technology open
source or keep it proprietary. If the managers decide to make the technology open source,
they also need to determine the portion of the technology that is going to be open source. Our
study aims to help managers in their decision making process and highlight the importance
of various factors that affect the optimal course of action, such as the characteristics of
the market (e.g., market competitiveness, market expectations from the next version of the
technology, and the valuation of the technology), characteristics of the firm (e.g., the cost of
fixing technology defects, the cost of development effort, and the available budget), and the
effects of making the technology fully or partially open source on the quality and demand of
current and next versions of the technology.
In this study, we derive and discuss several interesting and useful results and managerial
insights. For example, we find that the firm might keep its technology proprietary even in
conditions that seem to favor an open source environment. We also investigate the conditions
when the technology should be made fully open source, and find that the firm might make its
technology fully open source despite high collaboration costs. In addition, the sensitivities
of the current and next versions of the technology on openness influence the firm in deciding
whether to make the technology open or not. We further recommend managers to be careful
in planning their response to changes in the cost of managing the collaboration with the
open source community. This is because a drastic change in the behavior of the firm may be
observed if this cost changes. In particular, we find that the firm might change its decision
from keeping the technology proprietary to fully open (without any consideration of partial
openness) when the cost of collaboration decreases.
Furthermore, we investigate how the valuation of the technology might affect firm’s de-
cisions, and find that the managers should be careful in planning their response to changing
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market conditions. An increase in the valuation of the current version of the technology
might require the firm to reduce internal resources who are responsible for fixing defects and
developing the next version of the technology. Instead, the managers should be conducive
to increase the extent of openness in order to compensate for the reduction in fixing and
development efforts.
We further examine other business settings. For example, in some environments, firms
might be required to meet a specific quality threshold before the next version of the tech-
nology is released and the firm might have a limited budget. Hence, we also analyze such
settings and provide useful managerial insights. For example, we find that if the firm has a
limited budget, it might increase the extent of openness with increasing market requirements
despite high levels of market competition. However, if the firm is not constrained by a budget
and the market is highly competitive, the firm might decrease the extent of openness if the
market requirements increase.
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3. ESSAY 2: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING INFLUENCER MARKETING IN
SOCIAL NETWORKS: SELECTION AND SCHEDULING OF INFLUENCERS
3.1 Introduction
The ubiquity of social media allows businesses to easily access massive online social
networks and interact with users on these networks. The number of users on various social
media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, Twitter, and YouTube has increased
from 0.91 billion in 2010 to more than 2.46 billion in 2017 (eMarketer 2018). Consequently,
the total spending on social media advertising is expected to increase by two-fold from $7.52
billion in 2014 to $15.36 billion in 2018 to leverage the potential of social media (Statista
2018b). However, Aral et al. (2013) note that several operational aspects of advertising
through social networks are yet to receive a rigorous academic examination.
Although firms have a presence on social media, they often rely on opinion leaders or
influencers (e.g., Cristiano Ronaldo, a soccer player), who share their experiences with prod-
ucts on social media, to market their products. Indeed firms have advertised their products
through influencers for many decades. However, social media has enabled them to quantify
the value that influencers bring and effectiveness of their influence on social networks. The
focus of this study is on analyzing “influencer marketing” in social media for selection of
influencers and scheduling the posts of influencers over a planning horizon. Influencer mar-
keting involves hiring opinion leaders or influencers1 (e.g., users can influence their followers)
to seed (or post) ads on behalf of a firm on their social media platforms thereby disseminating
the contents of the ad to their existing followers on the platforms.
Influencer marketing relies on two essential features of social media platforms. First, in
addition to the massive size of social networks, social media enables influencers to directly
communicate with the audience without an intermediary. Second, social media platforms
facilitate message propagation, which plays a vital role in the success of influencer marketing.
1In the rest of this paper, we use the terms opinion leaders and influencers interchangeably.
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In particular, when an influencer posts a message (or an ad) on his/her social media page, the
message will directly reach all the followers of the influencer. Furthermore, the followers of
influencer may choose to share the same message on their social media page. As a result, the
message reaches the followers of followers who decide to share the message of an influencer.
In other words, the ad posted by an influencer reaches the audience that includes direct
followers of the influencer on social media and indirect followers of the influencer by virtue
of message propagation.
Advertising through influencers on social media, commonly known as seeding, has become
popular in the recent years. For example, Twitter (Karp 2016) reports that “nearly 40% of
Twitter users say they’ve made a purchase as a direct result of a Tweet from an influencer.”
In one study, it was found that 86% of the firms have utilized influencers to promote their
products in 2017 and 92% of these firms found this strategy to be effective (Linquia.com
2017). Another finding from this study is that the spending on influencer marketing by
firms (25% of firms on average spend $125,000-$250,000 per year) is set to increase by 39%
in 2018. The main reason behind the rise in influencer marketing is primarily attributed to
(i) the unique features of social media (as discussed earlier), and (ii) the findings of recent
studies, which suggest consumers are more likely to trust ads from influencers compared to
regular ads (Duran 2017). However, the literature on how to conduct an influencer marketing
campaign on social media is scarce. In this study, we seek to bridge this gap by developing a
data-driven optimization framework to conduct an influencer marketing campaign on social
media successfully.
Prominent social media influencers are often celebrities including actors, writers, musi-
cians, politicians, or athletes. Cristiano Ronaldo is one of the popular influencers with a
ten-year $1 billion deal with Nike to promote their products on his social media. Hookit
(2015) estimates that the tweets posted by Cristiano Ronaldo in 2016 to promote Nike brand
generated an estimated media value of $499.6 million for the firm. In addition to celebrity
influencers, there are a growing number of “non-celebrity” influencers on social media plat-
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forms. Micro influencers, as non-celebrity influencers are often referred to, are social bloggers
with expertise in a particular product category with a considerable amount of followings on
social media (e.g., 5,000 - 100,000 followers). Although micro influencers may not have large
followings like celebrities (e.g., Cristiano Ronaldo, who has more than 70 million followers on
Twitter), they are considered to (i) be more cost effective, (ii) generate higher social media
engagement, and (iii) have knowledge in the product domain and hence are considered more
trustworthy compared to celebrity influencers (Barker 2017). MarketingHub (2017) reports
that most of the influencers (around 90%) that are hired by the firms (e.g., Ford, Dr.Pepper,
and La Croix) belong to the category of micro-influencers. Furthermore, another study re-
ports the average price per social media post by a micro-influencer is around $271 (Heald
2017). Moreover, this form of advertising is not limited to a few countries but is prevalent
across the world. For example, a study estimates presence of more than 350,000 influencer
in India (Das 2018).
3.1.1 Problem Statement
The primary setting of the problem that we study is as follows. A firm wants to launch
an influencer marketing campaign on a social media platform, and the goal is to maximize
the effectiveness of this ad campaign. Industry reports suggest that firms typically work
with multiple influencers. For example, Linquia.com (2018) reports that on average 29%
of firms typically work with 1-10 influencers per marketing campaign and 52% of the firms
work with 10-25 influencers. Therefore, the success of an influencer marketing campaign
depends on (i) selecting the right set of influencers, and (ii) proper scheduling of ads by
multiple influencers during the planning horizon. The firms usually have a limited budget
for social media marketing, and hence can only hire a certain number of influencers for the
campaign and employ them throughout the planning horizon. The firm attains an expected
weighted benefit when the followers of the influencers receive and engage with the ad. In
this paper, we develop a comprehensive modeling framework to support decision making
related to conducting an influencer marketing campaign on a social media platform (such as
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Twitter). To do this, we break the problem into two phases.
In the first phase, we begin by developing an optimization model for selection of an op-
timal influencer set from a larger set of influencers (which we refer to as set W ) who are
appropriate for promoting the firm’s products. This set W is obtained by marketers qualita-
tively based on various product attributes (York 2018). For example, if a firm is interested
in promoting athletic shoes, it can identify a short list of influencers in the domains of fitness
and sports. Marketers can use platforms such as www.buzzsumo.com or www.shoutcart.com
to identify a list of influencers for set W . A simple web search revealed that there are approx-
imately 150 micro-influencers in the domains of fitness and sports on one of the platforms.
Marketers can use these 150 influencers as set W or the size of set W can be further reduced
based on other attributes. Furthermore, according to Businesswire (2016), about 67% of
marketers consider identifying the right set of influencers as one of their biggest operational
challenges. Common industry practice is to hire popular influencers (i.e., influencers with
large following). However, using real data collected from Twitter, we demonstrate that this
strategy is sub-optimal (refer to Section 3.4). To model the problem of selection of an opti-
mal influencer set from set W , we need to account for the following three unique features of
online social networks.
• First, different influencers have different levels of following (i.e., number of users fol-
lowing an influencer) and engagement (i.e., followers sharing the posts of influencers
to their followers). For example, an influencer might have a large following but lower
engagement levels, while another influencer might have a relatively lower following but
higher engagement levels. As a result, selecting an influencer either by the number of
followers or by engagement levels may not be optimal.
• Second, influencers might have a common subset of overlapping followers. Conse-
quently, the effect of multiple exposures (i.e., a follower getting exposed to the same
ad from multiple influencers) needs to be considered.
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• Third, in the context of the current study, social media users may receive the same
ad from multiple influencers (i.e., if a user follows multiple influencers) and also from
followers of influencers. For example, let us assume that users Y and Z follow influencer
X and user Z follows user Y. When influencer X tweets message, it reaches users Y
and Z. Further, if user Y chooses to retweet, the message reaches user Z the second
time. We define the influence of an influencer (i.e., X) on a follower as the influence
of an opinion leader and the influence of user Y on user Z is referred to as the peer
influence (See Figure 3.1).
Hence, the problem of selection of influencers who can seed a firm’s ad such that the message
reaches their followers and also influence their followers to propagate the message to other
social network members is a classic combinatorial optimization problem.






Next, given that firms hire multiple influencers for their marketing campaign, it is also
important to sequence the ads posted by influencers on social media over a planning horizon.
For example, if a firm chooses to hire ten influencers for three weeks to promote a product,
the following questions arise. Should the influencers randomly post the ad on their social
media pages or should all the influencers post the ad simultaneously at the same time or
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same day or is there an optimal sequence in which the influencers should post the ad on
social media? The problem of scheduling of ads to be posted by influencers is not trivial
as one needs to take into account (i) the multiple exposure effect and (ii) the impact of
time between each exposure. The multiple exposure effect is because of the following two
reasons. First, an influencer is often hired to post the same ad several times, and hence
the effect of a follower receiving the same ad multiple times from the influencer needs to be
taken into account. Second, as influencers may have a common subset of followers, the firm
needs to take into account ads reaching the audience from multiple influencers and multiple
times during the planning horizon. Furthermore, findings from an empirical study that we
conduct suggest that time between two exposures of the same ad also plays a vital role
in determining whether a follower engages with the ad or not. Hence, the problem of ad
scheduling by influencers is not trivial. Consequently, in the second phase, we address this
issue by developing an optimization framework to optimally sequence the posting of ads by
multiple influencers (who are selected in the first phase) over a planning horizon, a relevant
and critical problem from firm’s perspective.
3.1.2 Contributions
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to develop a comprehensive optimiza-
tion framework to conduct an influencer marketing campaign in social media. As discussed
earlier, our framework consists of two phases, namely, (i) selecting influencers or seeders in
the context of influencer marketing on social media, and (ii) scheduling of ads by multiple
influencers over a planning horizon.
With regard to the problem of selecting an influencer set, our contributions are as follows.
• We develop a mixed integer non-linear model (hereon, we refer to this model as the main
model) based on observations and findings from an empirical study that we conduct
using Twitter data. We show that the complexity of this model is NP-Hard. Hence,
the need for fast and effective solutions to solve large-size problems is supported by
the combinatorial explosion in the number of feasible influencer sets.
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• To obtain a solution for the main model in realistic time, we develop an alternative
model that provides a tight upper bound to the main model. Although the upper
bound model is non-linear and intractable, we reformulate the model as a linear integer
program using separable programming techniques. This enables us to obtain an optimal
solution for the upper bound model for small and medium-size problems. Further,
to deal with a large-size problem, we provide an LP-based largest fraction rounding
heuristic.
• We find that the average gap is less than 6% between the upper bound model and
the main model. Furthermore, we find that the solution provided by the upper bound
model is an optimal solution for the main model in more than 94% of the instances.
• We develop a lower bound to the main model by ignoring peer influence. We find that
ignoring peer influence could lead to solutions significantly worse than the optimal
solutions. In particular, our numerical analysis reveals that the average gap between
the lower bound and the optimal solution of the main model ranges from 5% to 81%.
Hence, it is in the best interest of the firm to consider peer influence in modeling the
influencer selection problem in promoting a product.
Next, we develop an optimization model to help firms with scheduling of ads by multiple
influencers based on observations and findings from an empirical study. To summarize, our
study provides a framework for managers to effectively conduct an influencer marketing
campaign on social media. The model provides a guideline for the selection of influencers,
the frequency of the ads to be posted by influencers, and the schedule for posting ads.
We also find that the objective function of the selection model is monotonic and there
remains a threshold on the number of influencers that we can hire. This is because of dimin-
ishing marginal returns of hiring an additional influencer. We demonstrate how the selection
model can be implemented via two case studies that we conduct using data from Twitter.
We also validate the superiority of the selection model against current industry benchmarks
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via the case studies. The results of both case studies demonstrate that the model-based solu-
tions have significant gains in the effectiveness over the current industry practice of selecting
influencers. With regard to the scheduling model, we find that the cost of conducting an in-
fluencer marketing campaign increases non-linearly with minimum engagement requirements
of the firm. Further, we provide insights on how frequently influencers are used throughout
the planning horizon.
3.1.3 Related Literature
This research builds on the existing research in operations and computer science. There
is a large body of related work on information diffusion in the computer science literature.
The main focus of this literature is on the propagation of influence of active users (i.e., users
who have received the information) on inactive users (i.e., users who have not received the
information) (Domingos and Richardson 2001). In particular, two of the most extensively
studied models are the linear threshold model (e.g. Kempe et al. 2003) and the independent
cascade model (e.g. Nguyen and Zheng 2013). In the linear threshold model, an inactive user
gets influenced based on the number of connections to the active nodes. On the other hand, in
the independent cascade model, a user in the network is influenced with a certain probability
by an active and connected node independently. That is, each node independently activates
an inactive node (if they are connected) by a predetermined probability. In contrast, in our
study, the active nodes have a cumulative influence effect on the inactive nodes, i.e., multiple
active nodes activate the inactive nodes simultaneously (rather than independent influence).
More importantly, the problem that we analyze in the current study is specialized in that it
focuses on the specific problem of influencer marketing.
The problem of identification of network seeders shares some similarity with maximal
covering location problem that has been extensively studied in the operations literature. In
Table 3.1, we compare the models that we develop in our study to models that were analyzed
in the prior literature. The main model of the current study (formulated as Model M2L) is
rather unique to the context of influencer marketing on social media as we incorporate the
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effect of peer influence in the model. We show that firms can experience a significant profit
loss when implementing a policy that is computed based on a model that ignores the peer
effect. The profit loss is particularly significant when the online network has a high number
of connections in the second level, and the influence of the peer effect is high. Moreover, the
size of the problem that we study in this paper is quite large compared to the ones that were
previously studied in the literature.
Table 3.1: Related Literature in Other Domains
• Set W denotes predetermined influencer set. Set V represents followers and followers of followers. t represents the number
of influencers to be selected from set W .
• Model M2L denotes problem of identification of influencers. Model M1L denotes a relaxed version of Model M2L. More
details regarding the models are provided in the sections that follow.
Our Models Current
Study
Chan et al. (2016) Camm et al. (2002)







Structural Properties Yes Yes No
Problem size |W | = 25 - 100;
|V | ≥ 25, 000;
t = 5 to 50
|W | = 10000;
|V | = 5000;
t = 5 to 200
|W | = 50 - 400;
|V | = 300 to 450;
t = 1 to 5
The other literature stream that our paper contributes to is ad scheduling. Prior literature
has analyzed how ads are scheduled in different contexts such as television, websites, and
mobiles has been extensively studied in the operations and information systems literature
(e.g., Bollapragada et al. 2004; Kumar et al. 2006; Sun et al. 2017). However, our work is
among the first, to the best of our knowledge, to address the problem of scheduling of ads
by multiple influencers over a planning horizon.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we formally present the
framework. In Section 3.3, we present the main model and its relaxations. In Section 3.4, we
present the results of our case studies. We present the scheduling framework for influencer
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marketing in Section 3.5. Finally, we conclude with future research directions in Section 3.6.
3.2 Problem Background
We start by focusing on developing a model to determine an optimal influencer set in the
context of influencer marketing on social media. To model this problem, we first understand
the underlying structure of online social networks. While there are several online social
networks such as Facebook, Instagram, and LinkedIn, we develop our framework in the
context of Twitter, a popular social media platform.2 Over the last decade, Twitter emerged
to be an effective social broadcasting tool with more than 335 million active users (Statista
2018a). Twitter users can post short messages (also referred to as tweets) with the length of
a message not exceeding 280 characters.
Twitter users can follow other users on the network (unless the users are private). Further,
if user X follows user Y, then X immediately receives all the tweets from user Y. Another
unique feature of Twitter is the ability to share or “retweet” the tweets of other users.
Retweeting is a simple function of Twitter and users only need to click a single button to
retweet someone’s message. By retweeting user Y ’s tweet, user X is sharing the original
message (of user Y ) to his/her followers. Specifically, retweeting can be seen as a form of
message propagation.
To learn about the underlying structure of the online social networks, we collect data on
influencers and their followers from Twitter. Using this data, we construct a network graph
to understand the relationship among Twitter users. Figure 3.2 illustrates one such network
graph of two influencers (denoted by Influencer 1 and Influencer 2) and their followers who
are connected by a directional edge (influencer→ follower). From this graph, we can observe
that these two influencers have several common followers (e.g., nodes 23 and 30) and the
followers of these influencers follow each other as well (e.g., nodes 13 and 19). Thus, we need
to account for the following crucial characteristics of online social networks. First, influencers
2Although the context of this study is Twitter, our framework can be applied to other popular social
media platforms including Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube.
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may have a common subset of followers. Hence, when two influencers tweet the same ad,
the common subset of followers would receive the ad multiple times. As a result, we need to
account for the multiple exposure effect of an ad. Second, directional edges exist not only
between an influential user and others but also between the followers of the influential users.
In particular, a follower might get an ad from the influencer that s/he follows, in addition to
another follower who retweets the ad of an influencer. From these observations, we proceed
to develop the model for determining an optimal influencer set. We now formally state the
problem of determining an optimal influencer set along with the parameters and variables
used. We refer to this problem as the main problem.
Figure 3.2: A Example of Online Social Network
3.2.1 Problem Definition
Technical Definition:
Instance: A social network associated with users of a domain of interest is represented by a
directed bipartite graph G(N,E), where N is the set of vertices representing the users in the
domain of interest, N = W ∪ V . Set W consists of potential network seeders or influential
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users whereas set V contains the direct followers of influential users in W and the followers
of direct followers of influencers in set W . Set E denotes the set of directed arcs within V,
and W to V that represent the follower relationship. A user j ∈ V retweets a message of
user i ∈ W with a probability of pij ≥ 0. In addition, a user j ∈ V retweets a message of
user k ∈ V with a probability of pkj ≥ 0. The retweeted message reaches the followers of
followers who retweeted. The number of followers of followers who retweet is denoted by Fj.
We are interested in determining a set of t influential users from set W such that the firm
maximizes the expected benefit from the marketing campaign. The variables and parameters
used in this model are summarized in Table 3.2.
Solution: Find t influencers from set W . The value of t is given.
Objective: Maximize the expected benefit to the firm for placing ads on social media via
influencers.
3.2.2 Model Parameters
Expected Benefit to Firm: Prior literature in marketing suggests that advertising provides
visibility to the firm, and thus positively affects the sales of a firm. However, our conversa-
tions with marketers along with recent literature indicate that in addition to the reach of
the ad (i.e., number of followers who receive the message), follower’s engagement with the
message is often used to measure the effectiveness of a social media ad campaign (Lambrecht
et al. 2018). Consistent with recent literature, we operationalize engagement via number of
retweets (e.g., Long 2015a; Lambrecht et al. 2018). By retweeting the message of influencers,
the user is spreading or transmitting the message to their followers and thus increasing the
reach of the message beyond the followers of the influencers (Kwak et al. 2010) and validat-
ing the content of the tweet (Suh et al. 2010). Consequently, in line with industry practices
and prior academic literature, we assume that a firm attains benefit (denoted by bj) only
when user j ∈ V retweets a message from an influencer. Although in the current study,
we operationalize engagement via number of retweets, other engagement metrics including
number of comments, number of likes, and number of clicks on the links in the tweet can be
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1, if user j ∈ V is a direct follower of k ∈ V ,
0, otherwise.
pij = probability of user j ∈ V retweeting the message of influencer i ∈W ; pij = 0 if aij = 0.
pkj = probability of user j ∈ V retweeting the message of user k ∈ V ; pij = 0 if ajk = 0.
bj = benefit to the firm when the tweet reaches user j ∈ V through i ∈W .
dj = benefit to the firm when the tweet reaches one follower of user j ∈ V .




1, if i ∈W is chosen as a seeder,
0, otherwise.
gj = the cumulative probability of user j ∈ V retweeting a message.
yj = the cumulative probability of user j ∈ V retweeting a message from users in W .
δj = the cumulative probability of user j ∈ V not retweeting a message from users in W .
αj = the cumulative probability of user j ∈ V not retweeting a message from users in V .
used to operationalize engagement.
Furthermore, when followers in set V decide to share the message with their followers,
there is an additional benefit to the firm as the ad reaches the second level followers. We
assume that a firm attains a benefit of dj per follower of follower j. Based on the data that is
available to firms from Twitter, we cannot identify the number of times a follower of follower
retweets. Hence, we do not consider engagement beyond the second level. To summarize,
the total expected benefit that a firm gets is the sum of benefits derived when a user gets
the message from multiple users (i.e., from users in set W and set V ).
Network Connections and Followers: The parameters aij and akj denote the links between
an influencer and a follower or between two followers. This data can be obtained from the
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social networking data. If
∑
j aij is high for influencer i, it denotes that the influencer has
large number of followers. Likewise, If
∑
j akj is high for a follower k, it implies that user k
has high number of followers who also follow other influencers. Furthermore, Fj denotes the
total number of followers of followers, which can be obtained from the profile of followers on
social media.
Probability of Retweet: When user j ∈ V receives a tweet from influencer i ∈ W, user j may
decide to retweet the tweet or not retweet. In other words, there is a probability (which
we denote by pij) with which user j retweets a tweet of influencer i. This probability is
similar to adoption probability in the diffusion literature and click probability in the context
of web and mobile ads. Prediction of these probabilities has received some attention in the
recent literature. For example, Mookerjee et al. (2016) develop a Logit model using web
user’s characteristics to predict the probability of a user clicking on an ad. Fang et al.
(2013) develop a Bayesian learning procedure to predict adoption probability of a follower
while Goyal et al. (2010) predict the probability of influence in social networks using existing
network data. Therefore, in this paper, we consider that the firms can calculate pij and it is
known to the firm.
Multiple Exposure Effect: The effect of multiple exposure on the total probability of retweet
can be modeled as follows. Let p1 be the probability that follower j retweets a message from
influencer X1 and p2 be the probability that follower j retweets a message from influencer
X2. The probability that follower j retweets the message of either influencer X1 or influencer
X2 is p1 + p2 − p1p2 = [1− (1− p1)(1− p2)]. More generally, the effect of multiple exposure




Our method of modeling total probability to incorporate the effect of multiple exposures
implies that a follower is likely to retweet the ad only once and the marginal probability
of a user retweeting (probability per exposure) an influencer’s message decreases with the
number of exposures. This way of modeling effect of multiple exposures is consistent with
existing literature on diffusion and mobile advertisement (e.g., Kumar et al. 2007; Goyal
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et al. 2010; Sun et al. 2017). Furthermore, marketing literature has long studied the impact
of ad repetition on consumer attitudes. In particular, literature in this stream argues that
the probability of consumer interacting with an ad depends on number of times that the
user has been exposed to the same ad (i.e., number of times that the user has displayed on
his/her social media page) and the marginal benefit of an ad is highest at the first exposure
and decreases with additional exposures.
To further validate this assumption, we conduct an empirical analysis using data collected
from Twitter. To do this, we collect data related to 18,571 tweets posted by 37 influencers.
The details of this empirical study are provided in Appendix B.3. The main finding of this
empirical study is that the total number of retweets of an ad increases with the number of
exposures. Figure 3.3 depicts the empirically predicted relationship between total number
of retweets and number of exposures. As can be seen in the figure, the first exposure is pre-
dicted to get the maximum number of retweets and the number of retweets tend to decrease
with additional number of tweets.

























3.3 Selection of Influencers: The Main Model
In this section, we first present the problem of selecting an optimal influencer set, and
then the relaxations of this problem. Hereon, we refer to this problem as the main prob-
lem or Problem M2L as it considers two-level influence. The mathematical formulation for
Model M2L is as follows.















(1− pijxi), ∀j ∈ V (3.3)




(1− pkjyk), ∀j ∈ V (3.5)
gj = 1− αjδj, ∀j ∈ V (3.6)
xi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ W. (3.7)
In the above formulation, the objective function, Ψ2 (i.e., Equation 3.1), maximizes the
total benefit to the firm when tweets reach the users on Twitter. Constraint (3.2) ensures
that at most t number of influencers are selected. Constraint (3.3) denotes the expected prob-
ability of user j ∈ V not retweeting message from influencer i ∈ W, while Constraint (3.4)
represents the probability that user j retweets the message from influencer i ∈ W. Constraint
(3.5) represents the expected probability that follower j ∈ V does not retweet the message
from k ∈ V. Constraint (3.6) is the expected probability of user j ∈ V retweeting a message.
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Finally, Constraint (3.7) imposes the binary constraint on the decision variable xi. Note
that Constraints (3.3), (3.5), and (3.6) make the problem non-linear and difficult to solve.
In Theorem 1, we formally prove the complexity of the problem. Theorem 1 asserts that the
problem to identify an optimal influencer set is strongly NP-hard.
Theorem 1. The decision problem corresponding to the multiplicative two-level influence
problem (i.e., model M2L) is strongly NP-complete.
The theorem is formally proved in Appendix B.1.1. For our reduction, we choose 3-Satisfiability
(3SAT) problem, which is a well-known strongly NP-complete problem (Garey and Johnson
1979).
The first proposition deals with a scenario where an optimal solution for Model M2L
can be obtained in polynomial time. In particular, when the social network is disjointed,
i.e., a user j ∈ Vi follows only one influencer i in set W or other followers of influencer







k∈Vi(1−pkjpik)], Vi represents the set of followers
of user i.
Proposition 11. If the social network is disjointed (i.e., any user j ∈ V follows only one
influencer i in Set W and some followers of influencer i), then there exists an optimal
solution to Problem M2L that includes the first t users in Set W after sorting them in the







Vi represents the set of followers of user i.
We present the proof in Section B.1.2 of the Appendix.
Proposition 11 has an important practical relevance. It provides a condition when the
solution to Model M2L is analytically tractable. Nevertheless, when the social network is
not disjointed, our plan to solve Model M2L is as follows. We first reformulate this model as
Model M2LUB. Next, we provide a linear approximation to Model M2LUB, which is a mixed
integer non-linear program. By converting the non-linear integer program to a linear integer
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program, we now are able to solve Model M2LUB for small and medium-size problems.
Furthermore for large-size problems, we provide a rounding heuristic to obtain solution for
Model M2LUB. Finally, we show that Model M2LUB provides a tight upper bound to Model
M2L, hence can provide us with near-optimal solutions for the main problem. We present
Model M2LUB in the next subsection.
3.3.1 M2LUB - Relaxation of Model M2L
As discussed earlier, the decision problem corresponding to the multiplicative two-level
influence problem (i.e., model M2L) is strongly NP-complete. Also, constraints (3.3) and
(3.5) make the problem non-linear (and difficult to solve). We start by defining a new
model M2LUB, by replacing constraint (3.5) in Model M2L with ᾱj =
∏
k∈V (1− pkj)yk .
The mathematical formulation of Model M2LUB is presented below:













(1− pkj)yk , ∀j ∈ V (3.9)
ḡj = 1− ᾱjδj, ∀j ∈ V (3.10)
xi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ W. (3.11)
Replacing constraint (3.5) with (3.9) will allow us to linearly approximate the non-linear
integer program, which we discuss shortly (in subsection (3.3.1.1)). Before doing so, we first
characterize the relationship between Models M2L and M2LUB in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. The objective value of Model M2LUB (i.e., ΨUB2 ) is an upper bound to the
objective value of Model M2L (i.e., Ψ2).
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We present the proof in Section B.1.3 of the Appendix. For this proof, we rely on Taylor’s
expansion of the following two logarithmic functions: (i) ln(1− py), and (ii) ln(1− p)× y.
Theorem 2 implies that an optimal solution to Model M2LUB (i.e., ΨUB2 ) provides an
upper bound to Ψ2. Next, in the proposition below, we show that the solution for Model
M2LUB is an optimal solution for the main model in certain instances.
Proposition 12. The objective value of Model M2LUB (i.e., ΨUB2 ) tends to the objective
value of Model M2L (i.e., Ψ2) when the peer influence (i.e., pkj, probability of user j ∈ V
retweeting the message of user k ∈ V ) tends to zero.
This proposition is proved using the binomial expansion of (1− x)n. We formally prove this
proposition in Section B.1.4 in the Appendix.
Proposition 12 implies that if the peer influence or the probability of users in set V
retweeting the messages from other users in set V tends to zero (i.e., pkj → 0), ΨUB2 → Ψ2.
Alternatively, when the number of edges between followers in set V tends to zero (i.e.,
followers do not follow each other), by solving Model M2LUB, we can obtain an optimal
solution for Model M2L. In Theorem 3, we formally prove the complexity of the problem.
Theorem 3. The decision problem corresponding to the relaxation of the main problem (i.e.,
Model M2LUB) is strongly NP-complete.
The theorem is formally proved in Appendix B.1.1. For our reduction, we choose 3-Satisfiability
(3SAT) problem, which is a well-known strongly NP-complete problem (Garey and Johnson
1979).
3.3.1.1 Linear Approximation of Model M2LUB
Clearly, we see that constraints (3.3), (3.9), and (3.10) make Model M2LUB a non-linear
mixed integer program. We reformulate the problem to transform the model to be separable
as proposed by Camm et al. (2002). Let W<1j = {i|0 < pij < 1} and W=1j = {i|pij = 1}. We
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(1− pij)xi , ∀j ∈ V (3.12)
yj ≤ 1− hj +
∑
i∈W=1j
xi, ∀j ∈ V (3.13)
Proposition 13. Following Camm et al. (2002), the mathematical formulation for model
M2LUB is equivalent to Equation (3.8) subject to constraints (3.2), (3.12) to (3.13), and
(3.9) to (3.11).
Further, since hj and ᾱj are strictly positive, we can now take log of each side of the















ln (1− pij)xi, ∀j ∈ V (3.16)
yj ≤ 1− hj +
∑
i∈W=1j




ln (1− pkj)yk, ∀j ∈ V (3.18)
ḡj = 1− αjδj, ∀j ∈ V (3.19)
0 ≤ ḡj ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ V ; hj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ V ; xi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ W. (3.20)
We now present a method to approximate the non-linear term ln(hj) by taking a convex
combination of points, λ, on the curve on similar lines as Bradley et al. (1977) and Camm
et al. (2002). Let Rj be the set of break points used to approximate the interval from 0 to
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1. Let Bjt be the t
th breakpoint and λjt the weighting of the t
th breakpoint. We then make




















γjt = 1. (3.26)
Next, let ρ = ᾱjδj. Taking log on both sides, we get ln(ρ) = ln(ᾱj) + ln(δj). we can now










ωjt = 1. (3.29)
Substituting the above values of hj, ln(hj), ᾱj, ln(ᾱj), ρj, and ln(ρj) into Equations 3.16 to
3.19, we get the linearized approximation of problemM2LUB that is presented in modelM2LUB−
AP.

























xi, ∀j ∈ V (3.33)
∑
t∈Rj






















xi, ∀j ∈ V (3.37)
∑
t∈Rj
γjt = 1, ∀j ∈ V (3.38)
∑
t∈Rj
ωjt = 1, ∀j ∈ V (3.39)
0 ≤ yj ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ V ; 0 ≤ ḡj ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ V ; λjt ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ V ∀t ∈ Rj (3.40)
xi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ W. (3.41)
We note that as the number of breakpoints (t) increases, the accuracy of the approxima-
tion increases. Clearly, the number of breakpoints can also vary for different approximations
(i.e., Constraints (3.33), (3.36), and (3.37)). Although we provide a formulation to ap-
proximate Model M2LUB, the problem is still a mixed integer program. While the current
computational capacities allow us to solve small and medium-size problems directly using
the available solvers such as CPLEX and Gurobi, they fail to provide an optimal solution for
large size problems. We now present an iterative heuristic based on the fractional rounding
principle to solve large-size problems of Model M2LUB − AP.
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3.3.1.2 Iterative Rounding Heuristic
In this heuristic, we first relax the integer constraints for variables xi in Model M2L
UB−
AP. Relaxing the integer constraints transforms the model to a linear program, thus allowing
us to solve the problem in polynomial time. However, this could give us fraction solutions
for all the decision variables. We round-off the largest fraction of xi, obtained from the first
run of linear programming model, to one. We repeat this procedure until t number of xi’s
are equal to one. This algorithm is formally presented below.
Algorithm 1 Iterative Rounding Heuristic:
1: Ŵ ← W , U ← ∅.
2: while |U | < t do
3: Solve Model M2LUB−AP as a linear program and obtain solution X = {xi|i ∈ W}.
4: Denote î = arg maxi∈Ŵ{xi}, then update U ← U ∪ {̂i}, Ŵ ← Ŵ\{̂i}.
5: Add an additional constraint xî = 1 to Model M2L
UB − AP.
6: end while
To demonstrate the improvement of solving time of the approximate model, we conduct
a numerical study. In this study, we run ten test instances to compare the CPU run time to
solve Model M2L using a non-linear solver (i.e., BONMIN) and the Model M2LUB − AP
using a linear solver (i.e., CPLEX). The results are presented in Table 3.3. As expected, we
can see the huge difference in run times between these two models.
3.3.2 Performance of Upper Bound Model
In this section, we assess the quality of the upper bound that we develop in the previous
subsection (i.e., Model M2LUB) with respect to the optimal solution for the main problem
(i.e., Model M2L). To do this, we perform an extensive numerical analysis. As the measure
of quality of the upper bound, we use the percentage optimality gap, which is calculated
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Table 3.3: Computational Evaluation of Upper Bound Model (M2LUB)
Problem Size Run Time in CPU secs
|W | |V | t M2L M2LUB −AP
25 250 10 15.64 0.92
25 500 10 321.56 6.83
25 750 10 483.58 29.92
25 1000 10 1169.22 91.84
25 1250 10 2583.66 8.91
50 250 20 1.05 1.05
50 500 20 211.34 36.19
50 750 20 745.81 2.50
50 1000 20 1782.54 5.08
50 1250 20 3225.08 9.28
by % Optimality Gap =
ΨUB2 −Ψ2
Ψ2
, where ΨUB2 is the objective function value of the upper
bound problem and Ψ2 is the objective function value of the main problem. A commercial
non-linear solver was used to solve both the models.3 Basic Open-source Nonlinear Mixed
Integer programming (BONMIN) is an open-source solver for general mixed integer non-
linear programming problems. BONMIN solver is run on Intel Core i7-7700 CPU with 3.60
GHz (2 cores) with 64GB ram.
To capture different real-life instances, we generate an experimental test bed by varying
the key parameters of the model that could potentially affect the quality of solutions. The
test bed is generated as follows. The number of influencers is 25 (i.e., |W | = 25) and Size
of set V is 250 (this represents a relatively small problem size. This assumption is required
to ensure that the non-linear solver is able to provide us with an optimal solution for Model
M2L). Benefit, bj is drawn from continuous uniform distribution, Uniform(0, 10) and dj is
drawn from a continuous uniform distribution, Uniform(0.1, 1). The number of followers of
followers in set V , Fj is drawn from continuous uniform distribution, Uniform(100, 1000).
3We note that the solution provided by current non-linear solvers may not be globally optimal. However,
since the same solver is being used for solving both the problems the results pertaining to % optimality gap
are appropriate.
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The first level influence was set to pij ∈ {Low, High}.4 The second level influence was
set to pkj ∈ {Low, High}. Next, the number of edges between influencers in set W and
followers in set V was set to, aij ∈{Low, Medium, High}. Finally, the number of edges
between the followers of influencers is set to akj ∈{Low, Medium, High}. To summarize, we
mainly vary the following parameters in each problem instance: aij, akj, pij, and pkj. Thus,
we generated 3× 2× 2× 3 = 36 combinations. For each of the 36 instances, we conducted
runs for cardinality t ∈ {1, 2, ..10}. Further, to estimate the average performance of solutions
provided by the models, for each of the 360 instances, we simulate the model for 30 new
instances by randomly drawing the values for the following parameters: bj, dj, and Fj. Thus
combining all parameter settings, we generated a set of 10,800 instances to ensure that our
test bed covers different scenarios.
The average performance of Model M2LUB against M2L in terms of % Optimality Gap
for each of the 36 core instances are summarized in Table B.8 (in the online appendix). The
average % Optimality Gap presented in the table represents the mean of 300 instances and
the maximum % Optimality Gap denotes the maximum gap over 300 instances. As can be
seen from the table, the gap is less than 5% (both average and maximum) across all the
instances. Figure 3.4 illustrates the performance of the upper bound model against the main
model over different values of akj and pkj. The gap between Model M2L and Model M2L
UB
decreases with the magnitude of second level influence and the number of edges within set
V. This leads us to our first managerial insight.
Insight 1. In a social network with relatively low second level influence (i.e., pkj) and low
number of edges between the followers of the influencers (i.e., akj), the benefit estimated by
Model M2LUB, i.e., ΨUB2 is approximately equal to the benefit estimated by Model M2L, i.e.,
Ψ2.
The intuition behind Insight 1 is as follows. The main difference between Models M2L
and M2LUB is the constraint which calculates the gain in total probability as a result of
4The distributions of Low and High are presented in Appendix B.4.
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second level influence. Hence, when the second level influence is low, the solutions of these
two models should be close to each other. This observation is consistent with the finding in
Proposition 1.




















Number of Edges within set V
High Second Level Influence
Low Second Level Influence
Figure 3.5: % Same Solution – Models
M2L vs M2LUB
Next, the last column in Table B.8 denotes the % of times that the solution set obtained
from the upper bound model (i.e., M2LUB) was the optimal solution set for the main model
(i.e., M2L) over 300 simulations. As can be seen, the solution set (i.e., optimal influencer
set) obtained from the upper bound problem is an optimal solution for the main model in
excess of 94% of instances in our test bed. Figure 3.5 summarizes the average performance,
in terms of an optimal solution set, of Model M2LUB against Model M2L, over different
values of akj and pkj. The interquartile box denotes 25%, 50%, and 75% percentiles, the
whiskers indicate the minimum and maximum % same solution over 10,800 instances. The
mean of means is represented by the cross mark in the figure. From the figure, we can infer
that with lower values of akj and pkj, the optimal solution of Model M2L
UB is an optimal
solution of Model M2L in increasing number of instances.
To summarize, the above computational results suggest that average gap between the
objective values of Model M2LUB and Model M2L is less than 4.52%. Furthermore, the
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solutions for Models M2LUB and M2L is same for over 94.33% of the instances. Given
that our test bed covers a wide variety of scenarios, the results suggest that Model M2LUB
provides a tight upper bound to Model M2L and near-optimal solution for the main model.
3.3.3 Single Level Influence Model
In this subsection, we present the second relaxation of the main model (i.e., Model M2L)
by considering only single level influence. In particular, we ignore the influence that users
in set V can exert on other users in set V, we now assume that pkj = 0 (that is there is
no peer effect). In such a scenario, yj = gj. We prove that this relaxed model provides
the lower bound for the main problem. The main purpose of this model is to demonstrate
the drawbacks of ignoring the second level influence (i.e., peer influence). We proceed by
presenting the formulation for this relaxed problem referred to as Model M1L.















(1− pijxi), ∀j ∈ V (3.44)
xi ∈ {0, 1}. (3.45)
The following theorem discusses the computational complexity of Model M1L.
Theorem 4. The decision problem corresponding to the above problem (Model M1L) is
strongly NP-complete.
The reduction is from the NP-Complete 3-Satisfiability problem (Garey and Johnson 1979).
See Section B.1.1 in the Appendix for the formal proof.
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Lemma 5. The solution of Model M1L is a lower bound to the solution for Model M2L.
The proof for this theorem is presented in Appendix B.1.5. Lemma 5 formally characterizes
the relationship between Model M2L and Model M1L. Furthermore, note that Model M1L
is a non-linear mixed integer program. However, this problem can be approximated linearly
through separable programming method that we used to linearize Model M2LUB. The
detailed description of the approximation is provided in Section B.2 of the Appendix. The
ordering of objective functions Models M2L,M2LUB, and M1L is presented in Lemma 6.
Lemma 6. The ordering of objective functions of Models M2L,M2LUB, and M1L is as
follows: Ψ1 ≤ Ψ2 ≤ ΨUB2 .
3.3.4 Comparing Main Model and Lower Bound Model
We conduct numerical analysis to observe the impact of ignoring the second level influ-
encer or the peer effect (i.e., pkj = 0). We utilize the same experimental test bed that as in
Section 3.3.2.
Table B.9 (in the appendix) summarizes the performance of Model M1L against Model
M2L on this test bed. This table is illustrated in Figure 3.6. As can be seen in the figure,
the optimality gap is quite high in most of the instances. Furthermore, we observe that the
gap between the lower bound model and the main model is relatively high (i.e., greater than
20%) when the probability of retweet in the second level (i.e., pkj) is relatively high.
Insight 2. Ignoring peer influence in the main model to select influencers could lead to
significant loss in objective value.
Furthermore, the last column of Table B.9 represents the percentage of instances where
the solution set (i.e., optimal influencer set) obtained from the lower bound model is same
as the solution set of the main problem. This result is summarized in Figure 3.7. As can be
seen, the solution set (i.e., optimal influencer set) obtained from the lower bound problem is
not an optimal solution for the main model in the majority of the instances. These results
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Number of Edges within set V
High Second Level Influence
Low Second Level Influence
Figure 3.7: % Same Solution – Models
M2L vs M1L
indicate that ignoring the second level influence (which most of the prior literature does)
could lead to a sub-optimal solution. This result is summarized in the next insight.
Insight 3. High second-level influence as a result of high values of pkj and akj increases the
optimality gap between Models M2L and M1L. In addition, the likelihood of Model M1L
providing an optimal solution to Model M2L decreases as pkj and akj increase.
Insight 3 concludes that ignoring second level influence could lead to a higher likelihood
of not obtaining an optimal solution to the main problem of selection of influencers. Further,
this likelihood will increase with higher values of pkj and akj. As can be seen in the box and
whisker plot (in Figure 3.7), the performance of Model M1L in terms of providing an optimal
solution to the main problem reduces for high akj and pkj. This insight is important not
only to the firms using influencer marketing but also the social media platforms. In order
to improve the effectiveness of influencer marketing campaigns, social media platforms can
share necessary data with the firms so that the firms identify the right set of influencers for
their ad campaign.
3.4 Case Study - Influencers on Twitter
This section describes the two case studies that we conduct to illustrate how our opti-
mization framework for selection of influencers can be applied to a real-world application
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and to quantify the value of model-based solutions against the current industry benchmarks
of selecting influencers. For the purpose of this case study, we obtain data from Twitter. For
the first case study, we randomly identify 18 influencers who actively promote products on
Twitter. The Federal Trade Commission act requires adding a hashtag ′#ad′ in the tweet
that is specifically designed for advertisement or for endorsing a product. We search for users
who tweet #ad to identify the influencers who actively tweet advertisements from their Twit-
ter account. Due to data restrictions from Twitter, we restrict our focus on influencers with
less than 25,000 followers. The data for this case was collected over a period of 10 months.
Our data consists of: (i) tweets posted by these 18 influencers, (ii) how many times the
tweet was retweeted, and (iii) by which follower was it retweeted. First, we estimate the
probability of retweet of a follower, i.e. pij. Although there are several ways to estimate the
probability of a user retweeting the message of an influencer, we estimate the probability
of retweet using historical data of an influencer on Twitter. In particular, we estimate the
probability of a follower retweeting the message of an influencer using the following formula:
Total number of times a follower retweeted an influencer’s tweet
Total number of tweets from an influencer
. From our dataset we obtain information on
the number of followers, i.e., Fj, of each follower j ∈ V. For the purpose of numerical
experiments, we assign the value of bj = 10 ∀j ∈ V and dj = .001 ∀j ∈ V.5 Furthermore, due
to current data limitations from Twitter, we are unable to estimate pkj (i.e., peer influence)
for this case study. However, provided data availability, this can be easily estimated. The
estimation procedure is as follows. The first step is to get the follower list of all retweeters.
Next, we identify if the followers of retweeters are also following an influencer. If so, we
keep such followers on the list and drop the other followers of retweeters. Once we have the
network graph of followers of followers who also follow an influencer, we can estimate the
probability of retweet using historical data. Hence to show the performance of our model
for a wide variety of instances, we run the experiment with different values of second level
influence. In particular, for high second level influence scenario, we have high values of akj,
5The results remain the same qualitatively with different values of bj and dj . In practice, the marketing
firm should be able to quantify the value of each retweet.
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i.e., connection between two peers (or edges between followers). Likewise, for low second level
influence scenario, we have low values of akj. The descriptive statistics of data collected from
Twitter for Case Study-I are provided in Table 3.4.6 A representative network graph of 5
influencers from this dataset is presented in Figure 3.8. For Case Study-II, we follow the
similar procedure, but with a new set of influencers (i.e., set W ). In particular, for Case
Study-II, we identify 37 new influencers. The data for the second case study was collected
for 5 months. The descriptive statistics for this influencer set are provided in Table 3.5.
Figure 3.8: Case Study Problem-I: Network Graph.
• In the network graph below, influencers are represented by dark colored dots.
3.4.1 Optimization Results
Given the problem size of both the case studies, it is computationally not feasible to
obtain an optimal solution for Model M2L using any of the existing non-linear solvers. In
the earlier sections, we demonstrated the accuracy of the upper bound model in estimating
a near-optimal solution for the main problem (i.e., Model M2L). Therefore, for this case
study, we first obtain the solution for the upper bound model (i.e, an influencer set for































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Model M2LUB) and use this solution set to compute the objective value of Model M2L.
CPLEX solver was used for computing the solutions for the mixed-integer optimization
program. The results of Case Study-I and II are presented in Tables B.10 and B.11 (in
Appendix B.6) respectively. The tables report (i) the objective values for high and low akj,
(ii) the benefit that a firm gets from an influencer (see column - Benefit per Influencer), and
(iii) % improvement in objective value for an additional influencer (i.e., marginal benefit of
an additional influencer). Each row in the table represents the solution corresponding to
problem instance t, i.e., number of influencers to be selected. For example, in Case Study-I,
t = 1 denotes that out of 18 influencers the firm wants to hire only one influencer.
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 illustrate the value of each influencer with increasing t for Case study-
I and II respectively. Figures 3.11 and 3.12 report the % marginal benefit of an influencer
for Case study-I and II respectively. The downward trend in all these figures suggests that
as the firms choose to hire multiple influencers, the benefit per influencer decreases. In
addition, the benefit per influencer flattens out faster when the second level influence is
lower. Furthermore, we report the total benefit of hiring influencers for Case Study-I and
II in Figures 3.13 and 3.14 respectively. These figures consistently indicate that the benefit
from influencers does not increase linearly with number of influencers. This leads us to our
next insight.
Insight 4.: The objective function of the main problem to select an influencer set is mono-
tonic but at a decreasing rate with the number of selected influencers.
The main takeaway from the above insight is that the firms should carefully decide on
how many influencers to hire. In particular, hiring too many influencers might lead to higher
overall costs than the benefit. This can be seen in Figures 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, and 3.14, wherein
the curves flatten out with high values of t. Whereas, hiring too few influencers leads to
decreased effectiveness of the ad campaign. Using Figures 3.9 and 3.10, the firm can perform
a cost benefit analysis and decide to hire the right number of influencers. For example,
industry reports suggest that the average cost of hiring micro-influencers is around $271
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Figure 3.11: Case Study Problem-I: % In-
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Figure 3.12: Case Study Problem-II: %
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(Heald 2017). In the context of Case Study-II, if the cost of hiring an influencer is around
$271, the firm is better off with hiring only 7 influencers as the benefit per influencer goes
below $271 with 7 influencers (in the case of low second level influence).
3.4.2 Comparison of Proposed Solutions to Current Industry Practices
Next, we assess the performance of our solution framework against current industry
practices. For this, we first reached out to several firms that facilitate influencer marketing.
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Figure 3.13: Case Study Problem-I:
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Figure 3.14: Case Study Problem-II:
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Our discussions with these firms indicate that the selection of influencers is done mostly
in an ad-hoc manner. They communicated that the decisions are made based on either (i)
number of followers of an influencer (we refer to this procedure as Benchmark 1), or (ii)
% active followers of an influencer (we refer to this procedure as Benchmark 2), or (iii)
number of active followers of an influencer (we refer to this procedure as Benchmark 3).
To check the performance of our framework against the current practices of a marketing
firm, we compare the objective values obtained from our model against the objective values
computed by Benchmark models 1, 2, and 3. We report the results of Case Study-I and Case
Study-II in Tables B.12 and B.13 (in Appendix B.6) respectively. The tables report (i) the
objective values computed by our model and Benchmark models 1, 2, and 3, and (ii) the
performance metric quantified by % optimality gap between our model and the Benchmark
models, where %Optimality Gap =
Ψo2−ΨB2
Ψo2
, where Ψ02 denotes model-based solution and Ψ
B
2
is the solution obtained by the Benchmark models. Each row in the table represents the
solution corresponding to problem instance t, i.e., number of influencers to be selected. For
example, in Case Study-I, t = 1 denotes that out of 18 influencers the firm wants to hire only
one influencer. Further, we assess the performance for both high and low values of second
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level influence.
In Figures 3.15 and 3.16, we report the % gaps between our model-based solution and
the benchmark models for case studies I and II respectively. In all the scenarios, our model-
based solution outperforms the benchmark models. In particular, in Case Study-II, our
model-based solution outperforms the benchmark models in the range of 38%-80% when
t ≤ 7. With $271 being the average cost of hiring an influencer, we had found that firms
benefit is maximized at t = 7. Hence, an increase in benefit by > 38% is significantly high.
Insight 5. Our optimization based framework outperforms benchmark methods consistently
in the plausible range of number of influencers (i.e., t). As expected, the gap between them
decreases as t increases.
Figure 3.15: Case Study Problem-I: Sensitivity of Optimality Gaps w.r.t. Number of Influ-
encers
3.5 Scheduling Influencers’ Ads
We now shift our focus to the second phase, i.e., scheduling of ads to be posted by
influencers that are selected in the first phase of our framework. More specifically, we now
present a framework to help firms with scheduling of ads to be posted by influencers on their
social media over a planning horizon. Although scheduling of ads in different contexts such
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Figure 3.16: Case Study Problem-II: Sensitivity of Optimality Gaps w.r.t. Number of Influ-
encers
as television, websites, and mobiles has been studied extensively in the operations literature
(e.g., Bollapragada et al. 2004; Kumar et al. 2006; Sun et al. 2017), our study is the first, to
the best of our knowledge, to explore scheduling of ads for an influencer marketing campaign.
In the previous sections, we developed a modeling framework to help firms select a set
of influencers for their ad campaign. The modeling assumption in Model M2L may suggest
that it may be optimal if all the influencers (that are selected) post at the same time to take
advantage of the multiple exposure effect. However, scheduling in such a way is not feasible
due to several reasons. First, firms, in general, plan to ensure that the ads consistently
reach the audience throughout the planning horizon. This assumption is consistent with the
earlier literature in scheduling of ads in different mediums such as television. For example,
Bollapragada et al. (2004) suggest that advertisers typically want ads to be evenly placed over
the planning horizon. Second, following Seshadri et al. (2015), who suggest “the contracts
between the advertisers and the [television] network require that the network delivers a target
viewership.” In the context of this study, a typical contract between the firm and influencer
would require that an influencer generates a certain level of engagement (measured by the
number of retweets which can be predetermined by the firms). Further, the firms may want
to consistently generate a certain level of engagement throughout the planning horizon (e.g.,
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if the planning horizon is one month, the firm may want to set weekly engagement targets
rather than a single monthly engagement target level). Finally, firms have a limited budget,
and hence they may not have enough budget to let all influencers post the ads throughout the
planning horizon. Consequently, it is necessary for firms to sequence the ads by influencers
in such a way that influencers generate engagement consistently throughout the planning
horizon while ensuring that they do not exceed their budget levels.
Prior literature on advertising has examined the effects of message spacing, i.e., should
the ads be evenly spaced out (e.g., one ad every two days for two weeks) or should the ads
be pulsed (e.g., 20 ads in 2 days), however, there are two schools of thoughts. On the one
hand, Schmidt and Eisend (2015) demonstrate that message spacing has a positive effect
on the relationship between exposures and attitude towards brand. This is because evenly
spacing ads (instead of publishing all the ads at once) will prevent the audience develop
boredom about the ad. For example, Heflin and Haygood (1985) demonstrate that massed
repetition of ads led to a negative response from the customers. On the other hand, Schmidt
and Eisend (2015) also find that the evenly spaced messages have a negative effect on the
relationship between exposures and recall of a brand. To clear this ambiguity on the impact
of message spacing on exposure effect, we empirically examine how message spacing (i.e.,
days between each ad with similar content) affects the relationship between the number of
exposures of an ad (i.e., number of times the ad with similar content was tweeted) and the
total number of retweets.
To empirically examine the effect of message spacing, we collect data from Twitter related
to 18,571 tweets posted by 37 influencers over a period of 10 months. We present the
details of our empirical study in Section B.3 of the Appendix. We briefly summarize the
main finding of this empirical study. Our results indicate that message spacing, which we
operationalize as the number of days between each identical ad (denoted by Gap in the
empirical model) moderates the relationship between exposure (denoted by Exposure) and
number of retweets (denoted byRetweet Count). We plot the relationship betweenExposure
84
and Retweet Count at different values of Gap in Figure 3.17. This graph accounts for all the
effects including number of exposures, message spacing, influencer individual heterogeneity,
and shows the total effect of exposure. As seen in the figure, the non-linear effect of exposures
on engagement varies with message spacing. More specifically, with higher gap between each
tweet, the effect of exposure lessens. This leads us to the following insight.


























Insight 6. Message spacing moderates the non-linear relationship between number of expo-
sures and number of retweets.
This insight leads us to an important trade-off that needs to be taken into account when
developing the scheduling framework. Although the empirical finding suggests that firms
should reduce the number of days between each message (e.g., post the ad every day), doing
so will, however, increase the costs to the firm as they need to pay influencers for posting
the ad everyday. Hence, this trade-off needs to be accounted in our model. We utilize this
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empirical finding to develop the scheduling framework for ads to be posted by influencers.
Before presenting our model, we present the assumptions that we make for our model.
Assumption 1: We assume that the diminishing effect of the number of exposures on the
total number of retweets depends on the gap between two messages of similar content.
In particular, we assume that the diminishing effect is greater when the gap between two
messages is high.
Assumption 2: We assume that the influencers can be hired for posting ads as per the
requirement of a firm. That is, the message frequency and quantity can be controlled by the
firm.
Assumption 3: We assume that the firm would like to meet a certain engagement level, E ,
every n time periods throughout the planning horizon.
Assumption 4: For analytical tractability, we assume that the probability that a follower
retweets is same for all the influencers. In particular, we assume that pij = pj. Further, pj
can be estimated by taking the mean of pij, ∀i ∈ W .
Assumption 5: To maintain a manageable computational complexity, we ignore peer influ-
ence (i.e., we set pkj = 0). This assumption is reasonable because in the first phase (i.e.,
selection model), we already considered the peer influence, and thus the influencers who got
selected in this phase might have high peer effect. Therefore, we believe that ignoring the
peer effect in the second phase will not affect the solution (i.e., our model would provide us
with a reasonably close solution).
We now formally state the problem of scheduling of ads to be posted by influencers. We
refer to this problem as the scheduling problem.
Problem Instance: A firm would like to schedule the ads to be posted by multiple influ-
encers over T time periods (e.g., days). For illustration purpose, in our problem instance, we
assume T = 12 days. However, T can be larger or smaller than 12 days. The firm wants to
categorize the influencers into 5 groups. The influencers in the first group post the same ad
every day for 12 consecutive days. The influencers in the second group (denoted by modes
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2 and 3) post the same ad once every two days. The influencers in the third group (denoted
by modes 4, 5, and 6) post the same ad once every three days. Next, influencers in the
fourth group (denoted by modes 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12) post once in six days. Finally,
influencer in the fifth group (denoted by modes 13-24) post at most one time during the
planning horizon. Figure 3.18 illustrates the problem instance, where X denotes the day on
which the influencer will post an ad. Further, in each of these groups, there could be several
modes. For example, in group four, there are six different modes depending on what day the
first ad is posted on Twitter. Note that number of modes can be varied based on the firm’s
requirement. Our empirical findings have indicated that the effect of the ad is highest when
the users get an ad every day. In other words, when a user does not get an ad on one of
the days, the probability of retweet decreases. We incorporate this loss in the probability of
retweet by introducing a discount factor.
Solution: Decision to assign influencers to a particular mode and group.
Objective: Maximize the expected benefit to the firm for placing ads on social media via
influencers.
3.5.1 Scheduling Model
The mathematical formulation is formally presented in Appendix B.5. The model is a
mixed integer program. We briefly describe our model.
Objective Function: The objective of the firm in this model is to maximize the benefit it
attains. As in Model M2L, the benefit, Bj = bj + djFj. However, there are costs involved
in the hiring of influencers. Since we assume different modes, the costs of hiring influencers
depend on how many ads that he/she is scheduled to post. In summary, the objective
function for this model is to maximize the difference between the benefit and the costs.
Constraints: The first set of constraints determine whether an influencer is hired or not and
if hired, which mode and group he/she is hired into. The second set of constraints estimate
the expected marginal benefit in terms of number retweets. The third set of constraints keep
track of how many consecutive times a follower, j ∈ V receives a message. If the follower does
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Figure 3.18: Scheduling Problem Framework
































not receive a message on consecutive days, there is a penalty based on our empirical findings.
This penalty is referred to as a discount factor. Finally, a set of constraints ensure that the
posts by influencer generate a certain number of retweets. Since, we are maximizing the
profit (i.e., benefit to the firm – cost to the firm), we initially ignore the budget constraint.
However, if the cost of running the campaign is likely to be more than the available budget,
we can easily add a budget constraint. Further, we perform sensitivity analysis with respect
to budget to understand the effect of other parameters on budget. We note that several
of these constraints turn out to be non-linear in nature. However, we present alternative
formulations to linearize these constraints. Refer to Section B.5.1 in the Appendix. As a
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result, the optimization model for scheduling of ads is a mixed integer program.
3.5.2 Insights
To generate recommendations related to the scheduling problem, we perform extensive
numerical analysis. The model was solved using a commercial linear solver, CPLEX, which
is run on Intel Core i7-7700 CPU running at 3.60 GHz (2 cores) with 64GB ram. we present
two sets of insights. First, we present insights in a scenario where there is no requirement
for minimum engagement levels or the levels are extremely small, i.e., E is ignored. Next,
we present insights when there is a minimum requirement for engagement levels. The details
of the experiments are presented in Sections B.5.2 and B.5.2.1 of the Appendix.
3.5.2.1 Low Requirements of Engagement Levels
First, in a scenario where an influencer has less number of followers and the average
probability the followers retweeting is low, we observe that it is not beneficial for the firm to
hire him/her at a high price. However, if the retweet probability of the followers is high, we
observe that it is beneficial for the firm to hire that influencer even when the cost of hiring
him/her is high and the influencer has less number of followers. The intuition behind this
result is that the expected benefit overcomes the high cost of hiring that the firm attains when
the followers retweet. The results pertaining to this observation are presented in Table B.14
(in the appendix). The observation is summarized in the insight below.
Insight 7. For an influencer with relatively less number of followers and who is relatively
expensive to hire, we observe the following:
• If the probability of retweet of followers is relatively low, do not hire the influencer.
• If the probability of retweet of followers is relatively high, hire the influencer but use
him sparingly.
Next, we observe that an influencer with a large number of followers should be hired for
posting an ad if he/she is less costly to hire despite low probability that his/her followers
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engage with the message. The rationale is that the although the probability of retweet
is low since the message is reaching a larger audience the expected benefit is supposed to
compensate for the low cost of influencer. The results pertaining to this insight are presented
in Table B.14. The insight is formally presented below.
Insight 8. If the relative cost of hiring an influencer with high number of followers is low, we
observe that the firm should hire the influencer and assign him/her to tweet the ad everyday
even if the average probability of followers retweeting the influencer’s ad (i.e., pj) is relatively
low.
Next, when an influencer with high following is costly to hire, it is beneficial to hire him
but how to use him/her depends on characteristics of other influencers. Likewise, when an
unpopular influencer is less costly, the firm can hire him/her but assign him/her to a mode
based on characteristics of other influencers. The results related to these observations are
presented in Table B.15 and summarized below.
Insight 9.
• If an influencer with comparatively high following is costly to hire, we observe that it
is cost effective to hire the influencer, however assignment to a certain mode depends
on the characteristics of other influencers.
• If an influencer with comparatively low following is less costly to hire, we observe that
it is cost effective to hire the influencer, however assignment to a certain mode depends
on the characteristics of other influencers.
Insight 10. When the overlap of followers between influencers is relatively high, we observe
the following:
• If the average retweet probability of followers is comparatively high, then the firm should
hire all the influencers when the influencers have relatively high following on social
media, even though they are costly to hire.
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• If the average retweet probability of followers is comparatively low,
– the firm should not hire any influencer if they have relatively low following on
social media, even though they are less costly to hire.
– the firm should hire all influencers if they have relatively high following.
The results pertaining to the above insight are reported in Table B.16. The above insight
highlights the importance of taking into account the overlap of followers between influencers.
In particular, when the influencers have large followings and have high overlap, the above
observation suggests that the firm should hire most of the influencers for posting ads.
3.5.2.2 High Requirements of Engagement Levels
The results pertaining to the numerical analysis used in this section are presented in
Table B.17. We observe that when the firms need to generate high engagement levels by
the end of the planning horizon, they need to assign influencers to post more number of ads
(see Figure 3.19, Type denotes different network types). This observation is presented in the
insight below.
Insight 11. In a scenario where the firm needs to achieve its target engagement level (E ) by
the end of the planning horizon, we observe that as the value of E increases the total number
of ads posted by all the influencers increases.
Next, we observe that the budget required by the firm increases non-linearly with the en-
gagement levels (See Figure 3.20). This observation makes an interesting connection between
budget and engagement levels, where the budget increases at an increasing rate.
Insight 12. In a scenario where the firm needs to achieve its target engagement level (E ) by
the end of the planning horizon, we observe that as the value of E increases the total budget
required to run the campaign increases non-linearly at an increasing rate.
The above insight indicates that a firm needs to have realistic expectations with regard
to their engagement levels. If the firm has relatively high engagement levels, the cost of
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Figure 3.20: Sensitivity of Engagement with respect to Budget
generating that engagement through influencers increases rapidly. In the next subsection, we
briefly discuss how our framework can be utilized by firms interested in influencer marketing.
3.5.3 Dynamic Implementation of Scheduling Model
In phase one of our framework, we choose an optimal influencer set. The solution that
we obtained in the first phase is based on the assumption that the retweet probability
can be estimated and likely to remain the same throughout the ad campaign. However,
when the planning horizon is long (e.g., one year), the retweet probability may increase or
decrease. Therefore, the retweet probability needs to be updated dynamically. In particular,
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we need to continually learn about the parameters and update them to changing needs and re-
estimate the influencer set. Hence, there is a need for updating the different sequence of ads
frequently. The firm may start of with a yearly schedule by assuming the retweet probability
based on historical averages, whereas for the monthly and weekly plan the probabilities can
be updated dynamically based on the performance of the influencers and a new weekly or
monthly scheduled can be generated. Since the data related to dynamic learning can be
obtained only from practice, we leave this for future research in this area.
3.6 Conclusion and Future Research Directions
Although firms have relied on social networks to advertise their products, the ubiquity
of social media has enabled easier access to large social networks. This study is among
the first of its kind to model the problem of conducting an influencer marketing campaign.
We provide a solution framework for analyzing the problem of selecting and scheduling
influencers during the planning horizon for marketing campaigns. Our framework is based
on interactions with marketers, exploratory analysis, and empirical analysis performed on
data from Twitter. We decompose the problem into two phases: (i) selection of influencers,
(ii) scheduling the placements of ads by influencers. For the first phase, we present the
mathematical formulation to the problem (i.e., the main model) of choosing influencers. We
show that firms can experience a significant profit loss when implementing a policy that
is computed based on a model (namely single level model) that ignores the peer effect.
The profit loss is particularly significant when the online network has a high number of
connections among the peer influencers, and the influence of the peer effect is high. However,
finding an optimal influencer set in main model with the presence of high peer effect is
challenging. We propose an alternative formulation that provides a near-optimal solution
for the main model. This alternative formulation is also non-linear, but we provide an
approximation procedure to transform the problem into a mixed integer linear program.
Furthermore, through computational analysis, we find that the gap between the upper bound
model and the main model slightly increases with peer effect. Our analysis highlights the
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importance of peer effect on a firm’s benefit. More specifically, we find that the gap between
the single level model and the main model can be as high as 85% in some instances.
In the second phase of our framework, we propose an optimization model for scheduling
the ads to be posted by the influencers (selected in the first phase) during the planning
horizon of a marketing campaign. We provide several managerially relevant insights based
on extensive numerical experiments. For example, our analysis suggests that an influencer
with relatively large number of followers should be hired for posting an ad if he/she is
relatively less costly to hire despite low probability of his/her followers engaging with the
message (in terms of number of retweets). Furthermore, we find that the cost of influencer
marketing campaign increases non-linearly with engagement. By laying out a framework, the
current work provides a foundation for future research in influencer marketing campaigns.
Future research can look at analyzing the impact of the interaction between budget and
cost of influencers on optimal influencer set, i.e., introduce budget constraint in the main
model. Another possible extension to the problem of the selection influencer set is to take
into account the spatial considerations. Although we do not tackle these two extensions
in the present study, we present the models in the appendix that incorporate budget and
spatial requirements and leave further analysis for future research.
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4. ESSAY 3: THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL MEDIA CONTENT ON ENGAGEMENT
4.1 Introduction
Social media in the recent times has become one of the primary mediums for individ-
ual celebrities or human brands, including politicians, CEOs, top management executives,
celebrities, musicians, artists, and athletes, to directly connect, communicate, and engage
with their online fans and followers. Human brands, also referred to as personal brands,
are individuals who desire to market and promote themselves to their desired audience. A
recent article in Wall Street Journal suggests that human brands are the most influential
users on social media and firms are increasingly trying to adopt human brands’ strategies to
build their brands on social media (Seetharaman 2015). Indeed, human brands rather than
traditional brands (i.e., firms and organizations) have larger social media following, in terms
of number of followers, compared to traditional “non-human” brands. For example, while
a popular brand Coca-Cola has around 3.42 million followers on Twitter, Katy Perry has
more than 109.5 million followers on Twitter and Cristiano Ronaldo’s page has more than
120 million followers on Facebook.1
The recent $1 billion Nike’s deal with Cristiano Ronaldo is an appropriate example for the
economic value of human brand on social media. Badenhausen (2017) argues that “Cristiano
is one of the top influencers on the planet who has effectively leveraged his social following
and engagement into a media powerhouse to drive tremendous value for his sponsor,” which
suggests that the high brand valuation of Ronaldo is mainly attributed to his ability to
generate engagement with his followers and being visible on social media. Despite the vast
popularity of human brands, research on the social media strategy of human brands, in
particular the effects of social media content created by human brands is scarce. Our study
seeks to fill this gap.
1https://twittercounter.com/pages/100; https://twitter.com/CocaCola; https://twitter.com/katyperry;
and https://www.facebook.com/Cristiano/ (last accessed: June 19, 2018).
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We define the human brand-generated content (HGC) as messages, blogs, comments,
Facebook posts, or tweets created and posted by celebrities (or human brands) on social
media designed to interact, connect, communicate, and more importantly engage with their
fans, followers, and online community in general. Although the recent studies in the area of
social media analyze the effects of user-generated content (UGC) and firm-generated content
(FGC) on social media (Goh et al. 2013; Lee et al. 2018), no study to our knowledge has
systematically examined the effect of social media content created by human brands. In
contrast to the relationship of social media users with firms, they build emotional connect
with human brands because of virtual face-to-face relationship. Thus, users are likely to have
different engagement patterns with content created by human brands compared to FGC.
Indeed, research on social media activities of human brands has received attention in recent
time. For example, Petrova et al. (2017) find that social media adoption led to an increase
of 2-3% in contributions received by politicians (i.e., human brands). In a closely related
study, Saboo et al. (2016) study the impact of social media activities of human brands (in
the context of music industry) on product sales. Our study contributes to the literature by
analyzing the effects of HGC, i.e., social media content generated by human brands. A unique
characteristic of social media platforms is that it facilitates direct communication and more
importantly engagement between human brands and online audience or customers. Recent
business reports have suggested that engagement is one of the key metric to quantify the
performance of social media strategies (Stelzner 2016). Recent studies suggest that higher
customer social media engagement plays an important role in increasing sales (Kumar et al.
2016) and brand’s profitability (Rishika et al. 2013). While anecdotal evidence suggests that
human brands have been successful in creating and sustaining social media engagement,
little is known if (and how) the content generated by human brands (i.e., HGC) affects
engagement with the online audience.
There are several reasons why people engage with the content generated by human brands.
One reason could be that the content has some handy information, and hence the audience
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would like to share the content of the human brand (Berger and Milkman 2012). While
there are several reasons why audience may choose to engage with the content, Heath et al.
(2001) argue that the emotional facet of the content plays a vital role in determining whether
audience engages with the content. Yet, there is no consensus on the effects of the tone and
no study to our knowledge has examined the effects of tone of HGC. Against the above
background, we examine the effect of HGC on social media engagement with a focus on the
differential effects of positive versus negative toned HGC.
4.1.1 Research Questions
More formally, the first research question that we examine is: (1) What is the impact
of the tone of HGC on social media audience engagement? First, we analyze the impact
of positive tone of HGC on social media engagement. On the one hand, one could argue
that the audience is more likely to engage with positive toned HGC on social media. The
rationale behind this argument is that the audience is more likely to interact with a positive
toned content as it reflects the positive attitude of the person engaging with the article. On
the other hand, based on the work of Fiske (1980), one can make a competing argument
that positive content, especially in social media, is uninteresting and does not entice the
curiosity of audience. Thus, audience may likely choose not to engage with positive toned
HGC. With respect to the negative tone HGC, literature in psychology suggests that negative
toned messages are likely to be perceived as engaging and may evoke more interest (Fiske
1980). Thus, we argue that the social media audience is more likely to interact or engage
with candidate’s negative toned tweets. However, negative tone of the content could have
detrimental effects, as the audience may not want to be associated with negative toned
content due to the fear of unintended backlash. Given this lack of empirical clarity on
the relationship between the tone of content (both positive and negative) and engagement,
we seek to answer the first research question, i.e., are the audience likely to engage more
with positive toned content or with negative toned content? Our study contributes to this
growing literature on the tone of content by providing an empirically driven answer to the
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first research question.
Human brands with large followers will likely have higher engagement levels and thus the
effect of the tones of HGC by audience may vary depending on the popularity of the can-
didate. More specifically, will audience engage differently with content created by popular
human brands in contrast to less popular human brands? Given that audience have different
expectations from a popular human brand compared to a less popular human brand, under-
standing the interplay between popularity and the HGC tones becomes important as human
brands pursue strategies to increase their engagement online. Although prior literature has
examined the impact of negative publicity on a brand’s popularity, what is not clear from
the existing literature is the impact of social media popularity on the relationship between
HGC tone and engagement. Therefore, our second research question is: (2) Does social me-
dia popularity moderate the relationship between the content tone (positive and negative)
and engagement? Analyzing this question will provide important insights on whether hu-
man brands need to use different strategies, with respect to creating content with a certain
tone, depending on how popular they are among the audience. In addition, our findings will
contribute to the leadership and brand popularity literature.
A unique aspect of human brands is that they often belong to a group or a community.
For instance, athletes, politicians are associated with teams and political parties respectively.
We define related brands as individual brands (e.g., Corn Flakes and Froot Loops) belonging
to the same corporate or umbrella brand (e.g., Kellogg’s). Literature in psychology suggests
that when forming an opinion about a person or a focal brand, the audience may look
for traits that are common between the focal brand and other related or similar brands
(Bazerman and Moore 2008). In a similar vein, if audience were to perceive some human
brands as related to each other, the tone of HGC of other brands that are related to a focal
brand can moderate the relationship between the HGC and engagement of a focal human
brand. We refer to this phenomenon to as perception spillover effects between brands.
We capture this by the moderating effect of related brands’ HGC tone on the association
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between a focal human brand’s HGC tone and engagement. Although spillover effects have
been documented in the context of traditional brands, no study, to the best of our knowledge,
has examined the role of perception spillover effects in the context of HGC and social media
platforms. Our findings on spillover effects provide important insights to human brands as
to how related brands’ content can affect their social media strategy to increase engagement.
To summarize, the third key research question that we analyze is: (3) What are the spillover
effects (if any) of related human brands HGC tone on focal human brand’s engagement
levels in social media platforms? In particular, does the tone of related brands’ HGC tone
moderate the relationship between focal human brand’s HGC and its engagement levels on
social media platforms? By providing an empirically driven answer to the third research
question, our study adds to the growing literature on perception spillovers.
4.1.2 Research Context
To empirically answer our research questions, we identify four critical requirements of
the research setting that serves as the basis for our study. First, we require a context where
human brands actively use social media platforms to communicate their ideas and messages
to the target audience with an aim to increase their engagement levels. Second, we need a
context where human brands are likely to use both positive and negative toned content on
social media with an aim to engage with their audience. Third, we require a context where
human brands belong to a group and the tone of HGC by a focal human brand is likely to
affect the engagement of related human brands (i.e., human brands belonging to the same
group). Finally, since we are investigating the effect of popularity, we need human brands
with varying levels of popularity among the social media audience.
To accomplish our objectives, we leverage a novel dataset in the context of Indian General
Elections 2014. The context of elections in which political candidates are human brands and
political parties as the umbrella brands satisfy the above critical requirements and aid us in
examining our research questions. Although brands were mainly associated with products
and organizations, the notion of branding is popular in political science (Smith and French
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2009). In recent years, alike corporate brands, both the political parties and the politicians
have increasingly embraced social media platforms as a means to promote their brands and
to engage with the target audience or their constituents. Several popular news outlets and
industry studies have also emphasized the role of social media in election campaigns. For
instance, a recent study reports that 66% of the online users have used social media to engage
in political activities (Duggan and Smith 2016). Bode and Dalrymple (2015) report that all
the major candidates during the 2010 U.S. elections have extensively used social media
to engage with their constituents and audience in general. Furthermore, recent anecdotal
evidence and evidence from prior literature suggest the pivotal role played by social media
in the elections worldwide. For example, the widespread use of social media during the 2008
U.S. Presidential election campaign has been cited as one of the key reasons behind success
of a presidential candidate (Carr 2008). The trend of widespread use of social media during
the elections is prevalent across the world. For instance, the 2014 Indian general election
was famously labeled as “India’s first social media election” (Khullar and Haridasani 2012)
because of extensive use of social media by politicians and political parties.
Political candidates often post positive content to promote their manifesto, agenda, and
ideas on various topics to their constituents and negative toned content to attack the repu-
tation of their opponents. Furthermore, political candidates are not only concerned about
their own victory, but also need to make sure that they do not hurt audience engagement
with other members of their political party (or related candidates). This is because political
candidates have an incentive to ensure that the related candidates are also elected. For
example, in the case of a parliamentary system that is followed in India, where the elected
members determine the Prime Minister, it is likely that social media content of candidates
who belong to the same political party as that of a focal candidate affects how audience
reacts to the social media content posted by the focal candidate. Further, in the context of
politics and politicians, we have human brands with varying levels of popularity on social
media, which allows us to analyze the impact of popularity on engagement. The above-
100
discussed characteristics of political candidates and elections in general provides us with an
ideal empirical setting to examine our research questions.
Set in the context of Indian general election held in 2014, we assemble a novel dataset
using data collected from a popular social media platform (Twitter.com) and the Election
Commission of India (ECI). Our data consists of detailed information on each political can-
didate’s tweets, number of times each tweet was retweeted (i.e., shared), and the popularity
of each candidate on Twitter. We combine this information with other offline characteristics
of political candidates and their respective political parties obtained from ECI. We employ
the Naive Bayes sentiment classification algorithm (Antweiler and Frank 2004) to categorize
the tone of candidates’ tweets into positive sentiment and negative sentiment. Several stud-
ies have identified multiple challenges associated with examining social network effects from
observational data. In particular, we face the problem of differentiating the effect of HGC
on engagement from different social interaction effects, i.e., engagement is consequence of
users interacting with each other on social media rather than the actual HGC. To account
for the social interaction effects in social media, we follow the prescriptions from recent lit-
erature on social networks (Ghose and Han 2011; Park et al. 2018) and propose a multi-level
mixed effects model to answer the three primary research questions. In addition, we perform
several robustness checks to rule out alternative explanations of our results. Specifically,
we supplement our main analysis with different model specifications, estimation strategies,
metrics for measuring engagement levels, and accounting for potential selection bias. In the
next subsection, we briefly discuss our key results and contributions.
4.1.3 Key Findings and Contributions
Towards the first research question, we investigate the impact of positive toned HGC and
negative toned HGC on social media engagement. We find that negative toned tweets by
human brands/candidates are associated with higher levels of engagement as measured by
number of retweets. Next, our results indicate that there is no empirical evidence for presence
of relationship between positive toned tweets and audience engagement levels. Whereas, prior
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literature has analyzed the impact of tone of content (e.g. Berger and Milkman 2012), our
study is the first to examine and document the relationship between the tone of social media
content of human brands and audience engagement on social media. By demonstrating that
the engagement levels are higher when the tone of HGC is negative, our study provides
important insights on drivers of engagement to human brands, an important measure of
success.
Towards the second research question, i.e., the moderating role of popularity of focal
human brand on the relationship between human brand’s HGC and engagement level, our
results indicate that the human brand’s popularity negatively moderates the positive rela-
tionship between negative tone and engagement. We also find that the marginal effect of
positive toned HGC is higher for popular human brands compared to less popular human
brands. In other words, our findings reveal that negative toned HGC is beneficial for less
popular human brands while positive toned HGC is more favorable for human brands that
are more popular.
Finally, with respect to spillover effects, we find evidence for asymmetric spillover effects
of content created by brands related to the focal brand. In particular, we find that the
positive effect of negative toned HGC is greater (resp., lower) when the tone of related
candidates is negative (resp., positive). In other words, the increased audience engagement
from negative toned HGC reduces when the tone of related brands is positive and increases
when the tone of the related brands is negative. This study, to the best of our knowledge, is
the first to analyze and document the moderating role of related brands’ HGC. Our results
demonstrate that the human brand’s engagement levels depend not only on his/her tone
but also on the tone of other related human brands. Finally, to demonstrate the effect of
social media engagement, we extend our analysis to provide evidence on the how engagement
increases the buzz and visibility of the candidate on social media.
Our work makes several important contributions to the academic literature and practice.
First, our study complements the growing literature on social media content (e.g. Lee et al.
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2018). Although the focus of the literature has been on the content generated by users and
firms, we contribute to the information systems (IS) and marketing literature on social media
engagement and social media content by studying the impact of tone of content generated by
human brands, who are the most widely followed on social media, on engagement. Second,
we identify and demonstrate the role of human brand’s popularity as a moderator. Ignoring
this moderating role may have an undesirable effect on the engagement levels of popular
human brands. Third, we establish the presence of spillover effect, i.e., the human brand’s
engagement is affected by the content of the related brands. These findings provide new
insights, thus help advance of current knowledge in research on social media content. From
the practice perspective, we demonstrate the need for a social media strategy that takes
into account the popularity of the human brand, the spillover effects of related brands’
content, and the moderating role of related brands’ content. Although the current study
is in the context of human brands from the field of politics, our findings should extend to
human brands in the corporate world. Top management executives of businesses are also
under constant pressure to engage with the social media audience in an effort to influence
the perception of their businesses (Saboo et al. 2016). Industry studies suggest that top
management executives who engage on social media are found to be better equipped than
their peers who are not active on social media in mitigating risks, enhancing the credibility
of the business, and handling crisis (BrandFrog.com 2016). Our findings provide actionable
insights to the executives on strategies to improve their social media engagement.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we present the
conceptual model to explain the rationale behind the effects of HGC tone on social media
engagement. In Section 4.3, we present the data and model development. We discuss the
results of our model in Section 4.4, followed by the discussion on how engagement affects
social media visibility Section 4.5. In Section 4.6, we provide discussion on supplementary
analysis that we conduct to ensure the robustness of our results. In Section 4.7, we discuss
the contributions and implications of our study to theory and practice. Finally, we conclude
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by presenting the limitations of our study and future research opportunities in Section 4.8.
4.2 Conceptual Framework
In this section, we develop and present a conceptual framework (see Figure 4.1) that
explains the rationale behind the effects of tone of HGC on social media engagement levels.
We build upon existing literature from the areas of IS, psychology and marketing to explain
and theorize the possible directions of the relationship between the tone of the human brand
and the social media engagement.
Figure 4.1: Conceptual Framework
4.2.1 Social Media Content, Tone, and Engagement
Van Doorn et al. (2010, p. 254) define engagement as “customer’s behavioral manifes-
tation towards a brand” and argue, “engagement is behavioral construct that goes beyond
purchase behavior alone.” In the context of social media, retweeting or sharing allows a user
to share social media content and helps the content reach beyond the followers and fans of
original source thereby amplifying the impact of the original content (Kumar et al. 2010;
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Kwak et al. 2010). Brand marketers acknowledge that the number of retweets is an appro-
priate measure of audience engagement on Twitter (Long 2015b). Consequently, consistent
with more recent studies (e.g. Lambrecht et al. 2018; Lee et al. 2018), we operationalize
engagement by the number of retweets.
Researchers in psychology and marketing have long been interested in understanding
why audience engage or share information (e.g., news article or advertisement content) with
others (e.g. Berger and Milkman 2012). Among all the factors that can persuade a user to
engage with the content, emotional aspect of the content has often been cited as one of the
critical driving forces (Heath et al. 2001). In the context of our study, i.e., social media
content created by political candidates, emotions can be expressed by varying the tones
of message. For instance, disappointment or anger against political opposition or about a
policy can be expressed in the form of negative toned message, while the positive tone of
content reveals politician’s enthusiasm and his/her strengths compared to the opponents.
Although the findings in the literature consistently demonstrate that users are more likely
to engage with highly emotional content (Rime et al. 1991), scholars have called for more
rigorous research in understanding the differential effects of positive vs negative tone on a
user’s decision to share (Godes et al. 2005). Our study responds to this call by analyzing
the effects of positive and negative toned social media content created by human brands on
engagement.
Positive toned social media content, in the context of elections, serves to communicate
the policies and plans of the political candidate and his/her political party to the online
audience in addition to emphasizing the strengths of the candidate. According to Cial-
dini (1984), people who express positive emotion are perceived more positively, and hence
considered more likable than people who express negative mood. Further, Berger and Milk-
man (2012) argue that most users want to be identified as someone who endorse optimistic
feel-good messages or messages from likable people rather than someone who share negative
information, which embodies pessimism. The aforementioned reasons suggest that the online
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users may be more driven to share positive content rather than negative content. Based on
the assumption that the online audience want to be perceived positively among their peers,
we expect that the audience is likely to engage more with positive toned content of political
candidates by sharing the content with their friends on social media.
Negative toned content in politics is used to attack an opponent by highlighting his/her
weaknesses. Although negative campaigning is often associated with politics, it is quite com-
mon to see negative or comparative advertising in brand/product promotion. The impression
formation literature in psychology, which studies how consumers process and integrate in-
formation, explains one of the rationales behind the effect of negative advertising. Within
the impression formation literature, the novelty theory proposed by Fiske (1980) argues that
negative information is novel and highly revealing as it distinguishes itself from other more
common information and thus requires greater attention. As a result, individuals pay more
attention to negative information and value it more when compared to positive information
(Hamilton and Zanna 1972; Baumeister et al. 2001). This effect of negative information
has been documented in both product evaluation and person perception (Wright 1974; Herr
et al. 1991). Furthermore, negative information is deemed more diagnostic when compared
to positive information, and hence given more weight by the audience (Maheswaran and
Meyers-Levy 1990; Herr et al. 1991). Based on the aforementioned research, we argue that
a human brand’s negative toned HGC will evoke the interest of the online community, and
therefore the online users are more likely to engage with the human brands by retweeting
more number of negative toned HGC. In summary, our study builds upon the prior literature
that focuses on the effects of the tone of content on the perception of audience; we extend
the literature and understand the effects of negative and positive toned HGC on engagement
with the audience on social media platforms.
4.2.2 Moderating Role of Popularity
Our context of elections brings up the role of leadership or popularity of political candi-
dates. Literature on leadership suggests that followers view leaders as their role models and
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have certain expectations in terms of moral behavior of leaders (Johnson 2009). Aronson
(2001) suggests that it is essential for leaders to set a “moral example” to their followers
by emphasizing on values, beliefs, and honorable behavior, which in turn results in positive
follower enthusiasm. Indeed, prior literature on leadership has demonstrated that followers
expect charismatic leaders to propagate positive emotion (e.g. Lewis 2000). In the context
of elections, audience anticipate charismatic leaders such as presidential candidates or other
popular political candidates to behave in a manner befitting their stature. For example, the
audience may not want charismatic leaders to indulge in mudslinging; rather expect them to
create positive toned HGC consistent with his/her stature. On the one hand, the audience
will have comparatively lower ethical expectations standards from not so popular candidates
(i.e., regular political party members). Therefore, we postulate that the online audience will
evaluate the tone of content based on the popularity and stature of the leader. As a result,
we expect that the online audience will engage more when popular human brands create
positive toned HGC compared to negative HGC.
On the other hand, recent literature suggests that negative publicity is good for firms
who are not well known, while it negatively affects the firms that are familiar to the cus-
tomers (Berger et al. 2010). Grounded on this reasoning, we propose that the negative tone
of content will help human brands who are not very popular compared to popular human
brands. An alternative explanation behind our postulation that negative tone may have a
larger impact on engagement for less popular brands compared to brands that are more pop-
ular is as follows. Human brands that are more popular may already have high engagement
levels given their fame among the audience, and hence we expect lower marginal effect of
the tone of content on engagement for popular human brands. In summary, our study seeks
to identify and document how the effect of HGC tone on engagement differs for different
human brands depending on the popularity of the human brands.
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4.2.3 Spillover Focal Brands and Related Brands
Spillover occurs when existing information and perception about a brand influences the
beliefs and opinions of another brand (Janakiraman et al. 2009). Prior studies in the area
of marketing have found evidence for presence of spillover, i.e., the perception of brands
related to a focal brand influencing the perception of the focal brand (Lei et al. 2008).
For example, in the context of marketing, information or perception about Corn Flakes
can affect consumers’ perception of Froot Loops, as they belong to the same corporate or
umbrella brand (i.e., Kellogg’s). Similar to the spillover of perception between brands related
to an umbrella brand, we argue that spillover of perception can happen between political
candidates related to the same political party. Analogous to corporate brands, political
parties represent an umbrella brand with several individual brands, i.e., individual political
members of a political party (Singer 2002). Hence, we argue that the perception of a focal
political candidate can affect how audience evaluate the other candidates related to the focal
candidates. In this study, we seek to examine whether (and how) perception spills over in
the context of social media content created by human brands.
Drawing on the accessibilitydiagnosticity theory, we explain the underlying rationale be-
hind the spillover of perceptions between human brands belonging to the same political
party. The central argument of the theory is that if an individual considers that brand X
is informative (diagnostic) about brand Y, s/he will use the information and perceptions
of brand X to form an opinion about brand Y (Janakiraman et al. 2009). However, this is
effective only if both the brands are accessible (or retrieved) in the memory of the individual
at the same time (Roehm and Tybout 2006). In other words, perception spills over between
human brands only when the association between the brands is strong and thereby they
are associated in the individual’s memory. In our context, the political members are often
grouped together based on their party lines, and hence we argue that the candidates belong-
ing to the same party are accessed in the memory of audience at the same time. Based on
the arguments of accessibility-diagnosticity theory, it is likely that audience view the content
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created by the candidates related to the focal candidate as diagnostic of the focal political
candidate.
Further, the spreading activation framework suggests that information about brands
and their attributes reside in customers’ knowledge network as network nodes and network
linkages between such nodes promote accessibility (Anderson 1983; Janakiraman et al. 2009).
Therefore, we argue that when a follower sees a tweet on Twitter from a focal candidate, the
node of the focal candidate is activated; in addition, all the associated nodes (i.e., related
candidates) are activated as well causing retrieval of memory of the user. Therefore, a user
utilizes all the information that is available in his/her memory (i.e., retrieves and evaluates
the HGC of focal and related candidates) when making a choice to engage with the social
media content of a focal human brand.
Whereas the spreading activation framework proposes that the HGC tone of related
brands will influence the decision of a user to engage with HGC of focal human brand,
no study to our knowledge has analyzed how the effect of HGC tone of focal brand on
engagement changes based on related brands’ HGC. In particular, we propose that the related
brands tone will moderate the relationship between the focal brand’s tone and audience
engagement, which we refer to as perception spillover effects within human brands. As we
are interested in the positive and negative tone of content created by both the focal human
brand and brands related to the focal brand, we have four possible moderating effects, namely
(i) the positive tone of related brands moderating the positive tone of focal brand, (ii) the
negative tone of related brands moderating the negative tone of focal brand, (iii) the positive
tone of related brands moderating the negative tone of focal brand, and (iv) the negative
tone of related brands moderating the positive tone of focal brand.
The multiple source effect proposed by Harkins and Petty (1981) suggests that when the
audience is exposed to similar kind of information from multiple sources, they are more likely
to process and trust that information. In the context of elections, when both the political
candidate and the other members his/her political party use a similar toned content (e.g.,
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all the members of a political party use similar negative toned content to attack the policies
of opposing political party), it reinforces the credibility of the information in the content.
Consequently, audience perceive the information to be trustworthy, which results in higher
likelihood of users engaging with the content of a focal brand. Thus, we expect greater
engagement levels when the tones of the focal brand and the related brands are similar.
Specifically, we argue that the engagement levels will increase when the tones of both the
focal and the related brands are positive (i.e., the positive tone of related brands is expected
to positively moderate the effect of focal human brand’s positive tone on engagement).
Likewise, we expect increased engagement levels when the tones of both the focal and the
related brands are negative.
In contrast, when the tones of focal human brands and the related brands are different
(i.e., the tone of one is positive while the tone of other is negative), we argue that the opposite
toned messages may work against each other. In other words, the opposite tones of focal and
related brands can lead to lack of credibility of their content. Furthermore, as the tones of
both the focal and related brands are different, we argue that the messages are significantly
different from each other and hence lacks for validation of information from multiple sources.
As a result, we expect the engagement levels to decrease when the tones of focal brand and
related brands contrast with each other. Specifically, we posit that engagement levels will
lessen when (i) the tone of related brands is positive and the tone of focal brand is negative
or (ii) the tone of related brands is negative and the tone of focal brand is positive.
4.3 Data and Model
In this section, we first summarize our data. Next, we describe the variables of interest.




As discussed earlier, the context of our study is the Indian general elections held in 2014.
India is the largest democracy in the world. The elections in India are widely followed around
the world as it has a widespread impact on global economy (Agrawal 2017). India follows
a parliamentary form of government where the parliament is the supreme legislative body
comprising two houses: Rajya Sabha (or the Upper House) and Lok Sabha (or the Lower
House). Constituents or people from a pre-defined geographical region (or a constituency)
elect a representative (called as Member of Parliament or MP in short) to represent them
in the Lok Sabha. The members of the Lok Sabha in turn elect the Prime Minister (PM)
of India. The PM is generally a member of the majority political party in the Lok Sabha.
The MPs not only elect the PM of India, but also act a representative of the people of the
constituency. Lok Sabha consists of 543 elected representatives of people and the elections
are held every five years. The general elections in India were last held in 2014 from April
7, 2014 to May 12, 2014. Several political parties and politicians have taken advantage of
the enormous size of network on various social media platforms to reach out to their target
constituents. Given the parliamentary structure of Indian elections, candidates belonging to
the same political party are typically viewed as similar to each other and this makes the issue
of perception spillover across politicians belonging to the same political party important.
Given this unique structure of the Indian election, we believe that the context is well
suited to study our research questions for the following reasons. First, evidences from popu-
lar news media suggest that the use of social media by the political candidates in the Indian
general election 2014 was high (Khullar and Haridasani 2012). Second, the primary objec-
tive of the candidates is to engage with the target audience and to propagate their messages.
Third, given the parliamentary nature of elections, several candidates contest the elections,
thus, this context provides us with the right setting to understand the spillover effects be-
tween the members of a political party. Finally, the period surrounding the Indian general
election provides us with the right context to examine our research questions, as the candi-
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dates and the political parties are typically more active on social media trying to leverage
the huge network of online users and hence the impact of social media tone on engagement
can be examined.
Our main data come from a popular micro-blogging website, Twitter. Our data consist
of individual level tweets related to the 2014 Indian general election. We collected tweets
(content on Twitter) using various keywords, such as the names of political parties, politi-
cians, and other terms related to the Indian elections from December 1, 2013 to May 31,
2014 (i.e., before, during, and after elections). Our data consists of two main components:
(i) individual tweets posted by political candidates (i.e., human brands), prominent political
party members, and the official Twitter accounts of political parties (i.e., related human
brands); and (ii) tweets by users of social media mentioning the human brands and the
related brands. Regarding the first component, we collect the content of tweets generated
by 297 Twitter accounts belonging to the candidates (i.e., human brands) and important
political party members (who are not contesting the elections) and political parties (i.e.,
related human brands). Since the focus of our study is to analyze the relationship between
the tone of content and engagement, it is important to focus on candidates who are actively
using social media platform to engage with the online audience. In other words, only when
the candidates are active on social media, can the online audience engage with the candi-
date. As a result, we drop candidates with fewer than twenty-six tweets (i.e., at least one
tweet per week).2 Therefore, our main analysis focuses on the content generated by 297
Twitter accounts belonging to the candidates, important political party members (who are
not contesting the elections), and political parties.
To summarize, our primary data consists of 63 candidates contesting the elections and
234 Twitter accounts belonging to the political parties and their members (i.e., related
candidates). In order to confirm that these accounts were indeed official (i.e., the content
is tweeted by the human brands), we manually verified the Twitter accounts of the Indian
2Not all candidates start tweeting in the first week of our dataset.
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politicians. In our dataset, we found that a few candidates had more than one official
Twitter account, in such an instance, we combined the data from all accounts. The above
criteria leave us with 16,471 distinct tweets by 63 candidates and 98,237 tweets by 234
related candidates. Our second data source is the website of Election Commission of India.3
The data from this source comprises of the personal attributes of a candidate including age,
education, gender, result of the election, political party, total net assets, and their respective
regions. This data helps us to control for candidate specific heterogeneity and fixed effects.
In the following subsections, we discuss the operationalization of the variables we use.
4.3.2 Dependent Variable: Number of Retweets
The unit of our analysis is at the candidate-weekly level. The dependent variable in
our study is the number of retweets (denoted by RTipt) received in week t by candidate i
belonging to the political party p. When a human brand posts a message on Twitter, the
message appears on the timeline of the followers. When the followers login to their Twitter
account, they see the recent tweets from the human brands they follow. However, if users
are not very active on Twitter (for example, they open the Twitter once a month), they will
generally see only the most recent tweets. Thus, we assume that a user has access to only
recent tweets and retweets tweets that are generated within the same week. We identify the
number of retweets for each of the 16,471 distinct tweets posted by 63 candidates contesting
the general elections.
4.3.3 Main Independent Variables
Our main explanatory variables deal with the sentiment of tweets by the individual can-
didates and their respective political party. Following recent studies, we employ a commonly
used sentiment classification algorithm - Naive Bayes algorithm (Antweiler and Frank 2004)
to classify tweets into three categories: positive sentiment, negative sentiment, and neu-
tral/mixed sentiment. This technique is proven to be highly reliable and has been widely
3See http://eci.nic.in.
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used in prior studies in management science (e.g. Das and Chen 2007; Gu et al. 2014). As
the name suggests, this algorithm is based on the Bayes theorem. The Naive Bayes model
is based upon the following principles: words in a tweet are independent to each other, each
word has a pre-determined tone or sentiment, and the overall sentiment or tone of a sentence
(or a tweet) is the collective sentiment of all the words in the tweet. For more details, please
refer to (Antweiler and Frank 2004).
In addition to classifying the tweets into positive tone and negative tone, the sentiment
classification algorithm categorizes tweets into mixed or neutral tone. We define mixed tone
tweets as those that contain either both positive and negative tone or neither of these tones.
Among the 16,471 tweets by candidates contesting the elections, our classification algorithm
classified 3,965 tweets as positive toned, 1,710 tweets as negative toned, and the remaining
tweets as mixed toned. The number of positive toned tweets in week t posted by candidate
i belonging to political party p is denoted by PosTipt. NegTipt represents the number of
negative toned tweets by candidate i belonging to political party p during week t. Finally,
MixTipt represents the number of mixed toned tweets by candidate i belonging to political
party p during week t.
Next, we capture the number of tweets of different tones of all the related candidates.
The related candidates of the human brand i of the political party p consist of: (i) all
the candidates of the political party p, (ii) the prominent members of the political party
p who are not participating in the elections, and (iii) the official Twitter accounts of the
political party p at the state level and the national level. The number of positive toned
tweets by the related candidates (denoted by PartyPosTipt) is the sum of all the positive
toned tweets by the candidates and prominent members belonging to party p not including
the positive toned tweets of the focal candidate during week t. Likewise, PartyNegTipt and
PartyMixTipt represent the number of negative and mixed/neutral toned tweets by related
candidates. Among the 98,237 tweets by related candidates, the Naive Bayes algorithm
classified 19,933 tweets as positive toned, 9,729 tweets as negative toned, and the rest as
114
mixed toned.
Our final important explanatory variable is candidate’s popularity on social media, which
we measure by number of followers (denoted by Folipt). We note that the number of followers
is dynamic (i.e., it could increase or decrease over a period). Therefore, we operationalize
this variable by calculating the number of followers on a weekly basis.
4.3.4 Control Variables
We include various candidate-specific variables in our model to improve the precision of
our estimates and to control for heterogeneity at the candidate level. Agei is the actual age
of the candidate in years. The age of the candidate is a broad indicator for the experience
of the candidate. Malei is a dummy variable set equal to one if the candidate is male. In
addition, we control for the candidate’s spending power measured by candidate’s net worth
in logarithmic scale (assetsi). We also control the level of education through three dummy
variables (i.e., high school or below, college degree, and higher degree). Further, we control
for the candidate’s geographical area through the dummy variables Regioni (i.e., North
India, East India, West India, and South India). We obtain the data on candidate-specific
time-invariant control variables from the website of the election commission of India. We
also control for the expenditure by the candidate’s party during the election (partyExpi).
To control for temporal shocks that represent major developments, such as announcements
of election dates, and phases of elections, we include time fixed effects in our model.
Berger and Schwartz (2011) suggest that the visibility of the candidate on social media
platform stimulates interest in the candidate, and it is positively correlated with engagement.
Therefore, we control for the visibility of the candidate through the variable mentionsipt,
which represents log-transformed number of mentions of a candidate in tweets by all the
users on Twitter at time t. Our data consists of entire set of Twitter activity on the topic
of elections. Hence, mention of a candidate by their Twitter username is a good proxy
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for his/her social media visibility.4 In other words, this variable captures how many times
a candidate i was tagged by all the Twitter users in their tweets. Tagging a candidate
on Twitter implies that the audience on social media is interested in discussing about the
candidate. Thus, we expect that higher chatter about a candidate in week t−1 will motivate
users to follow the HGC (or the tweets) of the candidate. That is, the higher chatter in
week t − 1 may affect the engagement in week t. Next, we control for the retweets and
mentions received by the related brands (PartyRTipt and PartyMCipt). Finally, we include
the tone of opposition candidates (OppPosTipt, OppNegTipt, and OppMixTipt) to remove any
unobserved confounding factors. We summarize the operationalization of all the variables
and their descriptive statistics in Table 4.1.
4.3.5 Model Development
In the rest of this subsection, we discuss model development to answer our research
questions: (i) the effect of human brand’s HGC tone on social media engagement levels;
(ii) the moderating role of popularity on the relationship between HGC tone and social
media engagement; and (iii) the moderating role of related human brand’s HGC tone on the
relationship between HGC tone and social media engagement. Before presenting our model,
we first present the identification challenges associated with using observable dataset and
then provide discussion on how we overcome these challenges.
4.3.5.1 Identification Challenges and Strategies
We recognize that we work with observational data to establish the effect of HGC tone
on social media engagement and that there are some potential challenges that need to be
overcome. In particular, since we examine how audience engages with the content generated
by human brands, we face the challenge of differentiating the audience engagement effect from
the social interaction effect. Social interaction effect exists when a user directly influences
4Users may use the first or last name of the candidate in their tweet rather than using their Twitter
username. However, we do not consider tweets that do not use the official Twitter username in a tweet. One
reason is because several Indian names are quite common and hence it would not be possible to differentiate
the candidates from non-candidates.
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Table 4.1: Variable Operationalization and Summary Statistics
Variable Variable Operationalization Mean SD
Dependent Variable
RTipt Total number of retweets of HGC of candidate i of
party p during week t
380.46 1975.51
Independent Variables
PosTipt Total number of positive toned tweets by candidate i
belonging to party p during week t
2.88 6.22
NegTipt Total number of negative toned tweets by candidate i
belonging to party p during week t
1.24 4.19
MixTipt Total number of mixed or neutral toned tweets by can-
didate i belonging to party p during week t
7.85 20.66
PartyPosTipt Total number of positive toned tweets by related
brands of candidate i of party p during week t
331.1 212.83
PartyNegTipt Total number of negative toned tweets by related
brands of candidate i of party p during week t
127.02 96.77
PartyMixTipt Total number of mixed/neutral toned tweets by related
brands of candidate i of party p during week t
1122.38 893.7
log(Folipt) Number of followers of candidate i on Twitter during
week t (on log scale)
9.29 2.73
Control Variables
log(Mentionsipt) Number of mentions of candidate i by on Twitter by
all users during week t (on log scale)
3.51 2.51
log(Assetsi) Net worth of candidate i (on log scale) 18.07 2.04
Agei Age in years of candidate i 50.9 10.59
Malei Gender of candidate i; Female=0, Male=1
Regioni Geographical region to which candidate i belongs (i.e.,
North, East, West, and South India)
Educationi Education level of candidate i (i.e., High School, Grad-
uate, and Post Graduate)
log(PartyExpi) Expenditure of candidate i’s Party (on log scale) 20.17 2.62
log(PartyRTipt) Number of retweets received by related brands of can-
didate i of party p during week t (on log scale)
8.85 2.73
log(PartyMCipt) Number of mentions of related brands of candidate i
of party p during week t (on log scale)
9.19 2.79
OppPosTipt Total number of positive toned tweets by related
brands of candidate i of party p during week t
906.88 268.68
OppNegTipt Total number of negative toned tweets by related
brands of candidate i of party p during week t
414.49 216.5
OppMixTipt Total number of mixed/neutral toned tweets by related
brands of candidate i of party p during week t
3275.77 1836.1
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the choices/outcomes of other users in a social network (Hartmann et al. 2008). In our
context, a follower’s decision to engage with the content created by a human brand could
depend on the actions of other followers of the focal human brand or the focal political party.
Prior literature has identified two primary confounding factors that could hinder uncovering
causal effects accurately in social networks (i) correlated unobservables and (ii) reflection
problem (Manski 1993; Hartmann et al. 2008). Before presenting our model and estimation
methods, we first discuss how we overcome these identification challenges.
The first challenge associated with proper identification of HGC effects is the issue of
correlated unobservables. This problem arises when the users’ behavior is influenced by
unobserved characteristics that may be correlated (Durlauf and Young 2004). In the context
of our study, major political events (such as large political meetings, release of manifesto,
and major news related to elections), could influence the decision of the audience to engage
with the human brand. If ignored, this increase in engagement levels may be mistaken for
the actual effect of HGC tone on engagement. To mitigate this effect, we include time-period
fixed effects to account for any unobserved exogenous time specific shocks (and to capture
important events) such as announcement of election notification, dates, and enforcement of
election poll conduct. In line with existing literature, we also account for location fixed
effects to account for any region specific effects (through region specific dummy variables)
that allow us to control for time invariant spatially correlated unobservables.
The second problem that often arises when dealing with observational data is the issue of
simultaneity or what is referred to as “reflection problem” in the social networks literature
(Manski 1993). This problem arises when individuals belonging to the same group can
influence each other’s behavior simultaneously. For example, in our context, number of party
retweets, and party level mentions could at the same time influence the number of retweets
of the focal candidates. In other words, the audience behavior is not fixed rather it varies
depending on the behavior of other group members simultaneously. To alleviate this concern,
we use lagged values for number of mentions, party mentions, party retweets, and opposition
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HGC tone. This method of using lagged values is often employed in the social networks
literature to overcome the concern of simultaneity (Hartmann et al. 2008; Park et al. 2018).
Hence, in our empirical model, we use lagged values for these variable, i.e., mentionsipt−1,
partyMCipt−1, partyRTipt−1, OppPosTipt−1, OppNegTipt−1, and OppMixTipt−1.
In the next subsection, we provide detailed discussion on our econometric model and the
identification strategy to mitigate the problems discussed above.
4.3.5.2 Candidate-Level Model
To answer our first research question, we develop a candidate-level model where we ex-
amine the effect of individual human brand’s HGC tone (i.e., PosTipt, NegTipt, and MixTipt)
on audience engagement measured via number of retweets (i.e., RTipt). In line with existing
literature (He et al. 2017), we log-transform the dependent variable (i.e., number of retweets,
RTipt) to control for skewness and high dispersion of the variable. To summarize, the depen-
dent variable in our model is the logged number of retweets received by the human brand
i belonging to party p in week t (denoted as log(RTipt)). In addition to the effects of HGC
tone, we also examine the popularity of human brand (i.e., Folipt) on his/her social media
engagement. We log transform this variable to control for skewness and high dispersion of
the variable.5 Controlling for the candidate-level heterogeneity through control variables
(that we discuss in 3.4), the candidate-level model allows us to examine the relationship
between tone and engagement. The candidate-level model is as follows.
log(RTipt) = β0pt + β1ptPosTipt + β2ptNegTipt + β3ptMixTipt + β4ptfolipt + ηipt (4.1)
where the variable PosTipt (resp., NegTipt) denotes the number of positive (resp., neg-
ative) toned tweets of candidate i belonging to political party p during the time-period t.
Likewise, MixTipt represents the number of mixed or neutral toned tweets and folipt denotes
5For brevity, from here on, we denote all log-transformed variables in lower case.
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the logged number of followers of candidate i belonging to party p during the time-period t.
Estimating the candidate-level model presented in Equation 4.1 using the pooled ordinary
least squares (OLS) method will lead to biased and inefficient estimation as candidates and
their related candidates belonging to the same party tend to be more similar to each other.
Because of this, the errors (ηipt ) may no longer be independent (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).
In other words, if the party level unobserved heterogeneity is unaccounted for, the effect of
HGC tone that we estimate is likely to have an upward bias. To alleviate this concern and
to separate party specific heterogeneity from the random error term, we decompose ηipt into
two components. The first component of ηipt consists of random error at the party level. The
component is common to all the candidates who belong to the same party (this random error
is identical for all the candidates belonging to the same political party). The second term
denotes random errors across all candidates and we assume that these errors are independent
to each other. Following the literature (e.g., Lee et al. 2015), in order to efficiently estimate
the model taking into account random errors at two-levels (i.e., party-level and candidate-
level), we employ random coefficients model. This estimation procedure, also referred to as
mixed effects estimator, is widely used in the IS and marketing literature when the data is
at candidate-level and candidates belong to different groups (e.g., Mithas et al. 2006; Boh
et al. 2007). In this estimation procedure, the party-level random errors are captured by
introducing party specific random coefficients of main independent variables. Specifically, we
allow the coefficients of interest β1pt, β2pt, β3pt, and β4pt (i.e., the slopes of PosTipt, NegTipt,
MixTipt, and folipt) to account for party specific characteristics. In addition, we also allow
the intercept (β0pt) to vary across different political parties. We now present the equations
for β0pt, β1pt, β2pt, β3pt, and β4pt as a “party-level” model.
4.3.5.3 Party-Level Model
In the party-level model, the estimates of β1pt and β2pt are modeled as a function of
candidate’s respective political party (i.e., cumulative effect of all human brands belonging
to the same political party). In other words, the party specific coefficients allow us to better
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control for unobserved party level heterogeneity. The coefficients β1pt and β2pt are modeled
as follows:
β1pt = γ10 + γ11PartyPosTipt + γ12PartyNegTipt + u1pt (4.2)
β2pt = γ20 + γ21PartyPosTipt + γ22PartyNegTipt + u2pt (4.3)
where PartyPosTipt (PartyNegTipt) denotes the number of positive (negative) toned tweets
of related brands of the focal candidate. We take into account the unobserved heterogeneity
of political parties (which are treated as random) by including u1pt and u2pt in each of
the coefficients as follows. The random error terms u1pt and u2pt are the same for all the
candidates belonging to the same political party and unobserved by us. By allowing the
coefficients to vary across different parties, we allow for the impact of key independent
variables in Equation 1 to interact with the party-specific HGC behavior as presented in
Equations 4.2 and 4.3. In addition, we allow the unobserved heterogeneity across political
parties with a random coefficient on the intercept (i.e., β0pt ), MixTipt (i.e., β3pt ), and folipt
(i.e., β4pt ) denoted as follows.
β0pt = γ00 + γ01PartyPosTipt + γ02PartyNegTipt + u0pt (4.4)
β3pt = λ3 + ν3pt (4.5)
β4pt = λ4 + ν4pt (4.6)
where u0pt, ν3pt, and ν4pt are random errors that denote unobserved heterogeneity at
party level, and λ3 and λ4 denote the coefficients of Mixipt and folipt, respectively, after
accounting for random errors at the party level.
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4.3.5.4 Full Model
Substituting the coefficients β1pt, β2pt, β0pt, β3pt, and β4pt (presented in Equations 4.2,
4.3, 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 respectively) in Equation 4.1, we obtain:
log(RTipt) = γ00 + γ01PartyPosTipt + γ02PartyNegTipt
+ γ10PosTipt + γ11PartyPosTiptPosTipt + γ12PartyNegTiptPosTipt
+ γ20NegTipt + γ21PartyPosTiptNegTipt + γ22PartyNegTiptNegTipt
+ λ3MixTipt + λ4folipt + u0pt + u1ptPosTipt + u2ptNegTipt
+ ν3ptMixTipt + ν4ptfolipt + ηipt (4.7)
The model in Equation 4.7 consists of main effects (i.e., PosTipt, NegTipt, and MixTipt)
and the interaction of focal candidate’s HGC tone and related candidates’ HGC tone (i.e.,
PosTipt × PartyPosTipt, PosTipt × PartyNegTipt, NegTipt × PartyPosTipt, and NegTipt ×
PartyNegTipt). The interactions between the HGC tones of the focal brand and the related
brands capture the spillover effects of related brands HGC. In particular, having an interac-
tion term between PartyPosTipt and PosTipt captures the spillover effect of positive toned
HGC of related brands when the tone of the focal brand is positive. The interaction between
PartyPosTipt and NegTipt captures the spillover effect of positive toned HGC of related
brands when the tone of the focal brand is negative. Similarly, the term PartyNegTipt ×
PosTipt (PartyNegTipt × NegTipt) captures the spillover effect of negative toned HGC of
related brands when the tone of focal brand is positive (negative). We thus have four in-
teraction terms to measure the spillover effect as follows: (i) PartyPosTipt × PosTipt, (ii)
PartyNegTipt × NegTipt, (iii) PartyPosTipt × NegTipt, and (iv) PartyNegTipt × PosTipt.
The signs of the coefficients of these interaction terms will provide us with the direc-
tion of the spillover effects. For example, if the sign associated with the interaction term
PartyPosTipt × PosTipt is positive, there is a positive spillover effect, i.e., positive tone of
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related brands positively moderates the relationship between the number of positive toned
content of focal human brand and engagement.
log(RTipt) = γ00 + γ01PartyPosTipt + γ02PartyNegTipt
+ γ10PosTipt + γ11PartyPosTiptPosTipt + γ12PartyNegTiptPosTipt
+ γ20NegTipt + γ21PartyPosTiptNegTipt + γ22PartyNegTiptNegTipt
+ λ3MixTipt + λ4folipt + ZCipt
+ λ5foliptPosTipt + λ6foliptNegTipt + λ7foliptMixTipt
+ u0pt + u1ptPosTipt + u2ptNegTipt + ν3ptMixTipt + ν4ptfolipt + ηipt (4.8)
We include all the control variables discussed in Section 4.3.4 to account for any observed
candidate heterogeneity. Cipt is a vector that consists of all the control variables to account
for candidate-level heterogeneity. The list of control variables used in this model is presented
in Table 4.2. The parameter estimates of all control variables are denoted by the vector Z.
The impact of negative toned HGC on engagement is captured through the coefficient γ20
and the effect of positive tone is captured by γ10. Next, the moderation effects of popularity
are captured by λ5, λ6, and λ7. The spillover effects between the focal human brand’s HGC
tone and related brands’ HGC tone are captured by the interaction coefficients γ11, γ12, γ21,
and γ22.
To summarize, the candidate-level variables are influenced by the party to which they
belong. Specifically, the candidate-level data is in the first level nested within the political
parties in level two. This structure of data is typically referred to as uniquely nested data
structure (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). However, this nested data structure of our data
violates one of the key assumptions of OLS estimation, that is, independence of random
errors (Kreft and De Leeuw 1998). To overcome this, following the previous literature, we
employ the random coefficients model. This estimation procedure allows us to model the
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variation in slopes and intercepts across different political parties through level two (party
level) variables.
We acknowledge that a controlled or natural experiment is the most appropriate way to
establish a causal effect of tones of HGC on audience engagement. However, such an approach
may not feasible in our context. We address the challenges (i.e., correlated unobservables
and simultaneity) associated with establishing a causal effect in social network settings using
observable data by relying on the solutions established in the social networks and panel data
econometrics literature. Following the arguments presented in Ghose and Han (2011), we
interpret the set of estimates of our model as an upper bound on the causal effect of HGC
tone on social media engagement. In the next section, we discuss the results of our proposed
model.
4.4 Results
We present the parameter estimates of the coefficients of our proposed model in Table 4.2.
Before estimating the results of our proposed model, we estimate a series of alternative null
models. First, we estimate a model of twitter engagement as a function of the intercept and
all the control variables discussed in Section 4.3.4. Model 2 adds the proposed independent
variables to Model 1. Model 3 builds on Model 2 by adding the proposed interaction terms.
The proposed model (presented in Equation 4.8) includes the main effects (i.e., candidate’s
HGC tone and related candidate’s HGC tone), interaction terms, and all the control vari-
ables. We estimate the proposed model (denoted by Model 3 in Table 4.2) as a random
coefficients model using the full maximum likelihood via the EM algorithm (Dempster et al.
1977). The AIC, BIC and log likelihood of the models are presented in Table 4.3. We find
that the proposed model has the best fit. All the models account for controls to address the
identification challenges discussed in Section 4.3.5.1, time-period dummies, and party-level
and individual-level random errors.
Furthermore, to address the concerns about failure to meet standard regression assump-
tions (e.g., i.i.d. errors), we account for heteroskedastic random errors by using the White’s
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sandwich covariance matrix, which is robust to heteroscedasticity (Wooldridge 2010). We
also cluster at political party level to account for within-cluster (i.e., candidates belonging
to the same political party) correlation of errors. This clustering of random errors allows the
errors to be correlated across all observations of all candidates belonging to the same politi-
cal party. This includes observations belonging to the same candidate (Cameron and Miller
2015), thus further improving the efficiency of the estimator. We report the robust-clustered
standard errors in column Model 4 of Table 4.2.6 The results for Models 1-4 are presented
in Table 4.2. As Model 4 has the best fit and accounts for heteroscedasticity clustered at
party level, we focus our discussion on the parameter estimates obtained from this model
(i.e., our proposed model).
4.4.1 Effect of Tone of HGC on Engagement
The estimates of the proposed model indicate that the negative toned HGC (i.e., NegT )
has a positive and significant effect on the number of retweets ( γ20 = 0.425 with p−value <
0.01). The coefficient associated with positive toned HGC (i.e., the conditional effect of
positive HGC) is found to be positive but statistically insignificant.7 However, we find that
the net marginal effect of positive tone (i.e., γ10 + γ11 + γ12 + λ5) is significantly positive at
mean values of all other variables in the proposed model. The conditional marginal estimates
of number of positive tone HGC and their standard errors for different levels of popularity
and all other variables at mean are provided in Table C.1. These results indicate that the
audience engagement with human brand tends to increase with negative toned HGC, while
it is likely to increase with positive toned HGC only for popular human brands. We also find
that the coefficient associated with mixed toned HGC (λ3 = 0.128 with p− value < 0.01) is
significantly positive.
6For the remainder of the analyses in the paper, we employ robust-clustered standard errors when esti-
mating the parameters.
7As we have interaction terms, the interpretation of the estimate of PosTipt is conditional on all interaction
terms with PosTipt equal to zero. In this case, when folipt, PartyPosTipt, and PartyNegTipt are zero,
estimate of PosTipt is 0.0359 and statistically insignificant.
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Table 4.2: Parameter Estimates: Effect of HGC on Social Media Engagement
 
   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 DV  ln(RT) ln(RT) ln(RT) ln(RT) 














PosT  0.0612*** 0.0359 0.0359 
  (0.0136) (0.069) (0.0551) 
NegT  0.0668 0.425*** 0.425*** 
  (0.0572) (0.102) (0.159) 
MixT  0.0409*** 0.128*** 0.128*** 
  (0.0128) (0.0186) (0.044) 
fol  0.177*** 0.275*** 0.275*** 
  (0.0375) (0.0339) (0.0246) 
PartyPosT  1.56E-03*** 1.94E-03*** 1.94E-03*** 
  (0.541E-03) (0.533E-03) (0.303E-03) 
PartyNegT  -0.267E-03 -1.79E-03* -1.79E-03* 
  (1.07E-03) (1.08E-03) (1.05E-03) 
PartyMixT  -1.36E-05 -5.62E-05 -5.62E-05 












fol x PosT   0.901E-03 0.901E-03 
   (5.1E-03) (3.8E-03) 
fol x NegT   -0.0304*** -0.0304*** 
   (7.33E-03) (0.0115) 
fol x MixT   -7.38E-03*** -7.38E-03** 
   (1.3E-03) (3.25E-03) 
PosT x PartyPosT   1.44E-05 1.44E-05 
   (7.49E-05) (4.02E-05) 
PosT x PartyNegT   0.99E-05 0.99E-05 
   (0.152 E-03) (0.115E-03) 
NegT x PartyPosT   -0.278E-03** -0.000278** 
   (0.13E-03) (0.136E-03) 
NegT x PartyNegT   0.524E-03* 0.000524* 








mentions(lag) 0.688*** 0.420*** 0.371*** 0.371*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0326) (0.0315) (0.0691) 
assets -0.107*** -0.0362 -0.0418* -0.0418 
 (0.0238) (0.0239) (0.0227) (0.0915) 
Age -0.0101* -1.25E-03 5.02E-03 5.02E-03 
 (5.35E-03) (5.28E-03) (4.99E-03) (6.1E-03) 
Male 0.273** 0.313** 0.344*** 0.344*** 
 (0.136) (0.134) (0.129) (0.112) 
partyMC(lag) -0.21 0.0321 -0.0602 -0.0602 
 (0.131) (0.126) (0.119) (0.0486) 
partyRT(lag) 0.382*** 0.052 0.129 0.129*** 
 (0.138) (0.131) (0.125) (0.0283) 
partyExp -0.100*** -0.213*** -0.196*** -0.196*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0548) (0.0417) (0.0537) 
Intercept 3.834*** 3.449*** 2.081** 2.081 
 (0.742) (1.155) (0.947) (2.272) 
N 1313 1313 1313 1313 
Region/Education /Time/Opposition HGC Controls were included in all the models. The parameter estimates for 
these controls are not reported for brevity. Standard errors in parentheses for Models 1-3. Robust SE clustered at 
party level are in parentheses for Model 4. The coefficients of models 2, 3, and 4 are estimated as mixed effects 
model using full maximum likelihood model via EM algorithm. 
  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01 
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Social media engagement as a function of 
control variables only 
-2515.928 5071.856 5175.458 
Model 2 Variables in Model 1  + Main Effects -2397.009 4858.018 5023.78 
Model 3 
Variables in Model 2 + Moderating effects of 
popularity + Spillover effects 
-2332.617 4731.234 4902.177 
Model 4 
Variables in Model 3 (estimated with robust 
cluster standard errors)  
-2332.617 4731.234 4902.177 
 
4.4.2 Moderating Effect of Popularity on the Impact of HGC Tone on Engage-
ment
Turning our attention to the moderating role of popularity, we find that the coeffi-
cient of interaction between NegT and fol is significantly negative (λ6 = −0.0304 with
p − value < 0.01). To illustrate the moderating effect of popularity on how negative toned
HGC affects engagement, we conduct a sensitivity analysis. In this analysis, we plot the
predicted engagement levels corresponding to the number of negative toned HGC at dif-
ferent levels of popularity (i.e., number of followers). The results are shown in Figure 4.2.
This figure highlights a higher slope for the less popular human brands (as compared to
more popular human brands), which suggests that the (positive) effect of negative HGC on
engagement diminishes as the popularity of human brand increases.
Although we find that the coefficient of the interaction between the number of positive
toned HGC (i.e., PosT ) and number of followers is insignificant, we perform additional anal-
yses to demonstrate how the marginal effect of PosT varies at different levels of popularity.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the conditional marginal effect of positive tone posts on engagement
for different levels of popularity at 90% significance level. From this figure, we can infer that
the marginal effect of positive tone is statistically positive when fol8 at 90% significance
level. This implies that the effect of positive tone HGC is significantly greater for popular
human brands as opposed to less popular human brand for whom the effect is not signif-
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Figure 4.2: Moderating Effect of Popularity (All other variables are at mean)
Figure 4.3: Conditional Marginal Effects of Positive Tone on Engagement at Different Levels
of Popularity (All other variables are at mean)
128
icant.8 Next, the coefficient of interaction between the number of mixed toned HGC and
number of followers is significantly negative.
Finally, our results indicate that the conditional effect of popularity (i.e., fol) on audience
engagement is significantly positive (λ4 = 0.275 with p − value < 0.01). To summarize
the moderating effect of human brand’s popularity, our findings reveal that whereas human
brand’s popularity (measured via number of followers) lessens the positive impact of negative
and mixed toned tweets on engagement, the popularity of a human brand strengthens the
positive impact of positive toned tweets on engagement. These findings are summarized in
Table 4.4. In the next subsection, we discuss the results related to the spillover effects.
Table 4.4: Summary of Results
  Main Effect of HGC 
Tone 
Moderating Effect of Human 
Brand’s Popularity 
  HGC Tone 
Number of Positive toned HGC by Focal Brand - Positive* 
Number of Negative toned HGC by Focal Brand Significantly Positive Significantly Negative 
* Partially supported when popularity is above mean. 
 
4.4.3 Spillover Effects of Related Brands’ HGC Tone
With regards to the spillover effects, the estimates of our model suggest that the in-
teraction between NegT and PartyPosT is negative and significant. That is, the effect of
candidate’s negative toned HGC on audience engagement decreases with the higher num-
ber of positive toned HGC from the related candidates. Next, we find that the interaction
between NegT and PartyNegT is positive and significant. This result suggests that the
effect of candidate’s negative toned HGC on audience engagement is greater when the tone
of related candidates’ HGC is negative. Figure 4.4 illustrates the interaction effect of NegT
8We acknowledge that these results are not to be interpreted as a full-blown counterfactual analysis,
rather, they are simulations conducted for illustration purposes to understand the dynamics of PosT and
NegT on audience engagement.
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and PartyPosT , which hints at the decreasing effect of negative HGC on engagement with
increased number of positive HGC by related brands (slopes are higher for lower number of
PartyPosT ). Figure 4.5 illustrates the interaction effect of NegT and PartyNegT, which
depicts that the percent change in engagement corresponding to higher number of negative
HGC by related brands is higher than that corresponding to lower number of negative HGC
by related brands (i.e., the slopes are higher for higher number of PartyNeg).
Figure 4.4: Moderating Effect of Positive Toned Tweets by Related Candidates (All other
variables are at mean)
We find that the relationship between the focal candidate’s positive toned HGC and
the related candidate’s positive (and negative) toned HGC is insignificant. However, the
marginal analysis that we conduct demonstrates that the effect of PosT varies at different
levels of the tone of related brands (i.e., PartyPosT and PartyNegT ). Figure 4.6 illustrates
the marginal effect of PosT at different values of PartyPosT. We find that the effect of
PosT becomes positive and significant when PartyPosT is around 250 (a little below mean).
Figure 4.7 shows that the marginal effect of PosT is positively significant when PartyNegT
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Figure 4.5: Moderating Effect of Negative Toned Tweets by Related Candidates (All other
variables are at mean)
is less than or equal to about 175 (which refers to around 69 percentile). The findings
related to spillover effects are summarized in Table 4.5. Finally, the coefficients of the main
effects of related brands’ tone on focal brand’s engagement. Our findings suggest that the
coefficient of number of positive toned HGC by related brands (i.e., PartyPosT ) is positive
and significant, while the coefficient of number of negative toned HGC by related brands
(i.e., PartyNegT ) is negative and significant. For brevity, we do not discuss the results
related to the control variables.
Table 4.5: Summary of Spillover Effects
  Spillover Effects 
  
Number of Positive Toned 
HGC by Related Brands 
Number of Negative Toned 
HGC by Related Brands 
Number of Positive toned HGC by Focal Brand Positive Spillover Effecta Positive Spillover Effectb 





a Partially supported when PartyPosT is high (i.e., PartyPosT  is above mean) 
b Partially supported when PartyNegT is low (i.e., PartyNegT  is below mean) 
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Figure 4.6: Conditional Marginal Effects of Positive Tone on Engagement at Different Levels
of Number of Positive Toned Tweets of Related Candidates
Figure 4.7: Conditional Marginal Effects of Positive Tone on Engagement at Different Levels
of Number of Negative Toned Tweets of Related Candidates
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4.5 Impact of Engagement on Social Media Visibility
Whereas earlier studies have demonstrated that higher social media engagement would
lead to higher sales, in the context of engagement of human brands, quantifying the impact
of engagement is challenging. This is because the value generated by audience engagement
of human brands is not often observable. We had relied on the number of retweets as a
measure of engagement. One would expect that higher engagement levels would lead to
more discourse on the candidate’s views. In this section, we assess the impact of HGC on
“buzz” about the candidates. This buzz on social media platforms implies higher visibility
of the candidate, which is one of the primary aims of human brand’s social media strategy.
In the context of Twitter, we can measure visibility of the candidate based on how many
times that candidate was mentioned on social media platforms (Cha et al. 2010). Cha et al.
(2010) argue that the number of mentions denotes response of audience to the candidate’s
HGC.
On Twitter, number of mentions represents the number of times the candidate was tagged
or cited by other users in their tweets. In particular, it represents the interest that Twitter
users have on the candidate. From our data, we count the number of times the candidate
was tagged by other users. Using this information, we empirically test the argument that
the higher engagement is associated with greater amount of chatter about the candidate by
the audience on social media. To do this, we run the following model using fixed effects
estimation strategy to control for individual level heterogeneity.
log(Mentionsit) = β0 + β1 log(RTit) + β2Tweetsit + β3fcit + β4PartyTweetsit
+ β5 log(PartyMCit−1) + β6 log(PartyRTit−1) + ui + vt + ηit (4.9)
In the above model, the dependent variable is the buzz around the focal candidate i. The
main variable of interest is number of retweets (denoted by RT ). Further, we control for
candidate i’s total number of tweets (i.e., Tweetsit = PosTit +NegTit +MixTit), popularity
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of the candidate (fcit), total number of tweets by related candidates (i.e., PartyTweetsit),
number of mentions of related candidates in the previous period (i.e., PartyMCit−1), and
the engagement levels of related brands in the previous period (i.e., PartyRTit−1). Table 4.6
reports the estimation results. We find that the coefficient of number of retweets is positive
and significant. This validates our argument that higher engagement is indeed positively
associated with chatter about the candidate on social media, which ratifies the importance
of social media engagement.
Table 4.6: Parameter Estimates: Model of Social Media Visibility
  Model 7 
DV  log(Mentionsipt) 
  (Robust SE) 
log(RT) 0.505*** 
 (0.0283) 












Time Controls [Yes] 
N 1313 
R-squared 0.8347 
Robust standard errors clustered at party level are in parentheses. 
The coefficients are estimated using fixed effects model. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01 
 
4.6 Supplementary Analysis
Although the estimation strategy that we discussed in Section 4.3.5 addresses the po-
tential bias from unobserved confounding factors and simultaneity, we conduct a series of
robustness tests using alternative estimation methods, specifications, and samples to rule out
alternate explanations. We find that our key results are substantively robust to these alterna-
tive specifications. In the following subsections, we provide discussion on the supplementary
analysis used to further validate our empirical results.
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4.6.1 Alternative Model Formulation: Conditional Fixed Effects Negative Bi-
nomial Model
Although count data models (e.g., negative binomial models) may be considered more
suitable for our data, He et al. (2017) argue that linear models are more robust to distribu-
tion misspecification. Hence, in our main analysis, we use a log-transformed linear model.
Nevertheless, we supplement our results from the linear model with count data models to
ensure consistency of results. Most commonly used count data models in the literature
are Poisson model and negative binomial model. Literature suggests that negative binomial
models compared to Poisson model provide un-biased estimates for over dispersed data, thus
we use this model (He et al. 2017). Further to control any unobserved confounding factors
due to time-invariant candidate level heterogeneity, we use the conditional fixed effects nega-
tive binomial (FE-NB) model for panel data as suggested by Hausman et al. (1984). Results
of FE-NB model are presented in column Model R1 in Table C.2 (in Appendix C). These
results suggest that our findings from the main model are robust to different estimation
strategies, providing further empirical support to our results.
4.6.2 Robustness Check: Fixed and Random Effects
Next, we compare the estimates of our proposed estimation procedure for our model in
Equation 4.8 to the conventional estimation procedures (fixed effects and random effects). As
discussed earlier, the past literature suggests that the mixed effects model provides efficient
estimates. Although it may be argued that fixed effects models can control for all unobserved
candidate level heterogeneity, the fixed effects models are often considered inefficient because
of the issue of over controls. Our model in Equation 4.8 employs various controls to account
for any candidate level heterogeneity while accounting for party level heterogeneity, and
hence we believe that our main estimated strategy, i.e., mixed effects model, provides the
most efficient standard errors. However, we provide estimates and their standard errors from
fixed effects model. If the estimates of the conventional fixed effects model are found to be
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consistent (even with not so efficient estimators), it will suggest that our qualitative results
are robust to inefficient estimator. Further, we also compare the estimates from random
effects model wherein we do not account for party level randomness. We present the results
of both the conventional models (i.e., random and fixed effects) in Table C.2 in Appendix C
(columns Model R2 and Model R3). The parameter estimates and their standard errors
suggest that all the results are consistent.
4.6.3 Robustness with Alternate Sample
Next, we re-estimate our full model with an alternative sample. As the focus of our study
is to understand the drivers of engagement based on human brand’s social media activity,
we had previously employed twenty-six tweets per candidate (i.e., on average at least one
tweet per week) as a cut-off for our main model. In order to examine the consistency of
our results, we re-estimated our model by including candidates with lower levels of activity
on Twitter. Specifically, we lowered the cut-off for number of tweets to six tweets for the
six-month period instead of twenty-six tweets (i.e., on average at least one tweet per month).
To demonstrate the robustness of our results, we re-estimated all the models discussed in
the previous sections. In particular, we estimated our models using four different estimation
strategies - the mixed effects model, FE-NB model, random effects model, and fixed effects
model to confirm robustness. The results, shown in Table C.3 (in Appendix C), are consistent
with the key findings regardless of different levels of activity on social media platforms.
4.6.4 Accounting for Self-Selection Bias
Next, it is likely that human brands who are more likely to receive engagement from
the online audience are expected to tweet. To test the impact of the selection of human
brands in our sample, we estimated the model in Equation 4.8 using Heckman two-step
selection model. In the first step, we develop a mixed effects Probit model (to account for
party level heterogeneity) that models human brand’s decision to either tweet or not tweet
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in a particular week.9 The Heckman (1977) selection correction term is obtained from the
estimates from the first step. In the second step, the selection term is then included in
the main model presented in Equation 4.8. The results of the second step are presented in
Table C.4 (in Appendix C). The results suggest that the findings are consistent with the
results of the main model. This further validates our empirical results. Furthermore, these
results indicate that the selection term is significant.
4.6.5 Alternative Measure of Engagement
In the next section, in line with the literature, we argue (and provide empirical evidence)
that the number of mentions is in fact a measure for visibility and number of retweets may
affect the visibility of the candidate on Twitter. However, one could argue that the number
of mentions in addition to number of retweets may be seen as a combined measure for en-
gagement. To alleviate this concern, we re-run our main model (as proposed in Equation 4.8)
using an alternative construct for engagement. In particular, the new dependent variable is
the sum number of retweets and number of mentions for each candidate i in week t. The
results are presented in Table C.5 (in Appendix C). The results are qualitatively the same
compared to our proposed measure for engagement, i.e., number of retweets.
4.7 Discussion
With human brands favoring social media over other traditional media modes to com-
municate and engage with audience, it is critical to analyze how the content generated by
human brands and related brands affects audience engagement. Although recent literature
has analyzed the relationship between the content generated by the users/firms and brand
engagement on social media, there is a lack of research in IS that explicitly and systematically
studies how human brands, who are widely followed on social media, generate engagement
on social media. Prior studies have argued that the interaction between audience and human
brands is of fandom and worship, which is different from how audience associate with corpo-
9Unlike the previous cases, we do not drop inactive candidates as we account for selection bias.
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rate brands (Saboo et al. 2016). Hence, we argue that the effect of HGC is not the same as
the effect of FGC. Our research provides insights into the impact of various tones of content
generated by human brands and their related brands on engagement. Using a unique dataset
obtained from Twitter, we examine the effects of the tone of human brand’s social media
content on audience engagement levels measured through the number of retweets. Moreover,
as industry experts vouch for firms to emulate human brands’ social media strategy, our
results could provide insights not only to human brands but also to non-human brands (i.e.,
firms) on how to design the social media content to generate audience engagement. In the
rest of this section, we first summarize our key findings and the intuition behind these find-
ings, and then present theoretical contributions of our study. Finally, we discuss the insights
that human brands, with respect to their social media strategy, can glean from our study.
4.7.1 Summary of Findings
Our empirical findings indicate that the negative tone of social media content generated
by human brands positively impacts engagement. We find that the popularity negatively
moderates the effect of negative tone on engagement, i.e., the impact of negative tone reduces
with the popularity of human brands. In contrast, the positive tone of social media content
has a positive effect on engagement only in case of highly popular human brands. These
findings suggest that audience do have different expectations in terms of ethical behavior of
their leaders. The audience expect highly popular leaders (e.g., Elon Musk, co-founder and
CEO of Tesla) to create more positive toned content rather than negative toned content.
With respect to the spillover effects, we find that the HGC tones of related human brands
affect how the content generated by human brands impacts social media engagement. In
particular, we find that the engagement levels are higher when the tones of the focal brand
and the related brands are negative. This indicates that frequent exposure to negative
toned HGC increases the likelihood of audience engaging with the audience. One plausible
explanation for this result is that when the tone of both the human brand and the related
brands is negative, the audience may find the content of all the brands belonging to the same
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group intriguing and therefore engage with all of them at the same time. The principle of
social proof could provide an alternative reasoning behind high engagement when both the
focal and related brands’ HGC tones are negative. Cialdini (2009) argues that audience tends
to determine if an information is correct by examining what the other audience perceives
to be correct. In particular, audience looks for consistency of the information and as the
audience see more news about a failed policy (i.e., negative toned HGC) they may choose
to engage with the content. For example, it is likely that all the candidates from the same
political party (i.e., focal candidate and all the related candidates) post content about a
similar topic in that particular week. For instance, they could be talking about a failed
policy of an opposition candidate or political party, and hence the tone of both the focal
brand and the related brands is negative. In this scenario, the audience perceives the negative
toned HGC of related brands as an endorsement to the negative toned HGC of focal human
brand and thus retweets the post. Further, our findings indicate partial support for positive
spillover effect of positive toned HGC of related brands when the tone of human brand is
also positive.
In contrary, our findings suggest that the effect of negative tone of focal candidate is
lower when the tone of related candidate is positive. In effect, the positive impact of number
of negative tone HGC on audience engagement is weakened with higher number of positive
tone related candidates’ HGC. Finally, we extend our analysis to empirically analyze the
significance of social media engagement from a human brand’s perspective. We find that
the engagement is positively associated with visibility on social media platforms. This result
indicates that higher engagement is indeed an important metric for human brands to evaluate
their social media strategy. To summarize the findings of our work (i) the tone of HGC
affects engagement; (ii) the effect of HGC on engagement is different for more popular human
brands as compared to less popular human brands; (iii) tone of related brands’ HGC affects
social media engagement; and (iv) higher engagement is associated to increased visibility on
social media. Overall, these findings provide interesting and important takeaways in addition
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to making a strong case for human brands (or their managers) to have a robust social media
strategy.
4.7.2 Implications
Our findings have several important implications for the academic literature and practice.
Our work presents, to the best of our knowledge, a first attempt to examine the engagement
of human brands, who are the most widely followed on social media, while the majority of
prior literature has mainly focused on the content of firms or non-celebrity users (e.g., Kumar
et al. 2016). The content of human brands is usually more polarizing in terms of their tone.
Hence, the effects of human brand’s HGC would vary from the effects of firm’s social media
content. Besides, even if the results from the prior work on user generated content and firm
generated were applicable to our context, there is no evidence for clear consensus on how the
tone of content affects the engagement on social media. Thus, from theoretical perspective,
our study takes the lead in understanding the consequences of the content created by human
brands.
Our study is one of the first attempts to systematically document the moderating role of
social media popularity on the effect of HGC, whereas Berger et al. (2010) have documented
the impact of brand popularity on the relationship between negative publicity and product
sales. The findings of our study indicate that the popularity of the human brand plays a
vital role in moderating the effect of HGC tone on engagement. This implies that failing to
account for popularity will likely result in overestimation of the effects of tone on engagement.
These novel findings on how popularity affects social media engagement contribute to the
growing literature on social media.
The results from the prior work demonstrate the presence of the spillover effects of content
generated by other firms on engagement. Borah and Tellis (2016), for example, demonstrate
the presence of the spillover of perception based on the content generated by online audience.
However, this result does not answer our question, that is, perception spillover of related
brands’ HGC tone on the audience engagement levels of a focal human brand. We establish
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the presence of spillover and the direction of spillover of HGC on social media engagement.
If this moderating role is ignored, the related brands’ HGC could have an adverse effect
on engagement. Our work contributes to the limited yet growing literature examining the
spillover effects of related brands on focal brand.
Unlike most of the earlier studies that have operationalized engagement in terms of sales
or other similar constructs, we focus a behavioral construct of engagement. Specifically, we
operationalize engagement via number of retweets. Further, we also empirically demonstrate
the significance of social media engagement. Our findings indicate that the engagement on
social media is associated with increased online visibility of the content creator. Our findings
demonstrate that the engagement can be seen as an important element for human brands
who are interested in increasing the visibility of their brand. This unique perspective will
enrich the stream of research examining the effects of the tone of social content.
Our work also has several significant managerial implications for the social media man-
agers of human brands who seek to increase their engagement with the audience. Although
we have shown the impact of HGC content on engagement in the context of politics and Twit-
ter, the implications of this study are potentially relevant to other contexts (e.g., top man-
agement executives of corporations) and other platforms (such as Facebook and LinkedIn).
Given that the human brands are increasingly using social media to engage with the online
community (e.g., CEOs), the question of how to generate social media engagement is of
importance. Furthermore, in certain industries, social media engagement of human brands
can have direct economic implications. For example, Saboo et al. (2016) demonstrate that
the social media activities of musicians have a positive impact on product sales. We discuss
the managerial implications of our study below.
Established brands should actively use positive tone, while less popular brands should
employ negative tone. An important insight that we glean from our study is that less popular
human brands should focus on creating negative toned content to generate higher engagement
and greater visibility on social media platforms. We believe that our findings can be extended
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to the context of traditional brands (or firms). In particular, our findings suggest that
less popular firms (such as small businesses and startups) could increase their audience
engagement (and thus visibility) by means of more number of negative toned content. It is
often argued that smaller brands need to create their social media content so that they can
stand out from the crowd. Our results indicate that one way of standing out is by creating
negative toned content, which could give the visibility needed for a smaller size firm. On the
other hand, in case of bigger firms (or more popular firms), offensive tone on social media
could backfire and will lower the audience engagement. Hence, our prescription for larger
firms is to create more number of positive toned content.
Have a comprehensive social media strategy. Our findings on presence of spillover effects
help marketing managers of a human brand understand the impact of tone of both the human
brands and its related brands on engagement, and thereby providing novel insights for better
decision making of managing the content of human brands. Given that we find evidence for
asymmetric spillover effects for different tones of HGC, the marketing managers of human
brands need to coordinate their social media strategy with each other so that the tone of
one human brand does not hurt the engagement of other human brands. Further, given
the similarities of human brands and traditional brands, we speculate our findings may be
applied to traditional brands as well. For example, the negative advertising strategy of one
nameplate (e.g., Toyota Corolla) might increase its engagement levels. However, this could
have negative impact on its related brands (e.g., Toyota Camry, Rav4, and Highlander).
Thus, as a first step, brands should have a comprehensive social media strategy across
different nameplates.
In summary, our research highlights the importance of social media tone, related brands’
social media tone, and popularity on online engagement and visibility. Unlike traditional
marketing strategies, social media allows human brands to implement its marketing plan
instantaneously. Hence, an effective social media strategy from the perspective of a focal
brand entails integrating the social media behavior of the related brands and its popularity.
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By integrating these external aspects into one’s strategy, he/she can adjust his/her strategy
to retain or increase audience engagement and visibility on social media platforms.
4.8 Conclusions and Future Research Directions
In this paper, we develop a multi-level hierarchical model to examine the impacts of
tone of a celebrity’s social media post on the resulting engagement with the audience. In
order to achieve our goals, we assemble a novel data comprising of candidate-level Twitter
data collected during the Indian elections 2014. Our empirical findings provide guidance to
human brands on an all-inclusive social media strategy while contributing to the literature.
Although the findings of our study provide several interesting and important insights on the
impact of HGC, we acknowledge the fact that our work has a few limitations. First, we
recognize the fact that our study is limited to examining the impact on only one particular
social media platform. Future research can explore and re-validate our findings on other
platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, and Snapchat. Second, we restricted our focus to
political candidates. Future studies can investigate the generalizability of our results with
human brands from different context. Although there are several similarities among political
candidates across the world, it would be interesting to check if our insights hold for candidates
in other countries as well to account for difference in cultures. Whereas our research focuses
only on one aspect of HGC content, i.e., tone, we hope that future research can build upon
our study to examine the impact of other aspects (such as including emotion and humor) of
HGC content. Finally, we use number of retweets as measure of engagement. It would be
worthwhile to employ other measures of engagement and revisit this issue. Future research
can build upon our study to explore other issues related to the content generated by human
brands in social media.
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The ubiquity of digital social networking platforms has enabled organizations to access
massive social networks and directly interact with the users in these networks, thus trans-
forming how organizations operate their businesses. For example, social networking plat-
forms such as GitHub facilitate firms to collaborate with external parties including users of
the products, competitors, and partners to build new products, test existing products, and
manage open source projects. Likewise, platforms such as Twitter, LinkedIn, and Facebook
have revolutionized the way firms market their products and interact with the customers.
Not surprisingly, social media platforms have become an integral part of everyday business
operations.
My research investigates the impact of online social networks on firms from an operational
perspective. In particular, my dissertation research demonstrates how firms can effectively
utilize online social networks to manage technology (Chapter 2), optimize their marketing op-
erations (Chapter 3), and attract customers to their products and services (Chapter 4). Our
findings suggest that the decision to either engage or not with the social networks is not triv-
ial. For example, we demonstrate that seeding through the most popular influencer, which
might seem to be an obvious strategy for firms, is not always an optimal strategy. Likewise,
our results suggest that firms might choose not to engage with the open source community,
in certain scenarios, even though it might seem to be a good strategy. Hence, firms need to
carefully evaluate the necessary trade-offs associated with the social networks for improved
decision-making. To accomplish my research goals, I take a multi-methodological approach,
which includes using optimal control theory, combinatorial optimization, and empirical mod-
els. This multi-methodological approach allows me to conduct research and provide solutions
at both strategic and operational levels.
While my current research sheds light on the impact of social networks on technology
management and marketing operations, I foresee several new research directions studying
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the impact of social networks on various other aspects of a business such as product recalls,
reverse logistics, product returns, demand forecasting, and policy implementation. Further-
more, whereas the literature is quite rich in the domain of advertising on internet and mobile
platforms, research on optimizing social media advertising is limited. In this regard, I plan to
build on my current work in the domain of social media marketing. For example, the prob-
lem of ad scheduling across multiple platforms is an apparent extension for the scheduling
model that I developed in Chapter 3.
My dissertation makes several important contributions to both theory and practice. From
theoretical perspective, the study presented in the first essay is among the first to analyze the
effects of open source community on managing technology, and more importantly determine
the optimal extent of openness, i.e., the extent of collaboration between the firm and open
source community. Furthermore, the theoretical contributions pertaining to the second and
third essays lie in providing a data-driven framework for conducting an influencer market-
ing campaign on online social networks and understanding what drives audience to engage
with influencers. In addition, the results of the three essays presented in this dissertation
provide several actionable insights for firms contemplating on using social networks. Below,
I conclude by briefly summarizing the three essays of my dissertation.
In the first essay, we model the impacts of making a portion of a firm’s technology open
source on the quality and maintenance effort of the current version of the technology, and on
the quality and development effort of the next version. The first study aims to help managers
evaluate the impact of various characteristics of the market, firm, and technology on decisions
related to optimal extent of openness and firm’s effort levels. This study complements the
existing operations literature that has studied the issue of resource allocation (i.e., effort
levels of maintaining existing technologies and developing new technologies) and innovation
separately, and has ignored the impact of technology openness on the behavior of the firm.
More importantly, ours is the first study, to the best of our knowledge, to model partial
openness - an increasingly popular business strategy.
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The results of the first study provide several interesting and important managerial in-
sights. For example, we find that the firm might open its technology even in conditions that
do not seem to favor an open source environment. In particular, when the loss to market
competition (a negative consequence of open technology) is high, our results suggest that the
firm should in fact fully open its technology, which is counter-intuitive. We also determine
the conditions when the technology should be kept proprietary, and find that the firm should
keep its technology fully closed despite high demand sensitivity of openness. In addition, we
find that the demand and quality sensitivities of the current and next versions of the technol-
ogy on openness influence the firm in deciding whether to make the technology open or not.
In the second essay, we model the problem of conducting an influencer marketing cam-
paign. In particular, we develop a solution framework for the problem of selecting and
scheduling influencers during the planning horizon for marketing campaigns. This frame-
work is based on the interactions with industry, and empirical analysis performed on data
from Twitter. We first solve the problem of selection of influencers and then extend our
analysis to scheduling the placements of ads by influencers. With regard to the selection
model, we present the mathematical formulation to the problem (i.e., the main model) of
choosing influencers. We show that the problem of selection of influencers is NP-complete.
Thus to solve the problem in realistic time, we propose an alternative formulation that pro-
vides a near-optimal solution for the main model. Besides, we demonstrate that firms can
experience a significant profit loss when implementing a policy that is computed based on a
model (namely single level model) that ignores the peer effect. Results from two case studies
that we conduct show that our model based solution consistently outperforms current indus-
try practices. Next, we propose an optimization model for scheduling the ads to be posted
by the influencers (selected in the first phase) during the planning horizon of a marketing
campaign. We provide several managerially relevant insights based on extensive numerical
experiments. For example, we find that the cost of influencer marketing campaign increases
non-linearly with engagement. Our study is among the first to propose a scheduling model
146
in the context of influencer marketing and to consider peer effect in the selection model.
In the third essay paper, we develop a multi-level hierarchical model to empirically in-
vestigate the effects of influencer’s social media tone on the audience engagement. To do
this, we assemble a novel data from Twitter collected during the Indian elections 2014. Our
empirical findings provides several important insights to human brands while contributing
to the growing literature on social media. From theoretical perspective, this study system-
atically examines the moderating role of popularity and the tone of related brands on the
relationship between social media tone of an influencer and engagement. Our empirical find-
ings suggest that, to increase audience engagement, influencers should vary the tone of their
social media content based on their popularity levels. Finally, our findings on spillover effects
demonstrate the importance of a comprehensive social media strategy across brands.
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APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2: HOW MUCH TO OPEN, HOW FAST TO FIX AND
DEVELOP? – IMPACTS OF TECHNOLOGY OPENNESS
A.1 Expressions for Thresholds
E ≡
2cdcf (T (bθ1kT + 2hρ1y + 2θ2k) + 2hρ2)
























2cd (T (2a+ ρ1y(2e− h)− θ2k) + ρ2(2e− h) + eρ0) + en2ρ21T (h− e)
)




























2 − 2(e− h) (ρ2 + ρ1Ty)− 2eρ0 + 2θ2kT
)
+ eρ1Tw (ρ1w(e− 2h)− θ1kmT )
)



































A.2 Proofs and Additional Propositions
Proofs of Lemmas 1 and 3
The Hamiltonian (Sethi and Thompson 2000) of the optimal control problem is given by:






+ k (θ0 + θ1q(t) + θ2s)
+λ2(t)(nv(t) + sy + wu(t)) (A.1)
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λ2(T ) = ρ1(h− es), (A.5)







λ3(T ) = 1, (A.8)
λ3(T ) = γ, (A.9)
∂H(t)
∂u(t)
= −2cfu(t)λ3(t) +mλ1(t) + wλ2(t) = 0, (A.10)
∂H(t)
∂v(t)







Note that, for Lemma 1, Equation (A.5) is active, whereas in when customer has specific
quality requirements (Lemma 3), i.e., when r(T ) = Z, Equation (A.6) is active. Next, when
the firm has sufficient budget to cover the expenditure for the effort levels, Equation (A.8) is
active else Equation (A.9) is active. The presented results are derived by solving the optimal
control problem with the corresponding active constraints.
In scenario 1, i.e., when there is no pre-set quality requirement and there is sufficient
budget, substituting Equations (A.3), (A.5), and (A.8) into Equation (A.10) and solving for
u(t), we get: u(t) = ρ1w(h−es)+θ1km(T−t)
2cf
. Similarly, substituting Equations (A.5) and (A.8)
into Equation (A.11) and solving for v(t), we obtain: v(t) = nρ1(h−es)
2cd
. Hence the results in
Lemma 1.
In a similar way, we derive the effort levels for scenario 2, where customer has pre-set qual-
ity requirements, we know that r(T ) = Z. Substituting Equations (A.3), (A.6), and (A.8)
into Equation (A.10) and solving for u(t), we get: u(t) = θ1km(T−t)+βw
2cf
. Similarly, substituting




Thus, by substituting the above derived effort levels (u(t) and v(t)) into Equation (2.3) and
solving for β, we get: β = − cd(4cf (sTy−Z)+θ1kmT
2w)
2T(w2cd+n2cf)











. Hence, the results in Lemma 3. In a similar way, we can
derive the effort levels for scenarios with low budget levels.
Proofs of Lemmas 2 and 4
By substituting the efforts levels derived in Lemmas 1 and 3, the profit of the firm can be
written as a function of s in both scenario 1 (no pre-set quality requirement) and scenario 2






3θ1kmρ1Tw(h − es) + 3ρ
2
1w





















































) + (h − es) (ρ0 + ρ2s + ρ1Z) − as2T. (A.15)
Hence, by taking the derivative of these functions with respect to s, we find that the optimal






cd(w(θ1kT 2(bw−my)+2w(−e(ρ0+ρ1Z)+hρ2+θ2kT ))+4yZcf)+n2cf (kT (bθ1T+2θ2)−2e(ρ0+ρ1Z)+2hρ2)
4cd(w2(aT+eρ2)+Ty2cf)+4n2cf (aT+eρ2)
.
After substituting these optimal values of s∗ into the effort levels presented in Lemmas 1
and 3 and the objective function of the firm, we derive the reported effort levels in Lemmas 2
and 4. Similarly, the optimal solutions for Π∗ in Lemma 2 and Lemma 4 can be obtained by
substituting the respective values of optimal s in to Equations (A.14) and (A.15). However,
for brevity, we do not present the expressions of Π∗ in Lemma 2 and Lemma 4.
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2 − 4cf (aT + eρ2 + eρ1Ty)
)
+ e2n2ρ21Tcf < 0.
We use this result later in deriving Propositions 1-7. Next, in scenario 2, the second-order
condition in the derivation of s∗ is always satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 1























When this condition is satisfied, the objective function is strictly concave with respect
to s. Therefore, when s∗ ≤ 0 and the second order condition holds, the objective func-
tion is decreasing in the feasible range and objective function is maximum at s = 0. By
analyzing the conditions for s∗ ≤ 0 and satisfying the second order condition (and also
ensuring that the feasibility conditions for e are satisfied), we find that the firm should
keep its technology proprietary when e ≥ 2cdcf (T (bθ1kT+2hρ1y+2θ2k)+2hρ2)
cd(4ρ0cf+ρ1Tw(2hρ1w+θ1kmT ))+2hn2ρ21Tcf



















When the above conditions are satisfied, the optimal value of the extent of openness (i.e.,
s∗) is equal to zero. Hence part (a) of the proposition. Likewise, if the solution suggests
that s∗ ≥ 1, and the second order condition is satisfied, it implies that the objective function
value is maximum at s = 1. Therefore, by analyzing the conditions for the inequality s∗ ≥ 1,
we find that the firm chooses to make its technology fully open source under the following
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≡ A . Hence part (b) of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2
Using the results from Lemma 2, in order to have the second-order condition satisfied
we need to have the following condition satisfied: cd (e
2ρ21Tw
2 − 4cf (aT + eρ2 + eρ1Ty)) +
e2n2ρ21Tcf < 0. By simple algebra, we obtain the following condition when the above men-
tioned second-order condition is not satisfied: a < A .
Hence, when the second-order condition is not satisfied (so that the objective function is
convex), we should have boundary conditions: either s = 0 or s = 1. Given that the second-
order condition is not satisfied, we first solve the optimization problem in Equation (2.1)
at s = 0. We get Πs=0 =
3h2ρ21T(w2cd+n2cf)+cd(12cf (hρ0+θ0kT )+θ21k2m2T 3)+3hθ1kmρ1T 2wcd
12cdcf
. Next,
we solve the optimization problem in Equation (2.1) at s = 1. The expression for Πs=1 is
omitted for brevity. By comparing the profits at s = 0 and s = 1, we obtain:






2 − 4 (aT + (e− h) (ρ2 + ρ1Ty) + eρ0 − θ2kT )
)
+ eρ1Tw (ρ1w(e− 2h) − θ1kmT )
)
+ en2ρ21Tcf (e− 2h)
4cdcf
.







2 − 2(e− h) (ρ2 + ρ1Ty)− 2eρ0 + 2θ2kT
)
+ eρ1Tw (ρ1w(e− 2h)− θ1kmT )
)
+ en2ρ21Tcf (e− 2h)
4Tcdcf
≡ Ā .
Therefore, when the second-order condition is not satisfied, i.e., a < A and a < Ā , we
have a boundary solution, s = 1. Further analysis of these two thresholds (i.e., A and Ā )
suggests that Ā < A if and only if e ≥ E . Therefore, when e ≥ E and a < Ā , we have
s = 1. Next, when Ā < a < A and e ≥ E , s = 0. Furthermore, as we did in the proof of
Proposition 1, by analyzing the conditions for s∗ ≤ 0 and second order condition is satisfied
(and also ensuring that the feasibility conditions for e are satisfied), we find that the firm
should keep its technology proprietary when e ≥ E , and a > A . Hence, part (a) of the
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proposition.
From part (a) of Proposition 1, we know that s ≤ 0 when e ≥ E . Therefore, when e < E
(and the second order condition is satisfied), then s > 0, i.e., partially open. Hence, part (b)
of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3
Analyzing the optimal trajectories of effort levels presented in Lemma 2, we have u(t)∗
strictly decreasing in t. Hence, we have u(0) > u(T ). Therefore, when u(T ) > v(t), the
maintenance effort is always greater than the development effort throughout the planning
horizon. We find that u(T ) > v(t) holds true if and only if w >
ncf
cd
. Hence the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4
Using the results from Lemma 2 and taking the derivative of optimal level of openness

































+ 2θ1m(T − t)
4cf
. (A.18)
From the proof of Lemma 2, in order to have the second-order condition in derivation of
s∗ to be satisfied, we need to have cd (e
2ρ21Tw
2 − 4cf (aT + eρ2 + eρ1Ty)) + e2n2ρ21Tcf < 0.
Hence, the sign of denominator of Equation (A.16) is always positive. Now analyzing the








Similarly, the denominator of Equation (A.17) is always positive, and by simple algebra we
find that when b < β0, then
ds(t)∗
dk
< 0. Next, the sign of the denominator of Equation (A.18)
is always negative. Analyzing this inequality, we find that du(t)
∗
dk
> 0 holds if and only if
b <








< 0, we have du(t)
∗
dk
strictly decreasing in t. Also observe that
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cd(4cf (2θ1m(t−T )(aT+eρ2+eρ1Ty)+eθ2ρ1Tw)+e2θ1mρ21Tw2(T−2t))+2e2θ1mn2ρ21Tcf (T−t)
2eθ1ρ1T 2wcdcf
, evaluated at the up-




. Hence, β0 < β1 for any t < T. Combining this
finding with the above threshold values (in addition to ensuring that the second order con-
dition is satisfied), we can write the behavior of the effort levels and the extent of openness
with respect to k as presented in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 5
Using the results from Lemma 2 and checking for sensitivity with respect to b and ensuring



























Hence, the findings in Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 6










4ahT − 2ekT (bθ1T + 2θ2) + 4e2ρ0
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4ahT − 2ekT (bθ1T + 2θ2) + 4e2ρ0
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Further analyzing the above inequalities, we find that when




and ensuring that the second order condition is satisfied and the non-negativity conditions






> 0, and dv
∗
dy
> 0. Hence, the results in the
proposition.
Proof of Proposition 7
Using the results from Lemma 2 and checking for sensitivity with respect to h and






























Analyzing the inequality in Equation (A.19) (and also ensuring that the second order con-











≡ T̄ , then ds∗
dh
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 8
























2 (aT + eρ2)
) ,
From the proof of Lemma 4, we know that the objective function is strictly concave in s.
Hence, we can easily derive the result in Proposition 8.
Proof of Proposition 9









< 0. Thus, we have s∗ strictly increases with h, u(t)∗ and v(t)∗ strictly
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decreases with h.
Proof of Proposition 10











w2 (aT + eρ2) + Ty2cf
)


















< 0. Also, from Equation (A.21), we find that u(t)∗ strictly increases with Z and v(t)∗
strictly increases with Z.
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A.3 Tables and Figures
Figure A.1: When to Keep the Technol-
ogy Proprietary












Figure A.2: When to Make the Technol-
ogy Fully Open










Fully OpenPartially Open or Proprietary
b < ℬ
Figure A.3: Should the Firm Focus on Maintenance or Development?
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Figure A.4: Impact of the Valuation of Current Version on Firm’s Behavior
Figure A.5: Parameter Regions Depicting the Condition, b > β1 in Proposition 4(c) (i.e., β1)










Figure A.6: Impact of Openness Sensitivity Terms on Firm’s Behavior
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Figure A.7: Impact of the Valuation of Next Version on Firm’s Behavior (Parameter Values:
w = 1, n = 2, y = 1, cf = 1, cd = 1, ρ1 = 2, ρ0 = 1, ρ2 = 3. For these parameter values, e > Ē
is always satisfied.)











s decreases with h
s increases with h
Δs > 0
Figure A.8: Impact of Changes in Market Requirements on Firm’s Behavior
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING INFLUENCER
MARKETING IN SOCIAL NETWORKS: SELECTION AND SCHEDULING OF
INFLUENCERS
B.1 Proofs
B.1.1 NP-Hard Proofs for Theorems 1, 3, and 4
In this section we provide proofs for Theorems 1, 3, and 4. First, let us start by presenting
the proof for Theorem 4.
B.1.1.1 NP Hard Proof for Theorem 4
We use the 3-Satisfiability (3SAT) problem (Garey and Johnson 1979) for our reduction.
3-Satisfiablility (3SAT) Problem:
Instance: A set X = {x1, x2, . . . , xm} of boolean variables and a collection C = {C1∩C2∩
. . .∩Ck} of clauses over X, each of which is a disjunction of literals, x1, x̄1, x2, x̄2, . . . , xm, x̄m
such that |Cj| = 3 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and x̄i = 1− xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ p.
Solution: Find an assignment of either a true (1) or a false (0) value to each variable
in {x1, x2, . . . , xm}, such that the expression C evaluates to true (1).
Given an arbitrary instance of 3SAT , we construct an instance of the M1L problem.
• Let m = 3 and k = 5. Thus, X = {x1, x2, x3}; and C = {C1 ∩ C2 ∩ C3 ∩ C4 ∩ C5},
where C1 = x̄1 ∪ x2 ∪ x̄3, C2 = x1 ∪ x̄2 ∪ x̄3, C3 = x̄1 ∪ x2 ∪ x3, and C4 = x1 ∪ x2 ∪ x3,
C5 = x̄1 ∪ x2 ∪ x̄3.
• The total number of influential users (i.e., size of set W ), |W | = 2m. Each variable in
set X = {x1, x̄1, x2, x̄2, x3, x̄3} corresponds to a distinct influential user.
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• The cardinality if the number of influential users, z = p = 3. Note that the truth
assignment for our instance is x̄1 = 1, x̄2 = 1 and x3 = 1.
• Each influential user has direct (or first level) followers defined by the clauses over X,
C = {C1 ∩ C2 ∩ . . . ∩ Ck}. There are a total of k immediate followers (k = 5 in the
example). Let the benefit to the firm (i.e., bj) when the message reaches the first level
followers C1 to C5 be h. Furthermore, let k immediate followers retweet the message
of any of the influencer with a probability, pij = 1. Let each of these k followers have
same number of followers, i.e., Fj = f1 and the benefit to the firm from reaching each
of the followers of followers be equal, i.e., dj = s. Refer Figure B.1 for the instance of
M1L problem that we construct.
• A pair of influential users (xi, x̄i) have a common identical M followers who retweet
with probability, pij = 1 and the benefit to the firm (i.e., bj) for reaching each of the
M followers be equal to g. Further, let each of the M followers have same number of
followers i.e., f2 and let the firm benefit dj = r.
• Retweet Tree of the followers of the influential user x1 (in our instance) is shown in
Figure B.2.
• The Minimum Cardinality, t = m (t = 3 in for our instance).
• Let M be a very large number and r > s, f2 > f1, and g > h.
For the above instance of the M1L problem constructed above, we consider the following
question:
Decision Problem: Does there exist a solution for the M1L problem with the total benefit
to the firm (i.e., objective value of problem M1L), Ψ1 ≥ (mMg +mMf2r) + (kh+ kf1s)?
The decision problem is NP. Also we can verify that the construction of our decision
problem from the 3SAT instance can be done in polynomial time. We now show that the
decision problem has an answer if and only if the 3SAT instance is satisfiable.
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The benefit to the firm is h from C1, C2, C3, C4, C5.
The benefit to the firm is s from each of the f1 followers of C1-5
The benefit to the firm is g when the message reaches each of the M followers. Each of the M followers has 
f2 number of followers. The benefit to the firm is r from each of the f2 followers of M followers.
If part: Suppose the instance of 3SAT is satisfiable, then either xi or x̄i has a truth as-
signment. For each pair of influential users (xi, x̄i), we select one user in the pair that
has TRUE value 1. Then this selection of m influential users will benefit the firm by
(mgM + mMf2r) via their M followers. Also, since the 3SAT instance is satisfiable, each
clause Ci, i = 1, 2, ..., k will be reached from the selected m influential users having a TRUE
value 1. This in turn further provides a benefit of of (kh+ kf1s) to the firm. Thus, the total
benefit that the firm gets is, Ψ1 = (mgM +mMf2r) + (kh+ kf1s).
Only If part: Suppose there exists a solution to the decision problem with Ψ1 ≥ (mgM +
mMf2r)+(kh+kf1s). Since the total benefit to the firm should be at most (mgM+mMf2r)+
(kh+kf1s), let Ψ1 = (mgM+mMf2r)+(kh+kf1s). Since the cardinality of set W is t = m,
we can select only m influential users. From above, we know that M is a very large number
and r > s, f2 > f1, and g > h, hence we can easily show that (mgM+mMf2r) > (kh+kf1s).
Since (mgM + mMf2r) > (kh + kf1s), to obtain the weighted sum equal to Ψ1, we need
to select at least m influential users else Ψ1 < (mgM + mMf2r) + (kh + kf1s). If m − 1
influential users are selected, Ψ1 = ((m− 1)gM + (m− 1)Mf2r) + (kh + kf1s) < (mgM +
mMf2r)+(kh+kf1s). Further, the m selected influential users need to reach all the followers
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The benefit to the firm is g when the message reaches each of the M followers of influential user x1. Each 
of the M followers has f2 number of followers. Since pij=1, the message reaches all the second level 
followers. Hence, the benefit to the firm is r from each of the f2 followers of M followers.
The benefit to the firm is h from users C1, C2, C3, C4, C5.
The benefit to the firm is s from each of the f1 followers of C1-5
with weight (kh+ kf1s) (i.e., C1, C2, C3, C4, C5). If m− 1 influencers are selected, we do not
reach at least one of the followers with weight (kh+ kf1s). Therefore, by construction only
when m influencers are selected, we reach all the followers with weight (kh + kf1s). Thus,
a satisfiable assignment, corresponding to m influential users, for the 3SAT instance is now
available. This completes the proof.
NP Hard Proofs for Theorem 1 and Theorem 3: Since Model M1L is a special
case of Model M2L and M2LUB. As model M1L is NP-Hard, models M2L and M2LUB are
also NP-hard. This completes the proof.
B.1.2 Proof of Proposition 11:
Proof: Since any user j ∈ V follows only one influencer i in set W , then V1, V2, . . . , Vn form a






It is easy to see that pij = 0, if j /∈ Vi. Thus, Constraint 3.3 can be rewritten as
δj = 1 − pijxi, ∀j ∈ Vi, ∀i ∈ W . Then, Constraint 3.4 can be rewritten as yj = 1 − δj =
pijxi, ∀j ∈ Vi,∀i ∈ W .
Since in V , a user j who is a follower of user i in W , only follows some followers




k∈Vi(1− pkjyk), ∀j ∈ Vi,∀i ∈ W . For k ∈ Vi, we also have yk = pikxi.
Then, Constraint 3.6 can be rewritten as gj = 1 − (1 − pijxi)
∏
k∈Vi(1− pkjyk) = 1 − (1 −
pijxi)
∏
k∈Vi(1− pkjpikxi), ∀j ∈ Vi,∀i ∈ W .












j∈Vi djFj[1− (1− pijxi)
∏





k∈Vi(1− pkjpikxi)]. When xi = 0, we have fi(0) =






k∈Vi(1− pkjpik)] = Λi.
For any feasible solutionX = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} to ProblemM2L, we have Ψ2 =
∑
i∈W fi(xi).
It is easy to see that an optimal solution with constraint
∑
i xi ≤ t includes the first t users
in Set W after sorting them in the descending order of Λi. This completes the proof.
B.1.3 Proof of Theorem 2:
For this proof, we will rely on the properties of two logarithmic functions: (i) ln(1− py),
and (ii) ln(1− p)× y. The Taylor’s expansion of these two functions are given by:

































have ln(1− p)y ≤ ln(1− py), and
∑
k∈V ln(1− pkj)yk ≤
∑
k∈V ln(1− pkjyk). Exponentiating







Hence, αj ≥ ᾱj, and gj ≤ ḡj. Closely analyzing the objective functions ΨUB2 (x) and
Ψ2(x), the first term (i.e.,
∑
j∈V bjyj) in both objective functions of M2L and M2L
UB are
the same. Since gj ≤ ḡj, for any given solution set x, ΨUB2 (x) ≥ Ψ2(x), i.e., the objective
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value of Model M2LUB is greater than equal to the objective value of Model M2L (the main
model).
More formally, if Ψ2 is the objective value for the optimal solution for Model M2L, as
ΨUB2 (x) ≥ Ψ2(x), we have Ψ
UB
2 ≥ Ψ2. However, the optimal solution for Model M2L might
not be an optimal solution for Model M2LUB. That is, there might exist another solution




2 . Therefore, the objective value
of the new model (Model M2L) provides an upper bound to the multiplicative two-level
influence model (Model M2L).
B.1.4 Proof of Proposition 12






1n−k (−x)k, which can be simplified to 1 − nx + n(n−1)
2!
· x2 − n(n−1)(n−2)
3!
· x3 . . . .
When x→ 0, (1− x)n → 1− nx.





p3kj . . . .
When pkj → 0, we have 1− pkjyk. Hence, the finding in Proposition 12 holds.
B.1.5 Proof of Lemma 5
Compared to Model M2L, in Model M1L we ignore the increase in probability of retweet
due to influence from users in set V . Therefore for any given solution x, Ψ2(x) ≥ Ψ1(x),
i.e., the objective value of the multiplicative two-level influence model (Model M2L) is
greater than or equal to the objective value of multiplicative single level influence model
(Model M1L). Let Ψo1 be the objective value for the optimal solution for Model M1L. Since
Ψ2(x) ≥ Ψ1(x), we have Ψo2 ≥ Ψo1. However, the optimal solution for Model M1L might
not be an optimal solution for Model M2L. That is, there exists another solution (which is
optimal for Model M2L) such that Ψ∗2 ≥ Ψo2. Thus, the objective value of the multiplicative
single level influence model (Model M1L) provides an lower bound to the multiplicative
two-level influence model (Model M2L).
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B.2 Approximation of Model M1L
Clearly, we see that constraint (3.44) makes the M1L a non-linear mixed integer pro-
gram. Camm et al. (2002) propose a method to linearize this non-linear constraint us-
ing the separable programming approach suggested by Saydam and McKnew (1985). Let
W<1j = {i|0 < pij < 1} and W=1j = {i|pij = 1}. We can now replace Equations 3.44 and




(1− pij)xi , ∀j ∈ V (B.3)
gj ≤ 1− hj +
∑
i∈W=1j
xi, ∀j ∈ V (B.4)
0 ≤ gj ≤ 1; hj ≥ 0; xi,∈ {0, 1}. (B.5)
Further, since hj is strictly positive, we can now take the log of each side of the non-linear















ln (1− pij)xi, ∀j ∈ V (B.8)
gj ≤ 1− hj +
∑
i∈W=1j
xi, ∀j ∈ V (B.9)
0 ≤ gj ≤ 1; hj ≥ 0; xi ∈ {0, 1}. (B.10)
As proposed by Bradley et al. (1977) and Camm et al. (2002), we now approximate the
non-linear term ln(hj) by taking a convex combination of points, λ, on the curve. Following
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Camm et al. (2002), let Rj be the set of break points used to approximate the interval from
0 to 1. Let Bjt be the t
th breakpoint and λjt the weighting of the t
th breakpoint. We then










λjt = 1. (B.13)
Substituting the above values of hj and ln(hj) into Constraints (B.8) and (B.9), we get
the linearized approximation of problem M1L that is presented in model M1L− AP.
























xi, ∀j ∈ V (B.17)
∑
t∈Rj
λjt = 1, ∀j ∈ V (B.18)
0 ≤ gj ≤ 1; λjt ≥ 0; xi ∈ {0, 1}. (B.19)
B.3 Empirical Analysis
In this section of the Online Appendix, we provide details of the empirical analysis that
we conduct to validate the assumptions made to develop a framework to select influencers
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and to sequence ads by influencers. Although, several recent studies in social media have
examined the effects of user-generated content and firm-generated content, no study to the
best of our knowledge has systematically analyzed the effect of multiple exposures (i.e.,
the same content being viewed by the audience multiple times) on engagement, which we
operationalize via number of retweets. Against the above background, our first objective is to
empirically analyze the relationship between the number of times the same tweet was posted
(i.e., number of exposures of a tweet) and number of retweets. The second objective of the
empirical study is to examine the impact of the gap between each tweet on the relationship
between exposures and engagement levels.
With regards to the first objective, in line with the literature on ads in other contexts
such as online and offline ads, we argue that the total number of clicks (or retweets in our
context) increases monotonically with number of exposures but with diminishing returns,
i.e., the relationship with the number of exposures and number of retweets is non-linear (or
Number of Retweets = f(Exposures) is non-linear). Hence, we postulate that the marginal
increase in the number of retweets per exposure is decreases with number of exposures (or
d
dt
Number of Retweets = f(Exposures)), where t denotes the exposure number. In other
words, we argue that the number of retweets per exposure decreases with exposures.
B.3.1 Data
To accomplish our objectives, we assemble a novel dataset. Our main data come from
Twitter and consists of individual level tweets posted by 37 influencers. The data consists
of 33,415 tweets posted by 37 influencers from August 2017 to May 2018. The 37 influencers
were randomly picked based on their tweeting behavior. Due to data restrictions from
Twitter, we collected tweets posted by these influencers every week, as historical data is not
available from Twitter (i.e., we can not get tweets older than a week). Further, since the focus
of this empirical study is to examine the effect of multiple exposures, we ignore the tweets
that were not repeated by the influencers. Moreover, we winsorize the data at 99.5%, i.e.,
we drop the tweets over 23 exposures to remove the influence of outliers that can distort the
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mean values. Thus for our main analysis, the data consists of 18571 tweets. To summarize,
our data consists of content of the tweet posted by influencers, number of retweets of the
tweet, and the date and time stamp of the tweet. Furthermore, we collect data on personal
attributes of an influencer including, the age of his/her twitter account, number of followers,
number of friends, and the total number of tweets posted by the influencer. This data helps
us control for individual specific heterogeneity of an influencer. The main variables used
in this analysis are summarized in Table B.1. In the following subsections, we discuss the
operationalization of the variables we use for the analysis.
B.3.2 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in our study is the number of retweets received by a tweet posted
by an influencer. Although an influencer might post multiple tweets with the same content,
the followers of influencer may choose to retweet either the first tweet or the subsequent
tweets. In this study, our aim is to uncover the relationship between the exposure and
number of retweets per exposure. In particular, the dependent variable is the number of
retweets per exposure of an ad or d
dt
Number of Retweets (denoted by RT in the model).
We identify the number of retweets per exposure of each of the 18,571 tweets posted by 37
influencers.
B.3.3 Independent Variables
Our main explanatory variable is the number of exposures of a similar tweet. In order
to identify similar tweets, we use an algorithm developed by Raffo (2017) to find similarities
between two tweets. This algorithm is necessary because the influencers might slightly
change the content of the ad when they repost it. Hence, to identify similar tweets, we
employ Matchit algorithm. For the main analysis, we set the similarity parameter to 95%.
That is, the algorithm will report that two tweets are identical to each other if it finds that at
least 95% of the content of those two tweets are similar to each other. Moreover, our results
are robust when the similarity parameter is set to 90%. The nth similar tweet represents n
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number of exposures (denoted by Exposures).
The second explanatory variable of interest is the gap between each tweet of similar
content (denoted by Gap), which we measure by calculating the number of days between
each tweet (i.e., date difference between the nth and (n − 1)th tweet). Since, we cannot
calculate the gap for the first tweet, we assign the value of zero to the gap. However, we run
re-run our models removing the first tweet as it does not have any gap to ensure robustness.
B.3.4 Control Variables
To control for heterogeneity among influencers we employ several influencer-specific con-
trol variables. First, we control for the popularity, which is measured by the number of
followers of the influencer (denoted by FollowerCount). Next, we control for number of
users that an influencer is following (denoted by FriendsCount). We also control for total
number of tweets that the influencer posted on his twitter account (denoted by StatusCount).
Finally, we control for the experience of influencer on Twitter, i.e., number of years since
the influencer first opened his/her account (denoted by Age). Furthermore, we control for
number of hashtags that the tweet consists of (denoted by HashtagsCount). Besides, to con-
trol for temporal shocks, we include time fixed effects (i.e., month dummies) and the hour
that the tweet was posted (denoted by Hr) in our model. Next, we control for the first tweet
(denoted by First Tweet). Finally, despite federal regulations to use #AD in the tweet,
several influencers fail use it consistently. To control for any heterogeneity when the hashtag
is used, we introduce indicator variable denoted by AD.
B.3.5 Model Specification
The dependent variable in our study, RT , is a count variable that takes only non-negative
integer variable. Literature suggests that linear regression models are not appropriate for
modeling count data and propose count data models such as Poisson and Negative Binomial
models. However, we observe that the variance of number of retweets per exposure is nearly
four times more than the mean. When the data is over-dispersed, Cameron and Trivedi
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(2013) argue that the Poisson model will underestimate the standard errors, which in turn
leads to high (and incorrect) levels of significance. Following Cameron and Trivedi (2013), an
appropriate model to account for over-dispersion of count data is negative binomial model.
We also perform additional analysis to check the significance of the over dispersion parameter.
In particular, the p-value for the LR test of Ho : α = 0 is < 0.000. Therefore, the estimate
of α is greater than zero, which validates our assumption to use negative binomial model.
We model number of retweets (RT ) of ad i as follows.










ln(µ) = β0 + β1Exposures+ β2Gap+ β3Hr + β4HashtagCount+ β5Ad
+∆Influencer Controls+ γMonthD + ε (B.21)
where Γ(.) denotes the gamma distribution, α is the over dispersion parameter, and µ is the
mean of RT . The coefficient β1 is of interest to us. More specifically, if the coefficient is
negative, it implies that the marginal number of retweets decreases with number of exposures
and vice-versa.
Next, to test the moderating effect of message spacing (i.e., Gap) on the relationship be-
tween exposures and retweets, we introduce the interaction term (Exposure×Gap). Specif-
ically, we run the following model to test the effect of Gap.
ln(µ) = β0 + β1Exposures+ β2Gap+ β3Exposure×Gap+ β4Hr + β5HashtagCount
+β6Ad+ ∆Influencer Controls+ γMonthD + ε (B.22)
In the above model, the coefficient of the interaction effect, β3, is of interest to us. More
specifically, the sign of the coefficient denotes the effect of message spacing.
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Table B.1: Variable Operationalization and Summary Statistics
Variable Name Variable Operationalization Mean SD
RT Number of Retweets per exposure 0.824 4.359
Exposures Number of times the same content was posted 3.787 4.680
Gap Number of days between each Tweet 3.404 9.849
First Tweet Dummy Variable =1 if first exposure, else 0
Hr The Time of Tweet (hour) 12.659 6.776
Hashtag Count Number of Hashtags in the Message 0.206 0.644
log(Follower Count) Number of Followers of Influencer 9.449 0.366
log(Friends Count) Number of Friends of Influencer 8.902 0.551
log(Status Count) Total Number of Tweets Posted by Influencer 11.078 1.101
Age Age of Influencer’s Twitter Account 4.449 0.0933
Month Month Dummy when the Tweet was Posted
Ad Dummy Variable =1 if #AD was used in the Tweet Content, else 0
B.3.6 Results
Before estimating the results of the proposed model, we estimate the model without the
interaction between Gap and Exposures. The estimates for this model are presented in
the first column. Furthermore, to address the concerns about failure to meet the standard
regression assumptions (i.e., i.i.d. errors), we account for heteroskedastic random errors
by using the Whites sandwich covariance matrix, which are robust to heteroscedasticity
(Wooldridge 2010). We report the robust standard errors in Table B.2. We present the
estimates of the coefficients of parameters of our proposed model (i.e., Equation (B.22)) in
Table B.2 (Column 2).
The estimates in the proposed model indicate that the number of Exposures has a
negative and significant effect on number of retweets. In terms of the magnitude of the effect,
we find that on average the number of retweets of a tweet decreases by 5.97% with additional
exposure (based on the incident ratio of the negative binomial model specification). This
result indicates that the number of retweets tends to increase with number of exposures. We
illustrate the relationship between retweets and exposures in Figure B.3. Next, we find that
the coefficient of Gap is negative but not statistically significant.
Turning our attention to the moderating role of Gap, we find that the coefficient of
Gap×Exposure is significantly negative. To better understand the relationship between the
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number of exposures and retweets and the moderating effect of days message spacing, we
conduct sensitivity analysis. In particular, we plot the relationship between Exposure and
Retweet Count at different values of Gap. The results are shown in Figure B.4. This graph
accounts for all the effects including the number of exposures, message spacing, influencer
individual heterogeneity, and shows the total effect of exposure. As seen in the figure, the
non-linear effect of exposures on engagement varies with message spacing (i.e., Gap). More
specifically, with a higher gap between each tweet, the effect of exposure on the number of
retweets diminishes.
B.3.7 Robustness Tests
To further validate our results from the count data model specification, we perform
additional analyses with linear models. More specifically, we run the following linear model.
ln(RT ) = β0 + β1Exposure+ β2Gap+ β3Exposure×Gap+ β4Hr + β5HashtagCount
+β6Ad+ ∆Influencer Controls+ γMonthD + ε
The estimates for the above model are presented in Table B.3. While we find that the
main effect of exposures is negative and significant in the model without interaction, the
conditional effect of exposures is negative and significant when Gap >= 1. Furthermore, we
find that the coefficient of the interaction between exposures and message spacing is negative
and significant. These results suggest that our findings from the main model are robust to
different estimation strategies, providing further empirical support to our results.
Next, we re-estimate our full model with an alternative sample. For our main analysis
we winsorized the data at 99.5% (i.e., we dropped tweets with more than 23 exposures) to
remove the influence of outliers that can distort the mean values. However, we now re-run the
models with full data to ensure robustness. The results of the estimation for the alternative
sample are provided in Table B.4. Finally, we run re-run our models removing the first tweet
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Exposures × Gap -0.00486∗
[0.00276]




log(Follower Count) 1.916∗∗∗ 1.928∗∗∗
[0.276] [0.277]
log(Status Count) -2.081∗∗∗ -2.081∗∗∗
[0.0595] [0.0595]








Month Dummy 1 0.161 0.124
[0.172] [0.173]
Month Dummy 2 0.301∗∗ 0.268∗
[0.152] [0.152]
Month Dummy 3 0.189 0.164
[0.169] [0.170]
Month Dummy 4 0.0674 0.0404
[0.148] [0.148]
Month Dummy 5 -0.952∗∗∗ -0.987∗∗∗
[0.274] [0.274]
Month Dummy 6 -35.20∗∗∗ -34.27∗∗∗
[1.016] [1.016]
Month Dummy 7 0.685 0.666
[0.967] [0.966]
Month Dummy 8 -0.100 -0.119
[0.616] [0.613]






Log Likelihood -13220.71 -13216.55
Pseudo R-Sq 0.2088 0.2091
N 18571 18571
Standard errors in brackets
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
as it does not have any value for the gap to ensure robustness. The results for this alternative
specification are presented in Table B.5. The results of the above robustness tests suggest
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that our findings in the main model are robust to alternative sample and specification.
Table B.3: Results - Robustness Test 1
(1) (2)









First Tweet 0.00238 0.00470
[0.00850] [0.00849]
log(Follower Count) 0.602∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗
[0.0594] [0.0596]
log(Status Count) -0.398∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗∗
[0.0131] [0.0133]












Month Dummies were included in all models.
The estimates for Month Dummies are not reported for brevity.
Standard errors in brackets
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
B.3.8 Cluster Analysis
To understand the strategies of influencers who post ads on Twitter, we classified in-
fluencers using “K-Means” technique. We classify the influencers into four clusters. The
mean number of retweets, days between, and number of exposure for each of these clusters is
presented in Table B.6. As seen in the table, the strategy of influencers in cluster 1 is to post
the same message two times everyday and post the same message an average of 18 times.
On the other hand, the strategy of influencers in cluster 2 is to post the same message every
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Table B.4: Results - Robustness Test 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RT RT log(RT ) log(RT )
Exposures -0.00614∗∗ -0.00422∗ -0.0000135 0.0000137
[0.00272] [0.00226] [0.0000368] [0.0000402]
Gap -0.0107∗∗∗ 0.00944∗ -0.00658∗∗∗ -0.00617∗∗∗
[0.00394] [0.00503] [0.000720] [0.000792]
Exposures × Gap -0.0101∗∗∗ -0.000136∗
[0.00207] [0.0000751]
First Tweet 0.317∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.0124 0.0118
[0.0918] [0.0922] [0.00803] [0.00802]
Hr -0.0145∗∗∗ -0.0148∗∗∗ -0.00573∗∗∗ -0.00570∗∗∗
[0.00514] [0.00509] [0.000455] [0.000455]
log(Follower Count) 1.969∗∗∗ 1.946∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗
[0.271] [0.276] [0.0589] [0.0589]
log(Status Count) -2.095∗∗∗ -2.099∗∗∗ -0.401∗∗∗ -0.401∗∗∗
[0.0635] [0.0618] [0.0128] [0.0128]
log(Friends Count) -0.0180 -0.0905 -0.175∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗
[0.125] [0.127] [0.0437] [0.0437]
Age 0.443∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.0637∗∗∗ 0.0638∗∗∗
[0.0309] [0.0308] [0.00235] [0.00235]
Hashtag Count 0.192∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.0339∗∗∗ 0.0338∗∗∗
[0.0467] [0.0469] [0.00720] [0.00720]
Ad 0.312 0.303 -0.200∗∗ -0.200∗∗
[0.424] [0.430] [0.0910] [0.0910]
Constant 0.800 1.904 -0.184∗ 0.480∗∗∗
[1.261] [1.323] [0.110] [0.123]
log(alpha) 0.997∗∗∗ 0.976∗∗∗
[0.0727] [0.0739]
N 21853 21853 21853 21853
Month Dummies were included in all models.
The estimates for Month Dummies are not reported for brevity.
Standard errors in brackets
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
two days on average. The mean number of exposures for the influencers in cluster 2 is 2.4.
Likewise, the mean number of exposures for the influencers in cluster 3 is 2.24. However,
the strategy of these influencers is to post the message about every 6 days on average. From
our data set, the strategy of the influencers in cluster 2 seems to be associated with higher
number of retweets.
B.3.9 Summary of Empirical Analysis
In this section, I briefly summarize the main findings from the empirical study.
(a) First, our results suggest a non-linear increasing relationship between exposures and
retweets.
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Table B.5: Results - Robustness Test 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RT RT log(RT ) log(RT )
Exposures -0.0786∗∗∗ -0.0591∗∗∗ -0.00325∗∗∗ 0.000120
[0.00886] [0.0116] [0.000661] [0.000955]
Gap -0.0123∗∗∗ 0.000644 -0.00675∗∗∗ -0.00167
[0.00461] [0.00770] [0.000753] [0.00153]
Exposures × Gap -0.00678∗∗ -0.00198∗∗∗
[0.00289] [0.000505]
Hr -0.0208∗∗∗ -0.0216∗∗∗ -0.00686∗∗∗ -0.00679∗∗∗
[0.00604] [0.00603] [0.000617] [0.000614]
log(Follower Count) 2.590∗∗∗ 2.628∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗
[0.312] [0.321] [0.0648] [0.0650]
log(Status Count) -2.163∗∗∗ -2.165∗∗∗ -0.391∗∗∗ -0.396∗∗∗
[0.0808] [0.0824] [0.0146] [0.0149]
log(Friends Count) -0.404∗∗ -0.481∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗
[0.174] [0.183] [0.0492] [0.0495]
Age 0.371∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.0696∗∗∗ 0.0678∗∗∗
[0.0415] [0.0405] [0.00313] [0.00311]
Hashtag Count 0.176∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.0354∗∗∗ 0.0336∗∗∗
[0.0549] [0.0547] [0.00935] [0.00937]
Ad 0.233 0.235 -0.283∗∗∗ -0.290∗∗∗
[0.608] [0.611] [0.101] [0.102]
Constant -0.0762 0.365 -0.221 0.207
[1.469] [1.451] [0.263] [0.149]
log(alpha) 0.727∗∗∗ 0.713∗∗∗
[0.0890] [0.0892]
N 12552 12552 12552 12552
Month Dummies were included in all models.
The estimates for Month Dummies are not reported for brevity.
Standard errors in brackets
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table B.6: Cluster Analysis
Mean Mean Mean
Cluster Retweet Days Between Exposure
1 0.128 1.743 14.406
2 3.246 0.561 1.404
3 1.303 4.009 2.216
4 0.7515 7.228 1.685
(b) Next, the coefficient of the interaction between days between each tweet and exposure
is negative and significant. This indicates that days between moderates the relation-
ship between exposure and retweets. We conduct sensitivity analysis to illustrate this
moderating effect and the results are shown in Figure B.4. This figure illustrates
the interaction effect by plotting predicted retweets corresponding to the frequency of
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exposure at different levels of moderating variables, i.e., days between each tweet.
(c) To glean insights on how different influencers post their ads, we perform exploratory
analysis. In particular, we classify influencers into 4 clusters using “K-Means” classifi-
cation technique. The results are summarized in Figure B.5. The results indicate the
strategy of different influencers.
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B.4 Experiment Setting for Selection Model
The first level influence was set to pij ∈ {Low, High}. Probabilities (i.e., pij) in Low set-
ting were drawn from Uniform(0, 1)/20 and in High setting were drawn from Uniform(0, 1)/6
distributions. Similarly, the second level influence was set to pkj ∈ {Low, High}. Probabil-
ities (i.e., pkj) in Low setting were drawn from Uniform(0, 1)/24 and in High setting were
drawn from Uniform(0, 1)/6 distributions. Next, the number of edges between influencers
in set W and followers in set V was set to, aij ∈{Low Medium, High}. Low is drawn from X5,
Medium is drawn from X4, and High is drawn from X3, where X ∼ Uniform[0, 1]. Finally,
the number of edges between the followers of influencers is set to akj ∈{Low Medium, High}.
Low is drawn from X6, Medium is drawn from X4, and High is drawn from X2, where
X ∼ Uniform[0, 1]. Thus, we generated 3× 2× 2× 3 = 36 combinations.
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B.5 Scheduling Model
In this section, we present the scheduling model that we describe in Section 3.5. Before
presenting the model, the list of parameters and decision variables used in the model are
presented in Table B.7.
Table B.7: List of Parameters and Variables - Scheduling Model
Symbol Description
Parameters:
aij = 1 if user j ∈ V is a direct follower of i ∈W ; 0 otherwise.
pj = average probability that user j ∈ V retweets a message from influencers in W.
bj = total benefit to the firm when the tweet reaches user j ∈ V through i ∈W .
dj = benefit to the firm when the tweet reaches one follower of user j ∈ V .
Fj = number of followers of user j ∈ V .
Bj = the benefit to the firm when user j retweets a message where Bj = (bj + djFj).
ci = cost to the firm when influencer i ∈W posts an ad.
l = Number of groups. We assume 5 different groups. The first group posts the ad everyday,
the second group posts every other day, the third group posts every three days,
the fourth group posts the ad once a week, and the fifth group posts once in 12 days.
m = Number of modes. In this problem instance, the number of modes, m = 24.
fjr = the cumulative probability of user j not retweeting when receiving r number of exposures.
fjr = (1− pj)r, where r takes the values of r = 0, 1, 2, . . . , rm.
E = Minimum number of Retweets in Time Period t.
M = Large Number.
Decision Variables:
xim = 1 if i ∈W is chosen in mode m; 0 otherwise.
Y lit = 1 if i ∈W in group l posts a message in time period t; 0 otherwise.
Kjt = number of posts or messages received by user j ∈ V in time period t.
λjt = 1 if Kjt > 0; 0 otherwise.
Ljt = number of posts or messages received by user j ∈ V until time period t.
θjt = number consecutive times user j ∈ V did not receive a message in time period t.
δjt = number days after which a user j ∈ V receives a message.
αnjt = 1 if a user gets a message after not receiving a message for n previous consecutive periods;
0 otherwise.
Urjt = dummy variable that denotes total number of received by user j ∈ V until time period t.
E.g., Urjt = 1 if user j receives a total of r exposures until time period t.
hjt = the cumulative probability of user j ∈ V not retweeting a message in time period t.
gjt = the cumulative probability of user j ∈ V retweeting a message in time period t.
Djt = Discount factor for cumulative probability of user j ∈ V retweeting a message in time period t.
γjt = marginal increase in cumulative probability (without discount factor) of user j ∈ V
retweeting a message in time period t.
ejt = marginal increase in cumulative probability (with discount factor) of user j ∈ V
retweeting a message in time period t.
The mathematical formulation is formally presented below.
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xim ≤ 1, ∀i ∈W (B.24)
T∑
t=1
Y 1it = Txi1, ∀i ∈W (B.25)










i11 = 6xi2, ∀i ∈W (B.26)










i12 = 6xi3, ∀i ∈W (B.27)






i10 = 4xi4, ∀i ∈W (B.28)






i11 = 4xi5, ∀i ∈W (B.29)






i12 = 4xi6, ∀i ∈W (B.30)
Y 4i1 + Y
4
i7 = 2xi7, i ∈W (B.31)
Y 4i2 + Y
4
i8 = 2xi8, i ∈W (B.32)
Y 4i3 + Y
4
i9 = 2xi9, i ∈W (B.33)
Y 4i4 + Y
4
i10 = 2xi10, i ∈W (B.34)
Y 4i5 + Y
4
i11 = 2xi11, i ∈W (B.35)
Y 4i6 + Y
4
i12 = 2xi12, i ∈W (B.36)
Y 5i1 = xi13, i ∈W (B.37)
Y 5i2 = xi14, i ∈W (B.38)
Y 5i3 = xi15, i ∈W (B.39)
Y 5i4 = xi16, i ∈W (B.40)
Y 5i5 = xi17, i ∈W (B.41)
Y 5i6 = xi18, i ∈W (B.42)
Y 5i7 = xi19, i ∈W (B.43)
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Y 5i8 = xi20, i ∈W (B.44)
Y 5i9 = xi21, i ∈W (B.45)
Y 5i10 = xi22, i ∈W (B.46)
Y 5i11 = xi23, i ∈W (B.47)








it, ∀j ∈ V, t = 1, 2, . . . , T (B.49)
λjt ≤MKjt, ∀j ∈ V, t = 1, 2, . . . , T (B.50)
Kjt ≤Mλjt, ∀j ∈ V, t = 1, 2, . . . , T (B.51)
θj0 = 0, ∀j ∈ V (B.52)
θjt = (θjt−1 + 1)(1− λjt), ∀j ∈ V, t = 1, 2, . . . , T (B.53)




nαnjt, ∀j ∈ V, t = 1, 2, . . . , T (B.55)
12∑
n=1










+ .25α5jt + .30α
6








rUrjt, ∀j ∈ V, t = 1, 2, . . . , T (B.59)
rm∑
k=0




fjrUrjt, ∀j ∈ V, t = 1, 2, . . . , T (B.61)
gjt = 1− hjt, ∀j ∈ V, t = 1, 2, . . . , T (B.62)
gj0 = 0, ∀j ∈ V (B.63)





















2γjt ≥ E4, (B.68)
ejt = γjt(1−Djt), ∀j ∈ V, t = 1, 2, . . . , T (B.69)
xim, Yit, Urjt ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈W, t = 1, 2, . . . , T. (B.70)
αjt, λjt ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ V, t = 1, 2, . . . , T. (B.71)
l = 1, 2, 3, 4; m = 1, 2, . . . , 12. (B.72)
In the above model, the objective function, Π (i.e., Equation B.23), maximizes the total
benefit to the firm minus the cost of hiring influencers. Constraint (B.24) ensures that an
influencer, if selected, is assigned to only one mode. Constraints (B.25)-(B.48) keep track
of the posts by influencers depending on which group (and mode) they are assigned to.
Constraint (B.49) represents the number of exposures received by user j ∈ V in time period
t. Constraints (B.50)-(B.54) checks whether user j receives an ad on consecutive days, if
not, these constraints keep track of number of days that the user did not receive a message
from the influencers. Constraints (B.55)-(B.57) generate the required discount factors for
not sending an ad to the users on consecutive days. Constraint (B.58) represents the total
number of exposures received by user j ∈ V till time period t. Constraints (B.59) and
(B.60) are utilized to generate dummy variables Ukjt. These constraints allow us to linear
the non-linear relationship between number of exposures and the probability of retweet.
Constraint (B.61) calculates the cumulative probability of user j not retweeting till time
period t. Constraint (B.62) tracks the cumulative probability that user j ∈ V retweets a
message till time period t and Constraint (B.64) tracks the marginal increase in cumulative
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probability in time period t. Constraints (B.65)-(B.68) ensure that the firm gets a minimum
of E number of retweets in the nth time period. Constraint (B.69) discounts the marginal
benefit, i.e., penalizes for not reaching the users on consecutive days.
Explanation of Constraints (B.59)-(B.61): We assume fjr = (1− pj)r and r takes the
values of r = 0, 1, 2, . . . , rm. Assume that values of fjr can be found a prior for all possible







k=0 Ukjt = 1
B.5.1 Alternative Formulations to Linearize Non-Linear Constraints
Non-linear Constraints: In the above formulation, there are three non-linear constraints
namely, Constraints (B.53), (B.54), and (B.69). We now provide discussion on how to
convert these non-linear equations into linear form, which will allows us to employ a linear
optimization solver (i.e., CPLEX ) rather than a non-linear solver.
Non-linear constraint (B.53):
θjt = (θjt−1 + 1)(1− λjt).
We can linearize this constraint using the below set of constraints.
θj1 = (1− λjt)
θjt ≤M(1− λjt), ∀j ∈ V, t = 2...T
θjt ≤ θjt−1 + 1, ∀j ∈ V, t = 2...T
θjt ≥ θjt−1 + 1−Mλjt, ∀j ∈ V, t = 2...T
θjt ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ V, t = 2...T
Non-linear constraint (B.54):
δjt = (θjt−1)(λjt).
We can linearize this constraint using the below set of constraints.
δj1 = 0
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δjt ≤M(λjt), ∀j ∈ V, t = 2...T
δjt ≤ θjt−1, ∀j ∈ V, t = 2...T
δjt ≥ θjt−1 −M(1− λjt), ∀j ∈ V, t = 2...T
δjt ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ V, t = 2...T.
Non-linear constraint (B.69):
ejt = γjt(1−Djt).
In this constraint, we first substitute Djt with the right hand side of constraint (eq6.6).
ejt = γjt(1− .05α1jt + .10α2jt + 0.15α3jt + .20α4jt + .25α5jt + .30α6jt).
In the above equation, we have six non-linear functions (i.e., γjt×α1jt, γjt×α2jt, . . . γjt×α6jt,).




We can linearize the six non-linear terms using the below set of constraints. For brevity, we
only present the linearization method only for one of the non-linear terms (i.e., e1jt).
e1jt ≤ α1jt, ∀j ∈ V, t = 2...T
e1jt ≤ γjt, ∀j ∈ V, t = 2...T
e1jt ≥ γjt + α1jt − 1, ∀j ∈ V, t = 2...T e1jt ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ V, t = 2...T.
B.5.2 Experiment Setting - Without Minimum Engagement Level Constraint:
We begin by specifying the default setting of the test bed. The number of influencers is
8 (i.e., |W | = 8). Size of set |V | is 200.1
• % First level followers, aij ∈ {Low, High}.
• Probability of retweet pj ∈ {Low, High}.
• Cost of hiring an influencer Ci ∈ {Low, High}.
• % Overlap of followers among influencers ∈ {Low, High}.
1This represents a relatively small problem size. This assumption is required to ensure that the solver is
able to provide us with an optimal solution for MIP. Furthermore, we assume only 4 groups (and 12 modes)
instead of 5 groups, i.e., we ignore modes 13-24).
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For each of the instances created using above criteria, we generate unique instances
by drawing the values of Pj, aij, and expected benefit Bj which is drawn from a continuous
uniform distribution (Uniform(100, 200)). To summarize, we simulated a set of 96 instances
to ensure that our test bed covers different scenarios. Table B.14 summarizes the scenario
where the overlap of followers is high among all the influencers (i.e., the influencers are likely
to have several similar followers) and all the influencers have either low or high levels of
followers. Table B.15 summarizes the scenario where there are two categories of influencers.
The influencers are categorized as Set 1 and Set 2. In the scenarios tested in Table B.15, the
overlap of followers is high among all the influencers (i.e., the influencers are likely to have
several similar followers) and all the influencers have either low or high levels of followers as
noted in the table. Finally, the scenarios considered in Table B.16, in addition to varying the
levels of followers and costs of hiring influencers among influencers in set 1 and set 2, we also
vary the %overlap of followers for influencers. Specifically, high overlap denotes the scenario
where influencers are likely to have the same set of followers. Specifically, in these scenarios,
influencers 1 to 4 have a high overlap of followers among themselves, while influencers 5 and
6 have a high overlap of followers among themselves, and influencers 7 and 8 have a high
overlap of followers among themselves. Furthermore, there is no overlap of followers between
the set 1 (i.e., influencers 1 to 4) and set 2 (i.e., influencers 5 to 8).
B.5.2.1 Computational Experiment - With Minimum Engagement Level Constraint
We now perform computational experiments by including the constraints pertaining to
the minimum engagement levels. The default setting of the test bed is as follows. The
number of influencers is 8 (i.e., |W | = 8). Size of set |V | is 200 and T = 6. We set the
number of first level followers high for all influencers and the probability of retweet pj is
also set to high values. Whereas the cost of hiring an influencer ci is Uniform (125,200).
To generate insights, we change the network type, value of E , i.e., minimum number of
retweets required by the firm, and the frequency, i.e., how often do we need to reach the
target engagement levels. With respect to network type, we assume three different networks
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(namely, Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3) and they are depicted in Figures B.6-B.6. We generate
unique instances by drawing the values of pj, aij, and expected benefit Bj is drawn from
continuous uniform distribution (Uniform(60, 80)).
Figure B.6: Computational Experiment - With Minimum Engagement Level Constraint:
Type 1
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Figure B.7: Computational Experiment - With Minimum Engagement Level Constraint:
Type 2
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Table B.8: Computational Evaluation of Upper Bound Model (M2LUB)




, where ΨUB2 the objective function value
of the upper bound problem and Ψ2 is the objective function value of the main model.
• Average optimality gap is the average over 30 instances and over t = 1..10, i.e., average over 300 random instances.
• Maximum optimality gap denotes the maximum gap over 30 instances and over t = 1..10, i.e., maximum gap over 300
randomly generated instances.
• % Same Solution represents the percentage of runs where the solution set (i.e., optimal influencer set) obtained from the
upper bound model is same as the solution set of the Model M2L.
Instances %Optimality Gap
% Same









High 3.47% 4.49% 94.33%
Medium 2.44% 3.16% 95.67%
Low 1.07% 1.39% 98.67%
Low
High 4.52% 5.07% 96.67%
Medium 2.95% 3.53% 97.67%
Low 1.29% 1.54% 96.00%
Low High
High
High 0.61% 0.78% 94.67%
Medium 0.24% 0.30% 99.33%
Low 0.08% 0.10% 100.00%
Low
High 0.72% 0.86% 99.00%
Medium 0.29% 0.34% 100.00%
Low 0.09% 0.11% 100.00%
High High | Low
High | Low
High 3.45% 4.42% 98.67%
Medium 2.57% 3.14% 99.33%
Low 1.28% 1.96% 98.67%
Low | High
High 2.73% 4.19% 97.33%
Medium 2.25% 3.19% 98.67%
Low 1.10% 1.53% 97.33%
Low High | Low
High | Low
High 0.61% 0.72% 99.67%
Medium 0.26% 0.34% 98.67%
Low 0.09% 0.52% 99.33%
Low | High
High 0.53% 0.69% 98.67%
Medium 0.24% 0.33% 96.67%
Low 0.07% 0.29% 97.67%
High High|Medium|Low
High|Medium|Low
High 2.03% 3.71% 98.00%
Medium 1.93% 3.90% 98.67%
Low 0.89% 1.30% 98.67%
Low|Medium|High
High 4.02% 4.84% 99.67%
Medium 2.95% 3.41% 99.67%
Low 1.29% 1.52% 99.33%
Low High|Medium |Low
High|Medium|Low
High 0.45% 0.65% 98.00%
Medium 0.21% 0.30% 99.33%
Low 0.07% 0.98% 99.33%
Low|Medium|High
High 0.68% 0.78% 100.00%
Medium 0.30% 0.35% 99.33%
Low 0.09% 0.14% 98.00%
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Table B.9: Computational Evaluation of Lower Bound Model (M1L)
• % Optimality gap is calculated using the following formula. %Gap = Ψ2−Ψ1
Ψ2
, where Ψ1 denotes the objective function
value of the lower bound problem and Ψ2 is the objective function value of the main model.
• Average optimality gap is the average over 30 instances and over t = 1..10, i.e., average over 300 instances.
• Maximum optimality gap denotes the maximum gap over 30 instances and over t = 1..10, i.e., maximum gap over 300
instances.
• % Same Solution represents the percentage of runs where the solution set (i.e., optimal influencer set) obtained from the


























High 79.28% 85.98% 13.67%
Medium 50.65% 56.73% 35.33%
Low 21.50% 27.00% 52.67%
Low
High 81.74% 86.39% 13.67%
Medium 52.58% 57.50% 37.67%
Low 22.53% 27.25% 52.67%
Low High
High
High 51.60% 60.94% 25.67%
Medium 20.76% 24.94% 65.67%
Low 6.41% 8.47% 84.33%
Low
High 53.42% 61.28% 26.33%
Medium 21.68% 25.35% 66.33%




High 79.82% 83.60% 37.00%
Medium 52.60% 58.62% 58.00%
Low 24.82% 29.92% 69.33%
Low | High
High 76.67% 84.59% 25.67%
Medium 49.92% 59.92% 39.00%




High 52.48% 56.63% 53.67%
Medium 22.11% 26.25% 79.33%
Low 7.62% 9.66% 90.00%
Low | High
High 49.70% 56.09% 40.33%
Medium 20.97% 24.54% 61.67%
Low 5.69% 6.99% 88.33%
High
High | Medium | Low
High | Medium | Low
High 72.51% 81.43% 66.67%
Medium 47.68% 55.71% 78.67%
Low 20.19% 24.94% 85.67%
Low | Medium | High
High 80.71% 83.56% 56.67%
Medium 53.36% 57.41% 67.33%
Low 22.97% 25.70% 76.00%
Low
High | Medium | Low
High | Medium | Low
High 47.53% 54.76% 77.00%
Medium 19.85% 24.39% 89.00%
Low 6.06% 8.70% 95.00%
Low | Medium | High
High 53.30% 56.51% 67.67%
Medium 22.58% 25.30% 83.67%
Low 6.96% 7.97% 91.33%
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Table B.10: Twitter Case Study Problem-I: Results
• Set t represents the number of influencers to be selected from set W .














1 552.34 552.34 -
2 1061.19 530.60 92.13%
3 1516.27 505.42 42.88%
4 1687.15 421.79 11.27%
5 1788.66 357.73 6.02%
6 1857.88 309.65 3.87%
7 1907.77 272.54 2.69%
8 1943.53 242.94 1.87%
9 1966.17 218.46 1.17%
10 1977.03 197.70 0.55%
11 1987.14 180.65 0.51%
12 1994.53 166.21 0.37%
13 1999.29 153.79 0.24%
14 2002.69 143.05 0.17%
15 2006.06 133.74 0.17%
16 2009.53 125.60 0.17%





















18 2013.56 111.86 0.04%
1 2775.67 2775.67 -
2 5088.96 2544.48 83.34%
3 7102.64 2367.55 39.57%
4 7900.62 1975.15 11.24%
5 8326.10 1665.22 5.39%
6 8653.87 1442.31 3.94%
7 8843.61 1263.37 2.19%
8 9000.86 1125.11 1.78%
9 9103.25 1011.47 1.14%
10 9148.97 914.90 0.50%
11 9192.51 835.68 0.48%
12 9226.23 768.85 0.37%
13 9246.68 711.28 0.22%
14 9261.37 661.53 0.16%
15 9275.14 618.34 0.15%
16 9288.65 580.54 0.15%





















18 9305.90 516.99 0.05%
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Table B.11: Twitter Case Study Problem-II: Results
• Set t represents the number of influencers to be selected from set W .
• The objective value for the main model (Ψ2) is calculated by using the solution set obtained from the upper bound model.



























1 1342.02 1342.02 - 4056.99 4056.99 -
2 2246.86 1123.43 67.42% 6620.5 3310.25 63.19%
3 2584 861.33 15.00% 7507.01 2502.34 13.39%
4 2898.61 724.65 12.18% 8292.52 2073.13 10.46%
5 3167.47 633.49 9.28% 8939.36 1787.87 7.80%
6 3368.06 561.34 6.33% 9371.1 1561.85 4.83%
7 3536.6 505.23 5.00% 9753.66 1393.38 4.08%
8 3647.82 455.98 3.14% 10116.94 1264.62 3.72%
9 3755.49 417.28 2.95% 10424.7 1158.30 3.04%
10 3860.21 386.02 2.79% 10709.1 1070.91 2.73%
11 3955.64 359.60 2.47% 10903.21 991.20 1.81%
12 4046.89 337.24 2.31% 11095.84 924.65 1.77%
13 4136.17 318.17 2.21% 11273.89 867.22 1.60%
14 4206.15 300.44 1.69% 11441.01 817.22 1.48%
15 4275.46 285.03 1.65% 11576.54 771.77 1.18%
16 4341.91 271.37 1.55% 11708.01 731.75 1.14%
17 4399.27 258.78 1.32% 11831.52 695.97 1.05%
18 4451.4 247.30 1.18% 11938.03 663.22 0.90%
19 4497.23 236.70 1.03% 12034.31 633.38 0.81%
20 4541.36 227.07 0.98% 12113.22 605.66 0.66%
21 4582.03 218.19 0.90% 12190.49 580.50 0.64%
22 4615.15 209.78 0.72% 12265.75 557.53 0.62%
23 4645.64 201.98 0.66% 12336.71 536.38 0.58%
24 4675.89 194.83 0.65% 12389.34 516.22 0.43%
25 4694.44 187.78 0.40% 12426.76 497.07 0.30%
26 4708.59 181.10 0.30% 12459.57 479.21 0.26%
27 4722.42 174.90 0.29% 12488.8 462.55 0.23%
28 4735.56 169.13 0.28% 12514.1 446.93 0.20%
29 4747.49 163.71 0.25% 12538.72 432.37 0.20%
30 4758.59 158.62 0.23% 12562.79 418.76 0.19%
31 4766.06 153.74 0.16% 12579.02 405.77 0.13%
32 4770.65 149.08 0.10% 12589.97 393.44 0.09%
33 4773.8 144.66 0.07% 12596.77 381.72 0.05%
34 4774.33 140.42 0.01% 12598.17 370.53 0.01%
35 4774.73 136.42 0.01% 12599.25 359.98 0.01%
36 4775.12 132.64 0.01% 12600.2 350.01 0.01%
37 4775.12 129.06 0.00% 12600.2 340.55 0.00%
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Table B.12: Case Study Problem-I: Performance of our Model-based Solution vs Current
Industry Practices
• For Benchmark 1, influencers were selected based on number of followers of each influencer. The data on number of
followers of each influencer is presented in Table3.4. For example, in problem instance where t = 2, influencer E and L had
the largest number of followers.
• In case of Benchmark 2, influencers were selected based on number of active followers (i.e., number of followers who
retweeted at least once) of each influencer. The data on % number of active followers of each influencer is presented in
Table3.4, see column - % of followers who retweeted. For example, in problem instance where t = 2, influencer K and R had
the largest number of active followers.
• For Benchmark 3, influencers were selected based on number of active followers (i.e., number of followers who retweeted at
least once) of each influencer. The data on number of active followers of each influencer is presented in Table3.4, see column -
Number of retweeters. For example, in problem instance where t = 2, influencer E and L had the largest number of active
followers.
• Gap represents the % difference in objective value obtained from the model based solution and the solution obtained for























1 552.34 482.31 12.68% 0.90 99.84% 482.31 12.68%
2 1061.19 996.57 6.09% 553.24 47.87% 996.57 6.09%
3 1516.27 999.79 34.06% 1021.49 32.63% 1516.27 0.00%
4 1687.15 1519.48 9.94% 1517.16 10.08% 1618.10 4.09%
5 1788.66 1596.14 10.76% 1618.99 9.49% 1654.07 7.52%
6 1857.88 1606.27 13.54% 1654.95 10.92% 1661.55 10.57%
7 1907.77 1656.44 13.17% 1662.44 12.86% 1738.04 8.90%
8 1943.53 1667.31 14.21% 1665.80 14.29% 1748.17 10.05%
9 1966.17 1768.80 10.04% 1742.29 11.39% 1752.97 10.84%
10 1977.03 1773.61 10.29% 1905.31 3.63% 1802.90 8.81%
11 1987.14 1809.49 8.94% 1910.08 3.88% 1965.79 1.07%
12 1994.53 1972.41 1.11% 1920.19 3.73% 1976.65 0.90%
13 1999.29 1979.80 0.98% 1942.84 2.82% 1979.80 0.97%
14 2002.69 2002.44 0.01% 1992.68 0.50% 2002.44 0.01%
15 2006.06 2005.91 0.01% 1996.09 0.50% 2003.32 0.14%
16 2009.53 2009.32 0.01% 2006.94 0.13% 2006.80 0.14%





















18 2013.56 2013.56 0.00% 2013.56 0.00% 2013.56 0.00%
1 2775.67 2403.35 13.41% 6.31 99.77% 2403.35 13.41%
2 5088.96 4760.99 6.44% 2781.54 45.34% 4760.99 6.44%
3 7102.64 4777.99 32.73% 4970.98 30.01% 7102.64 0.00%
4 7900.62 7118.52 9.90% 7107.84 10.03% 7539.32 4.57%
5 8326.10 7494.00 9.99% 7544.46 9.39% 7703.52 7.48%
6 8653.87 7541.95 12.85% 7708.63 10.92% 7739.20 10.57%
7 8843.61 7738.56 12.50% 7744.31 12.43% 8107.33 8.33%
8 9000.86 7783.96 13.52% 7758.47 13.80% 8154.42 9.40%
9 9103.25 8211.09 9.80% 8126.40 10.73% 8175.65 10.19%
10 9148.97 8232.30 10.02% 8864.79 3.11% 8368.04 8.54%
11 9192.51 8392.96 8.70% 8885.46 3.34% 9101.13 0.99%
12 9226.23 9125.68 1.09% 8931.49 3.19% 9144.72 0.88%
13 9246.68 9159.46 0.94% 9034.10 2.30% 9159.46 0.94%
14 9261.37 9261.37 0.00% 9221.61 0.43% 9261.37 0.00%
15 9275.14 9273.79 0.01% 9235.39 0.43% 9266.23 0.10%
16 9288.65 9287.55 0.01% 9278.82 0.11% 9278.64 0.11%





















18 9305.90 9305.90 0.00% 9305.90 0.00% 9305.90 0.00%
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1 1342.02 364.78 72.82% 402.72 69.99% 1039.72 22.53%
2 2246.86 1363.8 39.30% 517.16 76.98% 1404.29 37.50%
3 2584.00 1477.34 42.83% 1517.65 41.27% 1483.31 42.60%
4 2898.61 1477.34 49.03% 1739.11 40.00% 1682.39 41.96%
5 3167.47 1509.24 52.35% 1755.43 44.58% 1719.44 45.72%
6 3368.06 1524.19 54.75% 1831.21 45.63% 1734.21 48.51%
7 3536.60 1597.81 54.82% 1908.3 46.04% 1847.26 47.77%
8 3647.82 1704.63 53.27% 1978.66 45.76% 1899.79 47.92%
9 3755.49 1709.41 54.48% 2031.4 45.91% 3021.84 19.54%
10 3860.21 1756.5 54.50% 2223.44 42.40% 3226.3 16.42%
11 3955.64 1948.57 50.74% 2259.94 42.87% 3325.01 15.94%
12 4046.89 1962.05 51.52% 2615.8 35.36% 3396.71 16.07%
13 4136.17 1962.45 52.55% 3674.17 11.17% 3457.6 16.41%
14 4206.15 1999.29 52.47% 3688.26 12.31% 3561.28 15.33%
15 4275.46 2087.24 51.18% 3779.01 11.61% 3873.17 9.41%
16 4341.91 3199.58 26.31% 3882.42 10.58% 3963.54 8.71%
17 4399.27 3211.19 27.01% 3977.84 9.58% 3977.84 9.58%
18 4451.40 3285.01 26.20% 4008.42 9.95% 4229.27 4.99%
19 4497.23 3327.26 26.02% 4095.1 8.94% 4259.84 5.28%
20 4541.36 3434.02 24.38% 4169.12 8.20% 4346.18 4.30%
21 4582.03 3480.92 24.03% 4190.63 8.54% 4417.05 3.60%
22 4615.15 3493.97 24.29% 4198.14 9.04% 4457.78 3.41%
23 4645.64 3587.62 22.77% 4225.76 9.04% 4457.78 4.04%
24 4675.89 3606.45 22.87% 4473.66 4.32% 4476.4 4.27%
25 4694.44 3904.6 16.83% 4514.39 3.84% 4487.52 4.41%
26 4708.59 3905.02 17.07% 4514.91 4.11% 4518.03 4.05%
27 4722.42 3975.8 15.81% 4599.04 2.61% 4522.64 4.23%
28 4735.56 4032.76 14.84% 4610.16 2.65% 4608.27 2.69%
29 4747.49 4332.13 8.75% 4622.15 2.64% 4654.08 1.97%
30 4758.59 4335.31 8.90% 4622.15 2.87% 4666.01 1.95%
31 4766.06 4419.57 7.27% 4626.76 2.92% 4673.48 1.94%
32 4770.65 4420.1 7.35% 4672.6 2.06% 4674.01 2.03%
33 4773.80 4427.61 7.25% 4758.05 0.33% 4758.05 0.33%
34 4774.33 4458.13 6.62% 4758.46 0.33% 4758.44 0.33%
35 4774.73 4650.6 2.60% 4758.85 0.33% 4758.85 0.33%
























37 4775.12 4775.12 0.00% 4775.12 0.00% 4775.12 0.00%
1 4056.99 1227.89 69.73% 1335.1 67.09% 3382.85 16.62%
2 6620.50 4348.14 34.32% 1877.63 71.64% 4456.09 32.69%
3 7507.01 4648.58 38.08% 4929.92 34.33% 4694.23 37.47%
4 8292.52 4648.58 43.94% 5495.85 33.73% 5247.82 36.72%
5 8939.36 4726.79 47.12% 5556.27 37.84% 5365.16 39.98%
6 9371.10 4773.98 49.06% 5752.32 38.62% 5410.24 42.27%
7 9753.66 4989.96 48.84% 5993.01 38.56% 5863.75 39.88%
8 10116.94 5276.32 47.85% 6187.66 38.84% 6019.2 40.50%
9 10424.70 5292.74 49.23% 6341.29 39.17% 8719.68 16.36%
10 10709.10 5406.52 49.51% 6836.58 36.16% 9161.32 14.45%
11 10903.21 5923.47 45.67% 6944.25 36.31% 9379.06 13.98%
12 11095.84 5959.28 46.29% 7860.78 29.16% 9532.3 14.09%
13 11273.89 5960.83 47.13% 10212.75 9.41% 9690.33 14.05%
14 11441.01 6074.18 46.91% 10246.56 10.44% 9978.16 12.79%
15 11576.54 6404.87 44.67% 10435.84 9.85% 10679.67 7.75%
16 11708.01 9036.32 22.82% 10711.34 8.51% 10863.7 7.21%
17 11831.52 9067.36 23.36% 10904.96 7.83% 10904.96 7.83%
18 11938.03 9220.26 22.77% 10987.82 7.96% 11436.78 4.20%
19 12034.31 9308.28 22.65% 11241.89 6.58% 11492.04 4.51%
20 12113.22 9607.13 20.69% 11377.72 6.07% 11738.18 3.10%
21 12190.49 9722.89 20.24% 11417.49 6.34% 11864.08 2.68%
22 12265.75 9753.17 20.48% 11434.88 6.77% 11937.2 2.68%
23 12336.71 9951.44 19.33% 11485.73 6.90% 11937.2 3.24%
24 12389.34 9989.4 19.37% 11992.99 3.20% 11970.88 3.38%
25 12426.76 10646.95 14.32% 12065.52 2.91% 11996.33 3.46%
26 12459.57 10648.02 14.54% 12066.97 3.15% 12074.11 3.09%
27 12488.80 10788.26 13.62% 12282.71 1.65% 12085.43 3.23%
28 12514.10 10926.85 12.68% 12307.67 1.65% 12233.93 2.24%
29 12538.72 11567.62 7.74% 12332.2 1.65% 12311.96 1.81%
30 12562.79 11574.83 7.86% 12332.2 1.84% 12336.41 1.80%
31 12579.02 11796.4 6.22% 12343.33 1.87% 12352.88 1.80%
32 12589.97 11797.88 6.29% 12420.76 1.34% 12354.3 1.87%
33 12596.77 11814.87 6.21% 12566.18 0.24% 12566.18 0.24%
34 12598.17 11893.48 5.59% 12567.13 0.25% 12567.26 0.25%
35 12599.25 12249.77 2.77% 12568.22 0.25% 12568.22 0.25%
























37 12600.20 12600.2 0.00% 12600.2 0.00% 12600.2 0.00%
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Table B.14: Computational Evaluation-I of Scheduling Model
Number of 
followers
Cost of hiring an 
influencer
x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8 x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8 x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8
High High | Low 5 2 0 0 1 1 3 1 2 10 0 0 1 1 1 1 3 2 7 0 1 1 1 1
High Low | High 1 1 1 1 0 8 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 8 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 8 0 0
Low High | Low 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Low Low |High 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 0
High High | Low 4 6 7 4 3 2 2 3 4 8 5 4 3 2 2 4 5 7 7 4 2 1 2 3
High Low | High 1 1 2 1 0 7 7 7 1 1 2 1 0 7 7 7 1 1 2 1 0 4 4 0
Low High | Low 4 7 0 7 4 2 7 2 4 7 0 8 4 2 8 2 4 7 0 8 4 2 4 4
Low Low | High 2 2 4 2 7 7 0 7 2 2 5 2 7 4 0 7 2 2 4 4 7 4 0 7
Notes: In the above table, x 1 =5 implies x 15 =1, that is influencer 1 was selected and assigned to mode 5. Mode 5 implies that this influencer was 
assigned to tweet the ad once every three days.
Mode 1 := Influencer is assigned to tweet everyday for two weeks.
Modes 2 and 3 := Influencer is assigned to tweet every two days for two weeks.
Modes 4, 5, and 6 := Influencer is assigned to tweet once every three days for two weeks.











EXPERIMENT 1 EXPERIMENT 2 EXPERIMENT 3
Table B.15: Computational Evaluation-II of Scheduling Model
Set 1 Set 2 Set 1 Set 2 x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8 x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8 x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8
High High Low High 1 1 2 1 0 8 7 10 1 1 1 2 7 2 0 0 2 1 1 2 4 7 0 7
High High High Low 0 7 0 9 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 2
Low High High Low 0 7 0 9 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 2
Low High Low High 4 4 7 5 4 2 4 5 6 0 4 5 2 2 4 4 4 7 7 7 4 2 2 4
High Low Low High 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 2 0 0 0 0
High Low High Low 2 2 4 2 0 7 7 0 3 2 7 4 4 4 2 4 3 2 4 4 0 7 11 7
Low Low High Low 4 7 0 7 4 2 7 2 7 4 4 0 2 2 2 7 7 4 4 0 2 6 4 2
Low Low Low High 2 2 4 2 7 7 0 7 2 2 2 4 7 7 7 0 2 2 2 8 7 0 0 4
High High Low High 1 1 1 1 0 8 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Low Low Low High 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0
High Low Low High 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Low High Low High 3 0 0 4 0 1 2 4 0 0 0 0 2 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 3
Low High High Low 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
High Low High Low 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 7 0 3 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 7
High High High Low 5 2 0 0 1 1 3 1 6 5 7 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 3 1
Low Low High Low 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Notes: In the above table, x 1 =1 implies x 11 =1, that is influencer 1 was selected and assigned to mode 1. Mode 1 implies that this influencer was assigned to tweet the 
ad everyday.
Mode 1 := Influencer is assigned to tweet everyday for two weeks.
Modes 2 and 3 := Influencer is assigned to tweet every two days for two weeks.
Modes 4, 5, and 6 := Influencer is assigned to tweet once every three days for two weeks.
Modes 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 := Influencer is assigned to tweet once every six days for two weeks.
EXPERIMENT 1 EXPERIMENT 2 EXPERIMENT 3















































Number of followers Cost of hiring an 
influencer
Table B.16: Computational Evaluation-III of Scheduling Model
Set 1 Set 2 Set 1 Set 2 Set 1 Set 2 x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8 x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8 x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8
High Low Low High High Low 7 7 0 0 4 1 2 7 0 7 7 0 2 1 2 4 7 7 7 0 2 2 2 1
High Low Low High Low High 2 2 7 4 8 4 7 8 7 1 3 4 4 2 7 7 2 4 4 4 7 5 4 0
High Low High High Low High 1 2 1 2 7 4 8 4 1 2 2 2 10 8 8 4 1 1 1 3 7 2 4 5
High Low High High High Low 4 4 2 4 2 2 2 1 2 4 5 4 2 3 3 1 2 4 2 4 4 2 2 1
High Low High Low High Low 2 7 3 4 4 0 7 0 4 2 4 8 7 4 7 0 2 4 2 4 0 7 7 0
High Low High Low Low High 1 3 1 2 7 0 0 0 2 1 3 2 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 2 0 0 0 0
High Low Low Low Low High 2 2 4 0 7 0 0 0 5 2 4 4 0 0 0 0 2 2 7 4 0 0 0 0
High Low Low Low High Low 7 7 7 0 4 0 7 0 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 4 0 7 7 7 7 0
High Low Low High High Low 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 1 0
High Low Low High Low High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
High Low High High Low High 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
High Low High High High Low 2 0 2 0 4 2 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 8 0 2 4 0 1 3 2
High Low High Low High Low 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 2 7 0 0 0 0
High Low High Low Low High 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
High Low Low Low Low High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0























Notes: In the above table, x 1 =7 implies x 17 =1, that is influencer 1 was selected and assigned to mode 7. Mode 7 implies that this influencer was assigned 
to tweet the ad once a week.
Mode 1 denotest that an influencer is assigned to tweet everyday for two weeks.
Modes 2 and 3 denotest that an influencer is assigned to tweet every two days for two weeks.
Modes 4, 5, and 6 denotest that an influencer  is assigned to tweet once every three days for two weeks.
Modes 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 denotest that an influencer is assigned to tweet once every six days for two weeks.
Number of 
followers
Cost of hiring 
an influencer
EXPERIMENT 1 EXPERIMENT 2 EXPERIMENT 3



















Table B.17: Computational Evaluation-IV of Scheduling Model
Network 
Type Frequency of E E
x A x B x C x D x E x F x G x H
Weekly Low 4 2 2 7 4 2 2 7
Weekly Medium 2 4 2 4 4 2 4 4
Weekly High 2 4 2 4 4 1 7 5
Weekly Very High 2 4 2 4 4 1 5 2
Semi-weekly Low 2 4 2 7 4 2 7 4
Semi-weekly Medium 2 4 3 7 4 2 7 5
Semi-weekly High 2 4 3 7 4 3 7 5
Semi-weekly Very High 3 4 3 7 4 3 10 4
Weekly Low 2 3 3 4 7 2 5 2
Weekly Medium 2 3 1 4 5 2 4 2
Weekly High 2 3 1 2 3 2 2 2
Weekly Very High 2 1 1 2 3 1 2 3
Semi-weekly Low 3 2 2 5 7 2 4 4
Semi-weekly Medium 2 2 2 4 7 3 4 5
Semi-weekly High 3 2 3 5 7 2 4 4
Semi-weekly Very High 3 3 3 10 7 2 4 2
Weekly Low 7 7 4 7 0 7 0 0
Weekly Medium 4 7 4 7 0 7 0 0
Weekly High 4 7 4 7 0 7 0 7
Weekly Very High 4 7 4 4 7 7 0 7
Semi-weekly Low 10 7 4 10 0 0 0 7
Semi-weekly Medium 4 10 4 7 0 10 0 0
Semi-weekly High 4 10 4 10 0 7 0 7
Semi-weekly Very High 3 4 3 10 0 7 0 7
Notes: In the above table, x 1 =7 implies x 17 =1, that is influencer 1 was selected and 
assigned to mode 7. Mode 7 implies that this influencer was assigned to tweet the ad once a 
week.
The first column denotes "Network Type." Type 1 network is presented in Figure 26, Type 
2 network is illustrated in Figure 27, and Type 3 network is depicted in Figure 28.
The second column, Frequency of E, denotes how often a firm has a minimum number of 
retweets requirement. Weekly denotes, that the firm needs E number of retweets every 
week. Semi-week denotes that the firms needs atleast E number of retweets every 3 days. 
The third column, E, denotes what is minimum number of retweets that are required by the 
firm. Low indicates, the number of retweets required during the time period is low, 
whereas, Very High denotes that the number of retweets required during the time periof is 
very high. 
For this experiment, T= 6 days.
Mode 1 denotes that an influencer is assigned to tweet everyday.
Modes 2 and 3 denotest that an influencer is assigned to tweet every two days.
Modes 4, 5, and 6 denotest that an influencer  is assigned to tweet once every three days.







B.7.1 Model with Budget Constraint
We now present the our main model, i.e., the multiplicative two-level influence problem
(Model M2L). In particular, in this section we focus on multiplicative framework for cal-
culating the cumulative probability of retweet. Furthermore, as suggested by our data, we
assume that the users in set V may be influenced by users in set W and V . Before presenting








1, if user j ∈ V is a direct follower of k ∈ V ,
0, otherwise.
bj = total benefit to the firm when the tweet reaches user j ∈ V through all i ∈W .
ci = cost to the firm for hiring influencer i ∈W .
dj = benefit to the firm when the tweet reaches one follower of user j ∈ V .
Fj = number of followers of user j ∈ V .
pij = probability of user j ∈ V retweeting the message of influencer i ∈W ; pij = 0 if aij = 0.
pkj = probability of user j ∈ V retweeting the message of user k ∈ V ; pij = 0 if ajk = 0.
Decision Variables:
αj = the cumulative probability of user j ∈ V not retweeting a message from users in V .
δj = the cumulative probability of user j ∈ V not retweeting a message from users in W .
gj = the cumulative probability of user j ∈ V retweeting a message.
xi =

1, if i ∈W is chosen as a seeder,
0, otherwise.
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(1− pkj(1− δk)),∀j ∈ V (B.76)
gj = 1− αjδj , ∀j ∈ V (B.77)
xi ∈ {0, 1} . (B.78)
In the above model, the objective function, Ψ2 (i.e., Equation B.73), maximizes the total
benefit to the firm when tweets reach the users on Twitter. Constraint (B.74) ensures that
the cost of hiring the influencers is below the firm’s budget level. Constraint (B.75) denotes
the expected probability of user j ∈ V not retweeting message from user k ∈ V. Constraint
(B.76) represents the expected probability that follower j ∈ V does not retweets the message
from influencers i ∈ W and j ∈ V . Constraint (B.77) is the expected probability of user
j ∈ V retweeting a message.
B.7.2 Model with Coverage Constraints
We now present the our main model, i.e., the multiplicative two level influence prob-
lem (Model M2L). In particular, in this section we focus on multiplicative framework for
calculating the cumulative probability of retweet. Furthermore, as suggested by our data,
we assume that the users in set V may be influenced by users in set W and V . Before
presenting Model M2L, we first define our parameters and decision variables. There are R
set of regions. We need to cover certain number of users in region r ∈ R (N1r ) in set V and









1, if user j ∈ V is a direct follower of k ∈ V ,
0, otherwise.
pij = probability of user j ∈ V retweeting the message of influencer i ∈W ; pij = 0 if aij = 0.
pkj = probability of user j ∈ V retweeting the message of user k ∈ V ; pij = 0 if ajk = 0.
bj = benefit to the firm when the tweet reaches user j ∈ V through all i ∈W .
dj = benefit to the firm when the tweet reaches one follower of user j ∈ V .
Fj = number of followers of user j ∈ V .
ejr =

1, if user j ∈ V belongs to region r ∈ R,
0, otherwise.
fjr = number of followers of user j ∈ V belonging to region r ∈ R. Note that Fj =
∑
r∈R fjr.
N1r = minimum number of users in V belonging to region r ∈ R required to be covered.
N2r = minimum number of followers of V belonging to region r ∈ R required to be covered.




1, if i ∈W is chosen as a seeder,
0, otherwise.
gj = the cumulative probability of user j ∈ V retweeting a message.
δj = the cumulative probability of user j ∈ V not retweeting a message from users in W .
αj = the cumulative probability of user j ∈ V not retweeting a message from users in V .
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(1− pkj(1− δk)),∀j ∈ V (B.82)
gj = 1− αjδj , ∀j ∈ V (B.83)
yj ≥ 1− δj , ∀j ∈ V (B.84)
yj ≤M(1− δj), ∀j ∈ V (B.85)∑
j∈V
ejryj ≥ N1r , ∀r ∈ R (B.86)
∑
j∈V
fjryj ≥ N2r , ∀r ∈ R (B.87)
yj , xi ∈ {0, 1} (B.88)
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4: THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL MEDIA CONTENT ON
ENGAGEMENT
C.1 Additional Tables
Table C.1: Conditional Marginal Effects of PosT
  
fol Marginal 





1 0.0419 0.0501 0.4020 
2 0.0428 0.0465 0.3570 
3 0.0437 0.0431 0.3100 
4 0.0446 0.0396 0.2600 
5 0.0455 0.0363 0.2100 
6 0.0464 0.0330 0.1600 
7 0.0473 0.0299 0.1130 
8 0.0482 0.0270* 0.0740 
9 0.0491 0.0242** 0.0430 
10 0.0500 0.0219** 0.0220 
11 0.0509 0.0199** 0.0110 
12 0.0518 0.0186** 0.0050 
13 0.0527 0.0179** 0.0030 
14 0.0536 0.0181** 0.0030 
15 0.0545 0.0190** 0.0040 
16 0.0554 0.0206** 0.0070 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01 
The marginal values of PosT were estimated at different levels of 
popularity while keeping all other variables at their means. The 
marginal values of PosT were estimated at different levels of 
popularity while keeping all other variables at their means. The 
marginal effect of PosT at mean of  other variables (mean of fol 
= 9.29) = 0.0491 (p-value=0.0430) 
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Table C.2: Robustness Check: Alternative Models
 
   Model R1 Model R2 Model R3 
 DV  RT log(RT) log(RT) 









PosT -0.00563 0.0107 0.0170 
 (0.0355) (0.0419) (0.0374) 
NegT 0.334*** 0.407*** 0.407** 
 (0.0490) (0.152) (0.141) 
MixT 0.0930*** 0.140*** 0.145** 
 (0.0106) (0.0456) (0.0461) 
fol 0.148*** 0.302*** 0.111* 
 (0.0188) (0.0230) (0.0517) 
PartyPosT 0.000705** 0.00142** 0.00130* 






 (0.000706) (0.000483) (0.000537) 
PartyMixT 0.0000137 -0.0000231 -0.0000216 












fol x PosT 0.00145 0.00570** 0.00637* 
 (0.00238) (0.00281) (0.00266) 
fol x NegT -0.0226*** -0.0310*** -0.0311** 
 (0.00341) (0.0104) (0.00905) 
fol x MixT -0.00558*** -0.00805** -0.00837* 
 (0.000712) (0.00346) (0.00353) 
PosT x PartyPosT 0.0000550 0.0000195 0.0000317 
 (0.0000372) (0.0000652) (0.0000780) 
PosT x PartyNegT 0.0000214 -0.0000595 -0.000106 
 (0.0000791) (0.000163) (0.000193) 
NegT x PartyPosT -0.000197*** -0.000339*** -0.000373** 
 (0.0000602) (0.000116) (0.000113) 
NegT x PartyNegT 0.000251* 0.000638*** 0.000691** 








partyMentions(lag) -0.318*** -0.506*** -0.531*** 
 (0.105) (0.148) (0.115) 
partyRetweets(lag) 0.221** 0.260*** 0.305*** 
 (0.104) (0.0330) (0.0222) 
mentions(lag)  0.0000210*** 0.272*** 0.219*** 
 (0.00000548) (0.0581) (0.0500) 
Intercept -1.428*** -8.520 2.881** 
 (0.430) (6.470) (0.738) 
Region Controls [No] [Yes] [No] 
Education Controls [No] [Yes] [No] 
Time Controls [Yes] [Yes] [Yes] 
 Time invariant Controls [No] [Yes] [No] 
 Opp HGC Tone(lag) [Yes] [Yes] [Yes] 
 N 1313 1313 1313 
 Log-likelihood/R-sq -5420.01 0.671 0.494 
Robust standard errors clustered at party level are in parentheses. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01, + p<0.13.  
Model R1 is FE-NB; Model R2 is random effects; Model R3 is fixed effects. Time invariant controls are Age, 
assets, and Male. 
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Table C.3: Robustness Check: Alternate Sample
  
   Model R4A Model R4B Model R4C Model R4D 














PosT 0.0137 -0.0155 0.0117 0.027 
 (0.0475) (0.0356) (0.0354) (0.0344) 
NegT 0.489*** 0.355*** 0.404*** 0.377** 
 (0.128) (0.0488) (0.134) (0.134) 
MixT 0.135*** 0.0957*** 0.149*** 0.150*** 
 (0.0415) (0.0105) (0.0395) (0.0412) 
Fol 0.181*** 0.141*** 0.271*** 0.164** 
 (0.0295) (0.0176) (0.0221) (0.0698) 
PartyPosT 0.00149*** 0.000648* 0.00105*** 0.000962** 
 (0.000274) (0.000333) (0.000365) (0.000355) 
PartyNegT -0.00106* -0.00135** -0.000763** -0.000442 
 (0.000637) (0.000667) (0.000379) (0.000442) 
PartyMixT -0.0000841 0.00000823 -0.0000175 -0.00000483 












fol x PosT 0.00407 0.00215 0.00667** 0.00626* 
 (0.00267) (0.00238) (0.00270) (0.00324) 
fol x NegT -0.0365*** -0.0242*** -0.0321*** -0.0305*** 
 (0.00908) (0.00342) (0.00919) (0.00897) 
fol x MixT -0.00763** -0.00571*** -0.00857*** -0.00872** 
 (0.00316) (0.000710) (0.00309) (0.00323) 
PosT x PartyPosT 0.0000468 0.0000638* 0.0000383 0.0000422 
 (0.0000287) (0.0000375) (0.0000529) (0.0000611) 
PosT x PartyNegT -0.0000442 0.0000239 -0.000143 -0.000185 
 (0.0000930) (0.0000797) (0.000146) (0.000166) 
NegT x PartyPosT -0.000359** -0.000216*** -0.000361*** -0.000364** 
 (0.000148) (0.0000613) (0.000120) (0.000119) 
NegT x PartyNegT 0.000678** 0.000280** 0.000753*** 0.000777*** 








mentions(lag) 0.432*** 0.0000224*** 0.279*** 0.200*** 
 (0.0649) (0.00000537) (0.0553) (0.0494) 
partyMentions(lag) -0.045 -0.300*** -0.415*** -0.451*** 
 (0.0450) (0.103) (0.0873) (0.0745) 
partyRetweets(lag) 0.0734 0.222** 0.236*** 0.295*** 
 (0.0526) (0.104) (0.0410) (0.0735) 
partyExpenditure(lag) -0.135**  0.585*  
 (0.0577)  (0.299)  
 
Region/Education Controls [Yes] [NO] [Yes] [NO] 
 Time Controls [Yes] [Yes] [Yes] [Yes] 
 Opp HGC Tone [Yes] [Yes] [Yes] [Yes] 
 Intercept 1.834 -1.640*** -10.73* 1.303 
  (1.943) (0.357) (6.016) (0.846) 
 Observations 1841 1799 1841 1841 
 Log Likelihood/R-sq -3156.019 -5997.38 0.699 0.589 
 Robust standard errors clustered at party level are in parentheses. The coefficients of Model R4A were 
estimated using linear mixed effects model. The coefficients of Model R4B were estimated using 
negative binomial fixed effects model. The coefficients of Model R4C were estimated using random 
effects model (Party dummy variables are included). The coefficients of Model R4D were estimated 
using fixed effects model. Time invariant variable (Age, assets, and Male) were included for mixed and 
random effects model (i.e., Models R4A and R4C).  
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01 
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Table C.4: Robustness Check: Accounting for Selection Bias
   Model R5 
 DV  log(RT) 



































fol x PosT 0.00198 
 (0.00253) 
fol x NegT -0.0328*** 
 (0.00754) 
fol x MixT -0.00728** 
 (0.00316) 
PosT x PartyPosT 0.0000615** 
 (0.0000302) 
PosT x PartyNegT -0.000108 
 (0.0000982) 
NegT x PartyPosT -0.000348** 
 (0.000136) 
NegT x PartyNegT 0.000741** 














Inverse Mills -0.146*** 
  (0.0282) 
 Intercept 0.682 
 Region / Education Controls [Yes] 
 Opp HGC Tone Controls [Yes] 
 Time invariant controls [Yes] 
 Time Controls [Yes] 
 N 2310 
 Log-likelihood -3805.206 
 Robust standard errors clustered at party level are in parentheses. The coefficients are 
estimated as mixed effects model using full maximum likelihood model. Time invariant 
controls are Age, assets, and Male. 
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01 
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Table C.5: Alternate Measure for Engagement
 
  Model R6 
DV  log(Mentionsipt+RTipt) 















fol x PosT 0.00220 
 (0.00466) 
fol x NegT -0.0605*** 
 (0.0147) 
fol x MixT -0.0145** 
 (0.00681) 
PosT x PartyPosT 0.0000447 
 (0.0000580) 
PosT x PartyNegT -0.000130 
 (0.000199) 
NegT x PartyPosT -0.000538* 
 (0.000289) 
















Region & Education Controls [Yes] 
Opp HGC Tone [Yes] 
Time Controls [Yes] 
N 1313 
Log-likelihood -3029.382 
Robust standard errors clustered at party level are in parentheses. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01 
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